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2Over the last half century, millions of people have used the international refugee 
protection system to seek refuge from persecution and conflict, making it one of 
international law’s most recognizable features.  Despite the value of that system as an 
expressive achievement, its underlying reality can be a brutal one.  The system routinely 
places massive numbers of refugees in camps in the developing world, where they face 
chronic threats to their physical security from crime and disorder, coercion, and military 
attacks.1  Yet key actors responsible for refugee protection, including host states, 
advanced industrialized countries, and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), generally have failed to prioritize refugee security.2  This article 
asks: (1) Why?  (2) What have been the consequences?  (3) And what do these answers 
reveal about how organizations carry out legal mandates in complicated political 
environments?  
Conventional wisdom holds that security only recently became a major problem
in the refugee protection system, that UNHCR’s role in enhancing refugees’ physical 
security is limited by the agency’s legal mandate and practical constraints, and that 
problems of violence and physical security are largely episodic concerns affecting small 
numbers in discrete refugee populations.3 Drawing on historical documents, interviews, 
data on budgets and performance measures, and legal doctrine, I show this conventional 
wisdom to be wrong.4  A variety of distinct threats to refugees’ physical security have 
been a pervasive problem since the creation of the modern protection system in the 1950s 
and have grown worse as sprawling refugee camps near conflict zones have become a
lynchpin of that system.5  The legal concept of refugee protection clearly encompasses 
refugees’ physical security, and even provides a framework for disarming and separating 
combatants in the mass influx emergencies that have become commonplace in the 
developing world.  Key players in the refugee protection system nonetheless have long 
1 See infra Part I.b.
2
 In this context, the term “refugee security” refers to: (1) the protection of the physical integrity of refugees 
from threats of violence against them emanating from other refugees or surrounding populations; (2) the 
mitigation of the extent to which combatants or criminals manipulate refugees by keeping them hostage or 
exploiting resources meant to support civilian refugees; and (3) reductions in the risk that the presence of 
refugees will exacerbate regional conflict or war.  For a more detailed discussion of the scope of “refugee 
security,” see infra note 50 and accompanying text.
3 See infra Part I.b.
4
 My data included internal memos and cables, particularly from the 1970s and 1980s, to which I obtained
access from UNHCR Archives.  I also examined more recent (publicly-available) legal analyses and public 
pronouncements from UNHCR, the United Nations Secretariat, and nongovernmental organizations; as 
well as publicly-available budget documents and performance measurements from UNHCR.  In addition, I 
drew on declassified U.S. government documents discussing refugees, available from the National Security 
Archive at George Washington University.  I also examined selected documents from relief NGOs that 
collaborate with UNHCR, including fundraising appeals, press releases, and policy statements.  Finally, the 
data also included extensive semi-structured interviews with current and former officials and employees at 
UNHCR (34) and several of its NGO partners (6). Interviewees fell into three groups.  First, I interviewed 
(13) current and recent senior officials at UNHCR (selected because of their important managerial 
positions, suggesting extensive knowledge of organizational priorities and challenges).  Second, I selected a 
random sample of ten lower-level employees from protection (6) and operations (4) in the New York and 
Geneva offices, all with recent field experience.  Third, I obtained a snowball sample of (11) mid-level 
officials with positions likely to be relevant to violence and security, both at UNHCR and a number of 
NGOs.  Additional methodological details on file with author.
5 See infra  Part I.b,, Part III.a.
3neglected refugee security, creating immediate protection problems and subtler 
difficulties for the evaluation of the entire system.  
Only some of this neglect can be explained by international geopolitics or by legal 
compromises reflected in refugee law.  Instead, the problems associated with the modern 
system also reflect the intersecting effects of bureaucratic realties, political pressures, and 
legal interpretations shaping the discretionary choices of UNHCR and its 
nongovernmental organization partners – the refugee advocates at the center of the 
modern protection system.6 I develop the argument by tracing the remarkable history of 
UNHCR as it transformed itself, sometimes despite the concerted opposition of the 
nations that created it, from a refugee advocacy organization into a modern relief agency.  
The agency’s history reveals how bureaucratic actors were constrained when they 
responded to their environment, but they were not bereft of reasonable strategies to 
mitigate violence and manipulation by (among other things) accumulating expertise, 
supporting changes in the structure of oversight for refugee protection, and raising funds 
to support policing activities.  Nor are UNHCR and its partners powerless now –
particularly not with regard to problems involving the maintenance of law and order in 
the ersatz cities that refugee camps have become, or involving instances where refugees 
are coerced by combatants. While these problems have obvious relevance for refugees, 
they also tell a larger story about the challenges of implementing ambitious legal 
mandates under uncertainty, particularly when the organizations doing so operate in 
complex political environments.  
The argument proceeds as follows.  Part I introduces the problem of refugee 
security with a description of refugee camps, created in the wake of the Rwandan 
genocide, in the Great Lakes region of Africa during the mid-1990s.  The description 
reveals how a combination of proximity to conflict zones, international aid, poor camp 
management, and militarized camp control structures can turn refugee protection into a 
contradiction in terms.  The discussion then elucidates the scope and conceptual 
definition of refugee security problems throughout the globe, and considers why they 
matter beyond the specific context of refugee welfare.   
Part II provides the context for the analysis by describing the familiar and less-
familiar features of the overall global refugee protection system in which security 
problems persist.  As will become clear, nothing about that scheme makes sense without 
recognizing the protection system to be a compromise, the purpose of which is to regulate 
relations between predominantly poor refugee host countries, advanced industrialized 
countries, UNHCR, and the refugees themselves.  That arrangement (which I refer to as a 
“grand compromise”) places only limited burdens on developed countries, while it 
creates massive refugee camps at the frontiers of poorer ones.  Because most refugees are 
housed in camps in developing countries where physical security threats are endemic and 
few actors in the system are inclined to take responsibility for refugees’ physical security, 
this arrangement also fails to mitigate, and sometimes exacerbates, threats to refugee 
security.  Yet international law supposedly makes the physical integrity and security of 
refugees (“refugee security”) an important imperative for at least four sets of actors: (a) 
 
6 See infra Parts II and III.
4host country governments, (b) combatants, (c) the refugees themselves, and (d) UNHCR 
and its major partners.7
Regardless of such guarantees, Part III shows how security problems have long 
been recurring features of the global refugee problem.  While the violence marring 
refugee protection has been exacerbated by a host of predictable factors, such as host 
states’ inadequate provision of law enforcement services or outright complicity in camp 
militarization, close attention to security problems reveals that they can be disaggregated 
into three different types, some of which can be addressed more readily than others.  
Most difficult to resolve are the problems associated with states-in-exile that become 
heavily militarized with considerable support from rank and file refugees are the most 
difficult to resolve.  Recurrent crime-control problems appear (with some exceptions) to 
be more amenable to practical solutions, and situations involving the coercion of refugees 
by combatants are somewhere in the middle.  Despite these distinctions, security 
problems are conceptually related because they all implicate refugees’ physical integrity, 
they occasionally overlap (as when generalized fear of disorder and crime strengthens a 
state-in-exile), and historically they have often been lumped together when refugee 
advocates occasionally discuss them.8  While the threats to refugees’ security are rooted 
in the nature of refugees’ underlying circumstances and the structure of the refugee 
protection system itself, refugee advocates seem to retain limited power to mitigate at 
least some kinds of security problems even under existing legal mandates.  
Part IV then scrutinizes how such powers have been used by analyzing the 
evolution of the primary global refugee advocate, UNHCR.  It documents how UNHCR 
and its partners generally have not prioritized the goal of mitigating any of the 
aforementioned security problems.9 While individual staff members have at times shown 
deep concern and sensitivity to security problems, indeed sometimes forcefully,10 the 
historical performance of the key organizational player itself is a different story.  It 
reflects occasional, slow, protracted responses in articulating institutional priorities for 
protecting security.  UNHCR and refugee advocates repeatedly emphasize the 
responsibilities of host states (but these states do not or cannot carry them out), poorly 
evaluate the refugee (as opposed to staff) security situation in camps, place limited 
emphasis on diplomatic and political advocacy of security goals, and provide even more 
limited attention to the security consequences of its own activities providing material 
assistance.  The organization’s many partners – often funded largely with UNHCR 
resources – similarly tend to avoid responsibility for security.11
Instead, UNHCR’s focus has been primarily on delivering material assistance and 
secondarily on extending nominal legal protection to refugees.  By adopting an 
7 See infra Part II.
8 See infra Part III.
9 See infra Part IV.
10
 Some of the notable exceptions include: the focus of UNHCR and a few of its major relief provider NGO 
partners on calling attention to the problem of sexual and gender based violence since the late 1980s, 
occasional efforts to enhance camp security and negotiate workable agreements with local authorities led 
by enterprising field and protection staff within UNHCR and some NGOs, and occasional evaluations, 
studies, and public expressions of concern from humanitarian staff, particularly after being confronted with 
the crisis in Rwanda.  See infra Part IV.c.
11 See infra Parts IV.b. and IV.c.
5interpretation of its legal mandate promoting a focus on material assistance to 
increasingly broad categories of displaced people, the agency fostered conditions giving 
it little incentive to assert ownership over thorny physical security problems.  Although 
not all organizations crave the budgets and jurisdiction associated with missions like 
material assistance, UNHCR’s early leadership and staff nonetheless made choices to 
promote organizational survival that put the agency on a path towards seeking more 
resources and jurisdiction over time.12  As the organization navigated stormy political 
developments from the 1950s to the late 1990s, it settled into a predictable pattern.  The 
agency weathered crises by pressing to expand the populations who could benefit from its 
material assistance, cultivating government support of humanitarian relief and cementing 
perceptions that refugee problems could be managed primarily through an activity – the 
provision of material assistance – that the agency increasingly mastered.  
By contrast, the agency had no strong incentive to assume any responsibility for 
security problems.  From the agency’s perspective, many of the most visible such 
security problems implicated risky political complexities and appeared difficult to 
resolve.  Even if the agency merely sought to galvanize global attention to security 
problems, there was likely to be some tension between such concern and the agency’s 
implicit contention that virtually all refugee-like populations merited material assistance.  
These organizational developments appear to have been shaped by four critical factors 
that drive how some organizations implement their legal mandates: early external 
constraints imposed primarily by donor countries, early political choices by leaders and 
staff seeking to increase the global relevance of the refugee protection organization, 
locked-in organizational goals making it difficult for leaders and staff to change the 
agency’s subsequent priorities, and the structure of refugee law itself.13
Part V explains how refugee advocates’ relative neglect of physical security 
threats has materially diminished what the international refugee protection system can 
accomplish on behalf of a uniquely vulnerable population.  Even in a world of self-
interested nation-states with little reason to mitigate the underlying causes of refugee 
flows, practical strategies exist that would likely allow UNHCR and its partners to 
mitigate security problems.  Certain predictable host state failures to provide effective 
security services, for instance, may be mitigated with supplemental funding, technical 
assistance, and personnel.  In addition, refugee advocates’ priorities have almost certainly 
diminished global attention to security problems that can be mitigated, and papered over 
the relationship between more intractable security problems and the refugee protection 
system’s structure.  Thus, while the overall system is an expressive achievement of sorts, 
its structure ironically runs the risk of exacerbating the violence and chaos confronting 
refugees.14  In closing, this Part considers how the institutional redefinition of UNHCR’s 
mandate and the effect of such shifts on security problems may be an example of a more 
general phenomenon afflicting organizations with ambitious legal mandates facing 
complicated political constraints.
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 See infra Part V.
6But the present story is not only about institutional redefinition or the convoluted 
fate of legal doctrine.  It is also an intensely human drama of uprooted people facing 
threats to their own survival, and the vigorous, at times heroic, efforts of workers trying 
to help them.  The system’s failures persist and sometimes thrive despite the fine 
intentions of these workers.  It would dishonor the spirit of these workers’ humanitarian 
labors to ignore the gap between aspirations and reality, as refugee protection’s future 
depends on understanding that gap.  When the law entrusts to organizations the 
responsibility of addressing complicated problems involving risk, uncertainty, danger, 
and human misery, they rarely have the resources to fully take on, let alone to resolve, 
these problems.  What then?  In the absence of a miracle, organizations and the people 
within them settle for doing something.  Refugee protection provides a powerful insight 
into how that something gets chosen, what stories are told to justify it, and with what 
consequences.  This is, in short, not just about heaping blame on the thousands of people 
who have sought to improve refugees’ lives.  It is about understanding how, despite the 
best intentions, the system in which they work has produced the disturbing results that it 
has.  That story harbors precious lessons for anyone, including longtime refugee 
advocates, who hope that ambitious legal commitments can make the world a better 
place.  
I.  THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM: REFUGEE INSECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 
Between April and July of 1994, about a million and a half refugees left their 
countries and flooded into the thick brush of eastern Congo, deep in Africa’s Great Lakes 
region.15  Nearly all were ethnic Hutus from neighboring Rwanda and Burundi, two 
densely populated nations devastated by genocidal violence.  Hutu militias had
slaughtered 800,000 ethnic Tutsis and moderate or well-to-do Hutus in Rwanda, and 
several hundred thousand more in Burundi.16  In the aftermath, Tutsi rebels advanced on 
the Rwandan capital from makeshift bases in refugee camps, sending large chunks of the
Hutu population into a hasty retreat.  Most of these refugees headed west to the Congo on 
clogged dirt roads, and settled in refugee camps around the Congolese villages of Goma, 
Bukavu and Uvira.17
The fate of these refugees reveals how massive population movements in the 
developing world can fuel protracted violence around refugee camps, physical insecurity
within them, and social instability in surrounding regions.  This Part tells the story of the 
Great Lakes refugees as an introduction to these problems, and then defines the scope of 
the concept of “refugee security.”  While such security problems obviously matter to the 
refugees themselves, this Part also discusses how the factors exacerbating violence and 
physical insecurity for refugees also affect millions of people who are not refugees, and 
epitomize the complex transnational threats that increasingly frustrate national 
governments. 
15
 That nation was then known as Zaire, but in the wake of the overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko, its new 
leadership changed the name back to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  For simplicity, I refer to it as 
“Congo” throughout.
16 See GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS (1996).  For an insightful account of the dynamics of the 
genocide itself, see ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (1999).
17 See generally SARAH KENYON LISCHER, DANGEROUS SANCTUARIES: REFUGEE CAMPS, CIVIL WAR, AND 
THE DILEMMAS OF HUMANITARIAN AID (2005).
7A.  The Great Lakes 
As the Rwandan refugees crossed the Congolese border in the Spring of 1994, 
they were met by hundreds of humanitarian relief workers.  The workers spent their days 
shepherding arriving refugees into rapidly constructed camps just a few kilometers from 
the Rwandan border, on the banks of Lake Kivu.  Nearly overnight, for example, Goma 
village was surrounded by nine camps.  Together they housed 1.2 million people – the 
equivalent of San Diego, California’s population.18  Katale, the largest camp near Goma, 
soon acquired a population comparable to that of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  The Bukavu 
region was burdened with a “mere” 300,000 refugees, scattered across 27 camps, and 
Uvira housed another 180,000 in 12 encampments.19  Humanitarian workers rightly 
considered the construction of these instant cities and the staggering quantities of material 
assistance delivered to be striking achievements back in 1994.20
But it was another fact about the camps that soon overwhelmed the workers and 
refugees.  By 1996 these erstwhile humanitarian sanctuaries were under constant attack.21
The attackers pounced on the camps around the clock, as one of the Rwandan refugees in 
Eastern Congo describes in the following account of a day in October 1996:
It was during the day, around 3 P.M.  We heard gunfire, two shots far from us, 
and we were afraid it was the start of an operation.  We took the possessions we 
could carry and fled… [T]he soldiers encircled the group left in the forest with the 
children and took them away to massacre them, even the babies… Every time 
refugees erected camps, others would come and destroy them.  There was a little 
camp near Kibumba where I found many dead.  All the dead had been shot.22
The shots were fired by the new Tutsi-led Rwandan army based just across the border 
from the camps, and by their Congolese rebel allies, the Banyamulenge.  It was the 
arrival of the Tutsis that had triggered the mass exodus of Hutus from Rwanda and 
Burundi.  Many of the departing Hutus no doubt harbored a profound fear of reprisals by 
the newly empowered Tutsis.  But many other civilians were coerced into leaving by the 
retreating Hutu-led militias.23
18
 UNHCR, Refugee Camp Security in the Great Lakes Region, UNHCR Inspection and Evaluation Service 
Report No. EVAL/01/97 9 n.2 (April 1997)(“UNHCR, Camp Security Report”).
19 Id.
20
 UNHCR, Lessons Learned from the Rwanda and Burundi Emergencies, UNHCR Evaluation Report 3 
(December 1, 1996)(“[I]t is clear that UNHCR’s emergency response capacity, spearheaded by EPRS, 
PTSS and STS and supported by stand-by agreements with fellow agencies, represents a major operational 
asset for UNHCR which should not only by maintained but further strengthened to permit the organization 
to retain its international lead in this respect.”).
21 See id.
22 Zaire: “Attacked by All Sides” -- Civilians and the War in Eastern Zaire, Human Rights Watch Africa, 
vol. 9, no. 1 9 (A) (1997).
23 See UNHCR, Camp Security Report, supra note__, at 2 (“The [Hutu] MDNR propaganda machine 
survived the crisis and started up again, military operations were carried out in Rwandan territory, and the 
refugees were made to support this effort, by force if necessary.”); Johan Pottier, Relief and Repatriation: 
Views by Rwandan Refugees; Lessons for Humanitarian Aid Workers, 95 AFRICAN AFFAIRS 403, 410 (Jul. 
1996)(“Emergency food aid is both a means of survival and a common political weapon.  This was very 
visible in the early days of life in exile, when distributions were invariably hijacked by leaders and by the 
military (ex-FAR; Forces Armées Rwandaises).”).
8Coerced or not, the refugees soon found themselves in camps that were almost 
entirely controlled by the formerly official Hutu government, and by their allies among 
the militias who had just perpetrated the fastest mass genocide in history.  Hence the 
following observation from one employee who was in the Congo on behalf of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the agency charged with protecting 
refugees and the key funder of relief efforts:
I was there when Rwanda launched the attacks.  It was definitely an emergency 
which I hope never to see again.  We were working tirelessly.  There was no end 
to the suffering.  We didn’t have a day, we didn’t have a night.  Sometimes I’d 
sneak out of the scene, to take a nap.  I remember sneaking out then having to 
come right back, working with nothing but those occasional naps.  I was doing all 
but real protection, I would say – because it was mostly for me to attend to the 
needs of this population but I could not stop the attacks.  There were women who 
were dying here, and children, and women who were delivering.  It was just too 
much.  It was a disaster.24
A disaster all the more exasperating for such officials, no doubt, because of the paradox it 
revealed in the work of UNHCR, an organization that fields hundreds of “protection 
officers” and sits at the center of a system designed to protect refugees.25  Despite the 
overt importance of protecting refugees, the deteriorating security picture at the camps in 
eastern Congo showed its efforts to constitute “anything but real protection.”
None of this should have been a surprise to UNHCR.  Nor should the violence 
sweeping through the camps have surprised anyone else playing their part in the refugee 
protection system.  Residents of the Great Lakes region itself had witnessed much the 
same drama three decades earlier.  At the time, Rwandan Tutsis in Burundi had used 
refugee camps there as bases to mount a brutal attack on Rwanda.26  In effect, a simple 
fact true in the 1960s remained at play in mid-1990s: no matter how emphatically the law 
says that asylum should be “civilian and humanitarian” in character,27 the practice of 
24
 Interview with UNHCR Official, Geneva, Switzerland, July 21, 2004 (emphasis added).
25 See, e.g., UNHCR Handbook on Emergencies 12 (2000)(“UNCHR’s fundamental responsibilities are to: 
(i) provide international protection to refugees…”); id. at 19 (“The authorities of the country of asylum 
must be made aware of the fact that they retain primary responsibility for security and must ensure the 
safety and well-being of refugees.”).
26 See UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES 49 (2000):
Armed elements among the Rwandan refugees, who were for the most part in two camps close to 
the Rwandan border, carried out the raids into Rwanda itself.  These armed groups, known as 
inyenzi (the “cockroaches”), had the effect of hardening anti-Tutsi sentiment within Rwandan and 
confirming the Hutu ethnic mythology.
27 See UNHCR, Conclusion on the Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Asylum, Exec. Committee 
Concl. No. 94 1 (LIII)(2002).  Despite previous reluctance to reach such conclusions, the Executive 
Committee’s legal interpretation of UNHCR’s mandate therein emphasized that:
…refugee camps and settlements should have an exclusively civilian and humanitarian character, 
that the grant of asylum is a peaceful and humanitarian act which should not be regarded as 
unfriendly by another State, as stated in the 1969 OAU Convention… and a number of Executive 
Committee conclusion, and that all actors, including refugees themselves, have the obligation to 
cooperate in ensuring the peaceful and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements 
[emphasis added].
9channeling material resources into conflict zones without a workable security strategy 
invites combatants to take control of those resources and exploit refugees as they 
continue their struggle.28 Ironically, UNHCR’s initial response to this problem during the 
Great Lakes crisis was to belatedly subcontract with Congolese soldiers from the armies 
of dictator Mobutu Sese Seko to provide security in some of the camps – despite 
Mobutu’s alliance with the Rwandan Hutus that were hardening their grip on the camps.29
With a new base funded by international aid, the former leaders of Rwanda had 
organized a state-in-exile.   From there they repeatedly attacked the new Rwandan 
government across the border – just as the Tutsi-led forces now in power in Rwanda had 
once used refugee camps in Uganda to strike against the Hutus.30  The exiled Hutu leaders 
controlled the distribution of food and resources in the camps to reward their allies and 
punish their enemies.31 Bolstered by food aid, shelter, medical care, and the legal 
protection that supposedly attaches to a refugee camp, they continued using bank secrecy 
havens to funnel resources to international arms dealers.32
By 1996 this toxic brew had a predictable effect on civilians living in the camps.  
The new Rwandan army and their Congolese rebel allies began decimating much of what 
was left of the Hutus’ forces in the camps, along with the civilians therein, in punishing 
attacks like the one described above.  Force begat force.  The camps were emptied.  
28 See infra Part IV.a for a detailed explanation.
29 See DAVID RIEFF, A BED FOR THE NIGHT 189 (2002).
30 See Part IV.b.  See also Rieff, supra note__, at 190 (2002):
And so, goaded almost beyond sanity, the Rwandans attacked the camps.  UNHCR had predicted 
the refugees would not return peacefully.  It was wrong.  Most, in fact, walked back home, and far 
fewer died than NGOs such as Oxfam had predicted.  But the [Rwandan Patriotic Front] hunted 
down anyone who fled their advance.  The United States, which by then had moved from 
preventing action to halt the genocide to supporting the RPF, covered up the slaughter.
31
 Sometimes humanitarian workers seemed to encourage this control by the Hutu leaders to make the 
camps easier for it to administer.  See Pottier, supra note__, at 413 (describing camps in Goma, Zaire 
where food distribution occurred through the pre-existing “prefecture” government); UNHCR, Camp 
Security Report, supra note__, at 11 (“Contrary to what might have bbeen expected, the exodus of 
Rwandan refugees was not anarchic.  Organised groups traveled together or were later reformed.  This was 
due partly to the hierarchical structure of Rwandan society and partly to the effectiveness of the leadership 
of the authorities and militias.”).
32
 Documents found at the camps, for example, include a letter from the “Mil-Tec Corporation” to the 
Rwandan “Minister of Defense” (addressed, astonishingly, to a refugee camp in Bukavu, Zaire), noting 
that:
We were approached for very urgent supplies on the 10th of April 94, after the tragic death of His 
Excellency the President, we received this urgent request from Col. Kayumba, Major Tereraho 
and finally from the then [Hutu government] Minister of Defense Augustin Bizimana, as you will 
see our first shipment was delivered 8 days later at this time we insisted to the then Minister for 
the outstanding payment and we were assured these would be paid forthwith… it was suggested 
by some of your officials that the amount of U.S. $ 579,645.00 was received by us, we enclose a 
confirmation from our Bank (ANNEX 7) we can assure you, that had we received this payment we 
would not be making any claims for it.  [sic].  
Letter from MTC Mil-Tec Corporation Limited to The Minister of Defense, Republic of Rwanda, Bukavu, 
Zaire (Dec. 7, 1994), quoted in Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat?  The Paradox of Humanitarian Action
250 (2002)
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Hundreds of thousands returned to Rwanda.  Others fled deeper into the Congolese jungle 
or other nations, often with UNHCR convoys at their tail to continue delivering aid.  Tens 
of thousands of refugees, conservative estimates suggest, were killed in the process.33
Along Africa’s magnificent Great Lakes there grew a disaster fed by a rapid mass influx, 
the aftermath of a brutal genocide, the disintegration of a major host state, and the apathy 
of the international community.34  If anything can render the crisis less disturbing, it is 
perhaps the sense that security breakdowns marring an otherwise reliable global system 
of refugee protection and relief are a rarity.35
B.  The Scope and Significance of Refugee Security Problems 
Except they are not.  No doubt in some ways the scale of the Great Lakes carnage 
is in its own class.  Yet despite the determined efforts of refugee advocates in
transnational organizations, NGOs, and some governments, refugees have been 
chronically plagued by violence and threats to their physical security during the entire 
half-century history of the modern refugee protection system.  In February 1958, just as 
UNHCR was tip-toeing into the business of funding refugee camps in the developing 
world, French forces responded to artillery from anti-colonial forces along the Tunisian-
Algerian border by launching an air strike against a refugee community in Sakiet, 
Tunisia.36  Seventy-five civilians were killed in a single attack.  More followed.  In the 
1960s, Mozambican refugees in Tanzania lived in camps infiltrated by Frelimo, the 
Mozambican Liberation Front.  In response, Portugese forces invaded Tanzanian territory
and made punishing attacks against the Mozambican refugees.37  In the next decade 
Mozambique itself was the site of the slaughter of 3,600 refugees between mid 1976 and 
1977, with thousands more wounded by Rhodesian forces.38  South African forces 
attacked Kassinga camp in Huila Province, Angola, killing 600 refugees in a single attack 
and wounding 400 others.39   In the 1980s Cambodian refugees in camps on the Thai-
Cambodian border controlled by the Khmer Rouge were exploited by their erstwhile 
political masters, forced to support the combatants’ drive for renewed power against the 
Vietnamese-backed Cambodian government, and subjected to reprisal attacks from that 
government.40  Indeed, by the early 1980s, UNHCR was routinely receiving cables 
indicating deteriorating security situations at refugee camps.  Attacks by the Afghan Air 
33 See Dennis McNamara, The Protection of Refugees and the Responsibility of States: Engagement or 
Abdication?, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 355, 356 (“[T]ens of thousands more were killed or disappeared 
deeper into Zaire in the ethnic violence that tore through the region”).  Some commentators claim that 
UNHCR initially played down the casualties from attacks on the camps.  See Rieff, supra note__, at 190 
(“For its part, UNHCR refused to go public with the anecdotal evidence of mass killings tht is field workers 
had collected.”).
34 See, e.g., Prunier, supra note__, at __.  UNHCR, Camp Security Report, supra note__, at __.
35 Cf. Stephen John Stedman, Conclusions and Policy Recommendations, in REFUGEE MANIPULATION: 
WAR, POLITICS, AND THE ABUSE OF HUMAN SUFFERING 167 (Stephen John Stedman and Fred Tanner, eds. 
2003)(“The large majority of refugees and refugee groups are provided a modicum of security and 
experience little chronic violence in their exile.”).
36 See HORNE, A SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE: ALGERIA 1954-1962, 249-50, 265-9  (1969).
37 See SARAH KENYON LISCHER, DANGEROUS SANCTUARIES  116 (2005).
38 See Elly-Elikunda Mtango, Military and Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps, in Refugees and International 
Relations 87 (Gil Loescher and Laila Monahan, eds. 1989).
39 Id.
40 See infra Part IV.b.
11
Force killed 43 refugees in a single week in August 1984.41  An internal UNHCR report 
(which appears to be the only such effort) concluded that millions of refugees a year were 
affected by violence during the late 1980s and 1990s, even though it used a methodology 
that is likely to substantially understate the impact of violence on refugees.42
While such military attacks on refugees have often been devastating,43 they are not 
the only security problems afflicting refugee communities.44  Combatants who infiltrate 
the camps sometimes exploit the refugees directly even if these armed elements do not 
provoke reprisal attacks.  They may use refugees as hostages to imbue armed struggles by 
genocidal killers with the legitimacy of the blameless refugee label, as undertaken by the 
ruthlessly efficient Khmer Rouge with respect to Cambodian refugees in Thailand in the 
1980s.  Many of these problems also arose in Southern Africa in the 1970s.  Refugees
have been repeatedly taxed or imprisoned by armed combatants bent on continuing with 
combat and criminal activities.45  They are subject to forced recruitment, as were Algerian 
military-age men taking refuge in Moroccan and Tunisian camps in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, during the anti-colonial war against the French.46  Criminals and thugs 
directly exploit refugees at some camps, using them as staging areas for smuggling drugs 
41
 S. Wijertané, Acting Chief, South West Asia Section, UNHCR, Note for the File, Telephone 
Conversation with Mr. M. Rafet Mahdi, Counsellor, Pakistani Permanent Mission, Geneva (22 August 
1984)(“Mr. Mahdi confirmed that according to information received from Islamabad, 47 Afghan refugees 
have been killed and 17 refugees wounded as a result of the recent air raids in Pakistani territory by the 
Afghan Air Force”).  See also UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees, supra note__, at __ (“Further 
attacks in 1986 and 1987 killed hundreds more [refugees].  Soviet and Afghan government forces also 
carried out attacks against Pakistani civilians, fanning tensions between local populations and refugees.”).
42 See Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Refugee Involvement in Political Violence, WORKING PAPER NO. 26, NEW 
ISSUES IN REFUGEE RESEARCH, UNHCR EVALUATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS UNIT (July 2000)(on file 
with author).  The report relies on UNHCR’s own country reports (which do not routinely include reliably 
gathered data on security incidents in refugee camps, but reveal incident reports and impressions of staff) 
and press accounts, and it only analyzed the impact of “political violence,” thereby excluding the impact of 
internal disorder, crime, and attacks from bandits in the camps.  For a discussion of how closely linked 
political violence is to crime and private gain in Africa, see WILLIAM RENO, WARLORD POLITICS AND 
AFRICAN STATES (1998).  See also infra Part II.c.
43
 In contrast to the impact of military attacks on refugee camps, problems of access to food, water, and 
medical care have been increasingly resolved by a global assistance pipeline.  On the other hand, infectious 
disease is still occasionally a major problem.  See McNamara, supra note__, at __ (discussing Rwandan 
Hutu refugee deaths from infectious disease).
44 See supra Part IV.b.iv.
45 See supra Part IV.ii.
46
 A UNHCR official inspecting the camps in Morocco noted that ALN guerrillas were using many of the 
camps as a base of operations for attacks, and were forcibly recruiting young men into their ranks:
The mobilisation is openly in progress and appears to have been going on for some weeks.  The 
press-gang method is used for reluctant persons.  A small green truck known as the ‘salad basked’ 
circulates in the streets of Oujda City and young men are suddenly knocked on the head and 
popped into the bus.  In some cases of reluctance extreme measures have been used and I have 
been informed of three persons found with their throats cut.  The extent of the mobilisation in 
actual numbers is quite impossible for me to judge, but I am convinced that the new recruits must 
run into thousands.
Walton Memo to UNHCR Headquarters, Distribution of Rations to Refugees who May be Mobilized or 
Trained for Warlike Activities, 13/1/31 MR, F/HCR 11.1 (Feb. 1, 1961).
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or diamonds.47 And virtually every refugee camp is an “instant city,” forged in conditions 
that immediately give rise to severe law enforcement problems that only sometimes get 
successfully addressed by host countries or UNHCR.  In Northern Kenya, for example, 
refugee camps have experienced rampant violence, crime, and sexual assaults, along with 
a breakdown of nonviolent dispute resolution mechanisms.48 These conditions degrade 
life for refugees and have the potential to spread instability into the fragile hinterlands 
beyond the camps themselves.49  Discussion of refugee security should thus be 
understood to encompass several interrelated concepts.  They include: (1) the protection 
of the physical integrity of refugees from threats of violence against them emanating 
from other refugees or surrounding populations; (2) the mitigation of the extent to which 
combatants or criminals manipulate refugees by keeping them hostage or exploiting 
resources meant to support civilian refugees; and (3) reductions in the risk that the 
presence of refugees will exacerbate regional conflict or even war.50
Together the problems associated with crime and instability in refugee camps, 
coercion by armed elements, and militarized states-in-exile provoking reprisal attacks on 
camps paint a disturbing picture.  In it, refugee protection often degenerates into a 
contradiction in terms.  Security problems arise time and again, in multiple forms, and 
involving multiple perpetrators.  Despite the humanitarian mandate in the laws they are 
supposed to uphold and honor, UNHCR and international aid NGOs inject material 
assistance into camps dangerously close to a conflict zone, sometimes even helping to 
launder the resources that countries with strategic interests are funneling to combatants 
using refugee sanctuaries as bases of operation.51   Such material assistance tends to flow 
47 See Terry, supra note__, at 123 (“[P]art of the revenue [for the gangs] came from taxes levied on black 
marketers who came to the border to buy gold and gems from smugglers or to set up markets to sell goods 
to refugees.”).
48 See Interview with Senior UNHCR Official # 5, Geneva, July 21, 2004.  See also Jeff Crisp, A State of 
Insecurity: Violence in Kenyan Camps, UNHCR NEW ISSUES IN REFUGEE RESEARCH: WORKING PAPER 
NO. 16 (December 1999).
49 See Crisp, State of Insecurity, supra note__, at __. Quoting an internal UNHCR report from November 7, 
1998, this report shows the extent to which generalized violence and insecurity can pose problems as dire 
as those involving “political violence” for refugees:
The security situation in and around Dadaab has been deteriorating… Despite additional live 
fencing being installed, banditry attacks within the camps (including looting, shooting etc.) have 
become almost daily occurrences.  One or two bullets being fired is now considered a minor 
incident and some shootings even appear not to have been reported to the police.  A senior 
UNHCR staff security officer described the Daaab situation as probably worse than that in 
Kosovo.
Id. at 3.
50
 While emphasizing these problems’ common features sheds light on their legal and practical importance 
in the refugee protection scheme, Part III, infra, explains how many such problems become easier to 
resolve if they are distinguished and analyzed separately.
51 See, e.g., Loescher, supra note__, at 217 (“The refugee camps provided a shield behind which Pakistan 
could channel military aid and training to the Mujahadin fighters.  Even humanitarian aid had military 
purposes.”); Terry, supra note__, at __.  Throughout the many episodes where refugee camps illegally 
serve as conduits of resources to combatants, the question of what humanitarian officials knew and 
intended in these instances raises issues not unlike those raised in domestic money laundering prosecutions, 
where financial intermediaries often insist they do not know about the illicit provenance or intended use of 
the transferred funds. Compare United States v. Long, 977 U.S. 1264 (8th Cir. 1992)(evidence sufficient to 
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to conflict zones despite the potentially troubling relationship between that assistance and 
the conflict or criminal activities it can potentially prolong, thereby damaging what 
lawyers have since come to refer to as the “civilian and humanitarian character of 
asylum.”52
Moreover, the refugees’ plight affects more than just those who took flight. 
Breakdowns in the civilian and humanitarian character of the refugee camps can 
powerfully affect the spread of chaos, disease, and misery in some of the world’s most 
unstable and impoverished regions.  Eastern Congo is a classic example.  Combatants 
who exploited camps and their civilian populations came in droves masquerading as 
legitimate refugees.  They found chaotic conditions and natural resources to exploit.53
Many never left.  The resulting violence, destruction of foodstocks, and chaos fomented 
what has been called the “first world war of Africa,”54 which in turn has resulted in 
millions of deaths over the last few years.55 Thus refugee security is properly understood 
to encompass both the welfare of the refugees directly, and the regional security 
implications of refugee flows – implications that, as the reader will see, can turn sharply 
negative when the “civilian and humanitarian character of refugee protection” turns into a 
farce.56
Much of the responsibility for those negative consequences lies with national  
governments.57  Many host countries in the developing world neglect and in some cases 
deliberately interfere with the provision of security services in camps.  Their advanced 
industrialized counterparts have funded a system that relies heavily on refugee camps in 
conflict-torn regions, and in some cases have abetted the militarization of such camps.
While such governments cannot be expected to treat refugee security problems as 
a priority, however, one might expect something different from UNHCR.  Given its status 
the key refugee advocate under international law, one might expect the organization 
would emphatically prioritize the search for solutions to the security problems 
confronting refugees.  No reasonable person could expect even the dedicated and 
support money laundering conviction of owner of car dealership for cars purchased by drug traffickers on 
“willful blindness” ‘theory, even when he had no direct knowledge of the proceeds used to buy the cars) 
with WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, THE QUALITY OF MERCY: CAMBODIA, HOLOCAUST, AND MODERN 
CONSCIENCE  229 (1984)(analyzing internal United Nations World Food Program documents indicating 
that officials knew they were feeding Khmer Rouge combatants and other guerrillas).
52 See UNHCR, ExCom Conclusion No. 94 (2002).
53 See Prunier, supra note__, at __.
54 See Interview with Senior UNHCR Official # 1 (March 7, 2004).
55 See International Rescue Committee, Congo Report (2005)(estimating that 3.8 million people died in the 
“Second Congo War”).
56
 A small literature has developed seeking to explain this connection between the security of the refugees 
themselves and the larger regional and international security context.  See Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries,
supra note__, at __ for a particularly cogent analysis.  What remains to be discussed in the literature is the 
legal and organizational response, both historically and in terms of present and future possibilities.  
Although my focus on both of these aspects of refugee security is primarily consequentialist, there is also 
an ethical dimension to the whole issue, as humanitarian action is supposed to be the opposite of war, and 
UNHCR in particular is under a legal obligation to be “strictly neutral and non-political.”  See UNHCR 
Statute, supra note__, at __.  Beakdowns in security that allow aid to fuel war therefore represent a 
contradiction at the core of the whole humanitarian enterprise.  An illuminating if somewhat pessimistic 
discussion of the ethics of the problem are found in Terry, supra note__, at __.  
57 See generally infra Part I.c.
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determined refugee advocates working in such an agency to stop wars or achieve peace 
through mere words.  Instead, the agency might have anticipated recurring problems 
involving the delivery of law enforcement services, setting up a bureau to provide 
technical assistance on refugee security and recruiting specialists to monitor conditions.  
It could have gathered data on assaults and attacks as it does on refugee children’s 
education, and mounted a concerted decades-long effort to press nations, whether 
Security Council members or fragile host nations, to invest in security. The agency could 
have built up its own capacity to mitigate and prevent violence by hiring large numbers 
of security experts to work in its relief operations and advocating drastic changes in the 
refugee protection system to reduce the reliance on dangerous refugee camps. 
Yet refugee protection advocates’ response to such intense and diverse security 
problems poses something of a puzzle.  While physical security threats may be inherent 
in a system that relies so heavily on refugee camps near conflict zones, UNHCR and its 
partners still retain the power to mitigate some of the consequences of security problems
and advocate forcefully against them.  Nonetheless, during most of UNHCR’s history, 
the refugee advocates working there and their partners in other organizations have 
repeatedly neglected, denied responsibility for, or downplayed their role in mitigating 
dangers faced by refugees – a stance that unquestionably impinges on the more prosaic 
“protection” mission that the institution claims for itself when interpreting its legal 
mandate.  “Why,” ask some UNHCR officials even years after the problems with refugee 
militarization in Congo arose, “should UNHCR be worried about weapons?”58 Similarly, 
refugee advocates frequently question whether security problems are worth their attention 
when host states (such as Tanzania) and powerful countries (such as the United States) 
are the ones with the responsibility and power to solve them.59
Reality is more complicated.  As will become clear, UNHCR and its partners have 
not been powerless to blunt impact of security threats.  That refugee protection can fail –
as can domestic crime control, public housing schemes, transnational money laundering 
regulations, or environmental enforcement – will surprise virtually no one.  Nor should it 
surprise some observers to see how key actors in the system sometimes harbor callously 
little concern for the plight of refugee families.  On the other hand, the claim that their 
advocates systematically and repeatedly neglect a core concern of the refugees, and that 
such neglect materially worsens refugees’ lives, may strike at least some observers as a 
deeper failure.  Why is there no high-level bureaucratic unit devoted to protecting refugee 
security within an international organization that was explicitly created to advocate for 
and protect refugees, has grown to have at least a limited measure of autonomy, and 
boasts a yearly budget of over $1 billion?  Why has it historically made constant 
fundraising appeals to obtain food and shelter for refugees but not explicitly to find 
solutions to the violence affecting their camps?  Surely organizations with exceedingly 
difficult legal mandates sometimes respond to their context in complex and problematic 
58
 UNHCR protection officer, Geneva, July 1998 (quoted in Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, supra note__, 
at 4).  Another said that just shortly after nonetheless listing a number of things UNHCR could have done 
better and was only slowly implementing nearly a decade after the Great Lakes crisis.  “At the end of the 
day,” he said incongruously, “UNHCR cannot really do much about security.”  See Interview with UNHCR 
Protection Officer # 4, Geneva (July 23, 2004).
59 See infra Part IV for a discussion of examples.
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ways, but this observation simply restates the question given that those responses are 
often divergent and unpredictable.60  The puzzle is all the more interesting because it is 
not resolved by some of the most commonly-offered explanations advanced either by 
UNHCR officials or by scholars.  The problem is not a recent one.61  Similarly unavailing 
are assertions that UNHCR lacks the legal mandate to seek solutions to security 
problems,62 or that nothing can be done about security problems without, for example, 
massive interventions from the United Nations Security Council or deployments of 
peacekeepers.63
Nor does the small existing literature on refugee security problems or the history 
of UNHCR resolve the issue.  Most legal scholarship on refugee issues trains attention on 
the complicated doctrinal questions bearing on individualized asylum adjudications in 
industrialized countries.64  Historical work on UNHCR itself illuminates some aspects of 
the organization’s evolution (such as how much it grew) but not others (such as why it 
grew), and fails to draw on an extensive body of research on the behavior of public and 
international bureaucracies.65  Neither does it manage to explain how the refugee 
60 See infra Part IV for a more detailed discussion.
61 See McNamara, supra note__, at 356 (“Increasingly, refugee and relief agencies operate in the midst of 
conflict, rather than before or immediately after them.”); UNHCR, Safety and Security Issues, Exec. 
Committee for the High Commissioner’s Programme, Standing Committee, 24th meeting, Doc. No. 
EC/52/SC/CRP.11 1 (May 30, 2002)(“Managing the security of UNHCR’s staff, as well as that of refuges, 
returnees, internally displaced persons and others of concern to the Office, has become a major challenge 
in today’s operating environment.”)(emphasis added); Letter from Ambassador Felix Schnyder to Mr. Poul 
Hartling, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 4 (Sept. 29, 1982)(UNHCR Archives)(copy 
on file with author)(“Military attacks on refugee camps are a relatively new phenomenon…”).
62 See SADAKO OGATA, THE TURBULENT DECADE: CONFRONTING THE REFUGEE CRISES OF THE 1990S 198 
(2005)(“In principle, the implementation of security measures rests with the host government.”).  See also 
infra notes __  (describing interviews with UNHCR protection staff disclaiming responsibility for refugee 
security).  As Part II explains, these turn out to be inaccurate and misleading positions, which are in some 
tension even with recent legal interpretations from UNHCR itself.
63 See McNamara, supra note__, at 355 (“Unless governments are willing to provide muscle to support 
refugee protection, refugees will not be protected.”); Stephen John Stedman, Conclusions and Policy 
Recommendations, in REFUGEE MANIPULATION: WAR, POLITICS, AND THE ABUSE OF HUMAN SUFFERING
190 (Stephen John Stedman and Fred Tanner, eds. 2003)(“As long as the problem [of refugee safety] is not 
deemed a security threat, the choices for humanitarian agencies will be limited to providing assistance that 
prolongs war or walking away from the needs of those hundreds of thousands caught in the middle who 
deserve help.”)  In fact, security problems vary in their details, context, and severity, and a host of feasible 
tactics show potential for improving the situation over time – including, for example, tactics that UNHCR 
and other actors in the system have offered support for during the last ten years but which were equally 
appropriate at a policy level many decades earlier.  For a discussion of some of these tactics and strategies, 
see infra Part IV.  
64 See, e.g., Karen Musalo, Claims for Protection Based on Religion or Belief, 16 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 165 
(2004); Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case Study on the 
Implementation of Legal Norms in An Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 433 (1992); James C. Hathaway, The Causal Connection (“Nexus”) to a Convention Ground, 15 
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 461 (2002).  But see James C. Hathaway, The Right of States to Repatriate Former 
Refugees, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 175 (2004); JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
65
 By far the most thorough existing work on UNHCR’s history is GIL LOESCHER, THE UNHCR IN WORLD 
POLITICS (2002).  Although Loescher illuminates many aspects of UNHCR’s work and evolution, his 
account does not precisely address why UNHCR transformed itself from a legal and diplomatic advocate 
for refugees into a conduit for material assistance, nor does it analyze specifically how the agency’s refugee 
security policies evolved.
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protection system specifically has responded to refugee security problems.66  A small 
literature (primarily in political science) has begun to document and analyze the security 
problems afflicting refugees.67  Although all of this work is engaging, and some of it is 
particularly insightful, its focus has not been primarily on the organizational history of 
the response to these problems, or the legal and policy questions raised by the refugee 
protection system’s response to the problem (or lack thereof).  
As will become clear, filling these gaps requires more than just attention to 
security problems.  That is, we must comprehend not only what the core institutional 
advocate of refugee protection fails to do, but what it does do, why it does this, and how
its chosen organizational missions may be in tension with other goals enshrined in law.  
This requires a detailed investigation of why UNHCR evolved into its current form as it 
implemented refugee protection laws, and how those laws and policies themselves 
evolved along with UNHCR.  Although UNHCR does not describe or represent that 
entire system, its central importance to that domain as an interpreter of law, a conduit for 
assistance, and an advocate for refugees is widely acknowledged and hard to question.68
Close scrutiny of UNHCR and its partners is therefore likely to reward anyone trying to 
understand the performance of the entire refugee protection system.
Scrutiny of that system has obvious relevance for the fate of millions of refugees.  
But in a world where 1.1 billion people live on less than a dollar a day and nearly two 
billion lack basic health care,69 why focus on the plight of several million refugees?  
Unlike people starving in the third world or displaced by a tsunami, refugees by 
definition can rarely be helped within their own country.  The very nation where the 
refugees normally reside is either complicit in or otherwise in no position to stop the 
violence and persecution assailing them.  The refugees’ flight across borders lays bare the 
inherent tensions between universalist human rights aspirations and the territorial logic of 
global politics.  Their story provides an interesting moral and historical lens through 
66
 Some of that work, for example, makes much of tensions between UNHCR’s traditional “protection” 
function and its evolving role in providing material assistance. See id., __, passim.  But it is not 
immediately obvious what exactly “protection” encompasses.  This makes it hard to draw implications for 
security from the mere existence of a tension between protection and assistance.  Nor is it obvious without 
some further discussion why the agency’s assistance operations could not also integrate protection or
security concerns more fully than at present.
67 See generally STEPHEN STEDMAN AND FRED TANNER (eds.), REFUGEE MANIPULATION AND THE ABUSE OF 
HUMAN SUFFERING (2002); Terry, supra note __, Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, and Stéphane 
Jacquemet, Under What Circumstances Can a Person Who Has Taken an Active Part in the Hostilities of 
an International or a Non-International Armed Conflict Become an Asylum Seeker?, UNHCR DEP’T OF 
INT’L PROT.- LEGAL AND PROTECTION POLICY RES. SERIES PPLA/2004/01 (June 2004).  For a more 
pessimistic lament written in something of a journalistic spirit, see Rieff, supra note__, at ___.  These 
works provide insightful analyses of different facets of the refugee security problem, and Lischer’s – in 
addition to describing the problem – analyzes some of the factors shaping whether refugee movements 
contribute to civil conflict.  For the most part, though, these analyses do not attend to the organizational 
aspect of refugee security problems.
68
 As I discuss below, the organization’s leadership has had a crucial role in shaping the modern system, 
including its laws and commonly-accepted assumptions about the goals of refugee protection and 
assistance.  Its role as a funder of NGOs shapes their priorities.  And the history of the entire organization 
also reveals the political pressures impacting the entire refugee protection system.
69 See World Bank, Dramatic Decline in Global Poverty, But Progress Uneven (April 23, 2004), avail at 
http://web.worldbank.org, last accessed May 13, 2005.
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which to understand the consequences of manmade tragedies that have epitomized the 
last century and continue to mar the present one.70
Indeed, the disproportionate attention refugees already draw is reason enough to 
study the success and failure of the intricate administrative system designed to protect 
them.  Because both the practical and humanitarian implications of that refugee drama 
have not been entirely lost on policymakers, the refugee protection system makes for a 
compelling study of how legal mandates are carried out by organizations when a 
complicated, transnational problem does garner attention.  While various aspects of the 
system might work better if they received still greater resources or were blessed by more 
favorable domestic policies, efforts to resolve refugee problems nonetheless benefit from 
many institutional advantages flowing from global attention.71  This makes it appropriate 
to ask what can go wrong (or right) when a problem manages to garner the sustained 
attention that refugee problems have achieved.  That degree of attention has had an 
indelible effect on the distinctive strengths and weaknesses of the modern refugee 
protection system, to which we now turn.
II.  THE CONTEXT: ASYLUM SEEKERS AND “INSTANT CITIES” IN MODERN REFUGEE 
PROTECTION  
It is a testament to the expressive power of international law that the word 
“refugee” evokes such powerful imagery and sympathy from audiences across the 
world.72  Beneath the deceptive simplicity and blamelessness suggested by the label, 
however, lie daunting complexities.  The word can just as easily describe an Eastern 
European scientist, a Caribbean athlete, a Vietnamese fisherman, a poor central African 
farmer, or a Sub-Saharan child soldier.  Use of the refugee label invokes an elaborate 
legal regime defined by a host of familiar features, like asylum proceedings in advanced 
industrialized countries.  
Yet the international refugee protection system is also epitomized by a host of less 
familiar features, described in this Part, which together set the stage for chronic problems 
afflicting refugee security and promoting civil instability in areas surrounding refugee 
settlements.  Accordingly, the analysis that follows explains the compromises built into
the architecture of the refugee protection system and the tensions that arise as a result.  It 
begins by providing a snapshot of the global refugee problem.  That problem 
encompasses not only thousands of annual asylum-seekers arriving in developed 
70 See ARISTIDE ZOLBERG, ASTRI SUHRKE, AND SERGIO AGUAYO, ESCAPE FROM VIOLENCE: CONFLICT AND 
THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (1989) for an interesting discussion of these themes.
71
 These include an international organization with a current budget hovering around $1 billion, a network 
of NGOs raising and spending hundreds of millions of additional dollars on the plight of refugees, 
substantial media coverage in developed nations, a binding international treaty that most nations of the 
world have signed and to which they constantly reaffirm a commitment, a network of global declarations 
and regional agreements, and fairly massive amounts of scholarly attention through specialized journals, 
research centers, conferences, and scholarly projects.  It is, in short, a system that the advocates of many 
pressing global challenges that receive meager attention might envy.
72 See, e.g., Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees 75 (“The origins of refugee rights are closely intertwined 
with the mergence of the general system of international human rights law”); FRANCES NICHOLSON AND 
PATRICK TWOMEY, REFUGEE RIGHTS AND REALITIES: EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONCEPTS AND REGIMES
(1999).
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countries but also hundreds of thousands or millions annually seeking refuge in the 
poorer half of the globe.  As a result, refugee protection is increasingly built around 
“instant cities” holding people for long periods of time in developing countries, supported 
by large amounts of international material assistance.  The architecture of that system 
ends up increasing the importance of discretionary choices made by UNHCR, refugee 
advocates, donor countries, and host states.  By understanding the architecture of the 
refugee protection system, we can better appreciate how these discretionary choices 
affect vulnerable populations, and how those choices measure up against the goals 
allegedly at the heart of that system.
A.  The Familiar and Less-Familiar Features of the Global Refugee Problem 
Today each of the aforementioned people and millions like them can apply for 
asylum in most advanced industrialized countries.  Because of successive waves of 
applications from such people, nations such as Canada, the United States, and France 
have each come to house hundreds of thousands of refugees on their territory.  The 
European Union countries alone received 300,000 new asylum applications in a single 
year (2003), and hundreds of thousands more applied in advanced industrialized countries 
elsewhere in the world.73  In principle, nations receiving these applications decide them in 
accordance with international law treaties, including particularly the Refugee Convention 
and its 1967 Protocol,74 as well as interlocking domestic laws.  Arriving asylum seekers 
benefit from elaborate individualized adjudication procedures generally geared to draw 
distinctions on the basis of the provisions of the Refugee Convention, which makes 
protections conditional on a showing that a person has a well-founded fear of persecution 
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.75  The bulk of legal scholarship on refugees trains attention on the subtle 
doctrinal questions arising at the intersection of the elaborate Convention categories and 
the domestic laws giving it effect.76
Despite scholars’ tendency to focus primarily on refugee determinations as they 
play out in industrialized nations’ domestic courts, millions of refugees never make it out 
of the developing world and primarily end up in refugee camps.77  As a result, other actors 
in the system exist to fill in gaps left by the advanced industrialized countries.  Chief 
73 See UNHCR, REFUGEE STATISTICS YEARBOOK (2004), Table C4 et al., Appendix I.  Because recognition 
of refugee status in advanced industrialized countries is often linked to permanent immigration benefits, 
people granted refugee status in such countries are assumed to stop being refugees after five to ten years.
74 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28 1951, 189 UNTS 137 
(1951)(“Refugee Convention”); 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 UNTS 267, entered 
into force October 4, 1967 (“1967 Protocol”).
75 See id., supra note__, at __.  Parsing the “well-founded” and “on account of” language is the subject of a 
considerable proportion of existing refugee law scholarship.  For particularly thoughtful treatments, see 
GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 43-80 (2nd ed. 1996), and JAMES C. 
HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 65- 185 (1991).
76
 Those questions are all the more important because they arise constantly in national legal systems capable 
of giving some effect to judicial pronouncements, and because achieving refugee status under the terms of 
that Convention tends to result in access to desirable opportunities for long-term asylum in advanced 
industrialized countries.  Developed nations are therefore extremely sensitive to changes in domestic or 
international laws that might force them to accept larger numbers of refugees. 
77 See infra note __ (discussing protracted refugee situations).
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among these is UNHCR, a complex agency entrusted with the legal mandate of 
advocating on behalf of the protection of refugees, searching for solutions to their 
problems, and (more recently) raising large amounts of money to play the crucial role in 
assisting refugees in developing countries.78  The agency also works with NGOs partially 
funded through UNHCR itself.  Together the agency and its NGO partners endeavor to 
respond to the needs of refugees and asylum seekers in the marginalized corners of the 
world’s southern half, where individualized adjudication opportunities and the promise of 
long-term asylum are not forthcoming.  UNHCR must therefore distinguish among 
asylum seekers on the basis of whether they are encompassed by the refugee concept 
without the benefit of such individual adjudication procedures.79  It must also find means 
of encouraging developing nations to accept refugees when they may be inclined not to 
do so, while simultaneously pressing more prosperous nations with individualized 
adjudication systems to apply their laws consistently with their international 
commitments.80
This balancing act calls for UNHCR to decide whether (for example) 10,000 
Congolese peasants arriving in Tanzania on a particular day are refugees within the 
meaning of the law it interprets.  Group determinations allow UNHCR to solve the 
problem of serving as the international arbiter of the refugee definition even if thousands 
of people simultaneously stream into a country unbidden. But group determinations 
themselves bring their own difficulties, because they are necessarily somewhat ad hoc
applications of a legal definition meant to apply to individuals.  Similar difficulties arise 
from UNHCR decisions about who might benefit from the assistance of the refugee 
protection system without meeting formal legal requirements for being a refugee.  The 
modern refugee concept, grounded most firmly in the Refugee Convention, was initially 
designed to apply to individuals and their families.  The drafters were predominantly 
from two places: war-torn regions of industrialized Europe, and the United States.81 The 
beneficiaries were initially overwhelmingly European individuals and families.82  The 
drafters did not take it upon themselves to figure out what to do about tidal-wave sized 
movements of humanity fleeing wars in the developing world, because they did not think 
that would be their problem. 
The experiences of UNHCR and host countries in applying refugee law to these 
massive groups of incoming asylum seekers reveals some of the complexities inherent in 
that law.  Under the familiar Convention definition, it takes more than fear of violence to 
78 See UNHCR Statute, supra note__, at __.  See infra Part IV for a discussion of UNHCR’s evolution.
79 See generally UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES: FIFTY YEARS OF HUMANITARIAN 
ACTION (2000) (chronicling UNHCR’s evolving legal and logistical challenges).
80 See Goodwin-Gill, supra note__ at 33-34, 327-28 (describing the difficulty of ensuring that advanced 
industrialized countries live up to their commitments under refugee law, and some of UNHCR’s efforts to 
achieve it).
81 See id. (discussing the drafters of the Refugee Convention).
82
 These refugees may have seemed more desirable to a host of countries than racially different, 
predominantly unskilled Asian and African migrants.  Cf. James A. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the 
Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31 HARV. INT’L L. J. 129, 171 (1990)(“Reconsideration”)(“The ease 
with which the refugee definition can accommodate both the encouragement and deterrence of refugee 
claims via the subjectivity of its central criterion creates a significant opportunity for states to interpose 
other priorities besides the needs of refugees…[and] may flow  from a host of extraneous political 
factors.”).
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trigger international protection.83  The key is the link between a refugee’s (well-founded) 
fear and some aspect of her civil or political status, such as that persecution is on account 
of religion or race.84 The assumption behind the use of the elaborate Convention 
categories makes sense in light of the historical context and the interests of Western 
nations expecting to absorb refugees at the time.  It seemed to be that people displaced by 
Nazi persecution or fleeing socialist countries could be protected without opening a
spigot that would let massive numbers of people legally emigrate by qualifying as 
refugees.  As most observers of the refugee protection system have realized, things did 
not stay this way for long.  De-colonization and the wars that followed inaugurated 
massive crises in the developing world.85  UNHCR’s response was to do its best to 
broaden the legal definition of a refugee to encompass these millions of people.  When 
such broadening placed more strain on the definition than it would bear, the agency 
pushed the bounds of its legal mandate to assist populations resembling refugees.86  In 
this fashion, the agency and its partners have come to the aid of the hundreds of 
thousands of displaced families in Darfur, who are in situations sufficiently similar to 
those of bona fide refugees that they merit assistance under the High Commissioner’s 
“good offices.”87  Many countries wanted it to do precisely that, because they wanted its 
assistance in dealing with a mass influx of foreigners.  UNHCR’s move to broaden the 
refugee definition was also aided by the fact that – despite the aforementioned strictures 
of the Convention definition of a refugee – there was support for a broader definition of a 
refugee in the agency’s own statute and in some regional agreements.88 Although some 
83 See Refugee Conv. supra note__, at __.
84
 These definitions first developed in response to western nations’ political goals (and, to some extent, their 
substantive values).  See Hathaway, Reconsideration, supra note __, at __, for a particularly cogent 
account.
85 See Loescher, supra note__, at __.
86 See infra Part IV.b.
87 See generally Louise W. Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time: The Work of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, 1951-1972, Vol. 1 (1975) 434-40 (discussing the legal evolution of the 
“good offices” concept used in the UNHCR statute from one referring to the role of an impartial 
intermediary assisting in the solution of a dispute between two states to one encompassing the distribution 
of material assistance to individuals otherwise outside the scope of UNHCR’s responsibilities); Sadruddin 
Aga Khan, Statement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to the Economic and Social 
Council, July 26, 1976 (avail. at http://www.unhcr.ch, last accessed August 1, 2005)( “In agreement with 
governments, my Office continues to have recourse to this [good offices] concept whenever a narrow 
legalistic approach would appear to be incompatible with the humanitarian objectives of UNHCR…”).
88
 Although term refugee is indeed a legal term of art, is not defined exclusively by the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol.  Someone to be a refugee even if they don’t merit the protections of the 
Convention and Protocol.  At least three other bodies of law are relevant: (1) regional treaties or 
declarations explicitly expanding the scope of the refugee term, specifically the 1969 Organization for 
African Unity (OAU) Convention, and the more recent Cartagena Declaration of the Organization of 
American States; (2) the UNHCR Statute and the many General Assembly resolutions discussing its terms, 
and (3) the emergence – according to some scholars like Guy Goodwin-Gill – of a customary law norm 
against refoulement (explusion) of certain asylum seekers and “refugees.”  UNHCR has often interpreted 
the Convention more broadly than virtually any country would in individualized determinations.  Zolberg et 
al. sought to summarize several decades’ worth of definitional developments in such interpretation by 
observing that the refugee term should encompass people who flee across an international border and is in 
need of protection.  See Zolberg et. al., supra note__, at __.  This fudges the question of whether it’s 
enough for them to fear the adverse impact of conflict on their lives, or whether they need to fear some kind 
of persecution (even if they cannot show it to be on account of a protected characteristic, as the Convention 
and Protocol would require). 
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nuance is required to make sense of UNHCR’s group determinations amid the chaos, a 
reasonable synthesis would suggest that over time the agency’s used the “refugee” label 
to cover people escaping violence or the threat of it – including, but not limited to, those 
who face the specific persecution that would trigger protections at the national level on 
the basis of the Convention.  Such determinations have swelled.  By using that power and 
also stretching the definition categories, UNHCR was able to extend its “protection” to 
millions of people who would have had a hard time qualifying for refugee status in the 
elaborate, Convention-focused individualized adjudication proceedings in advanced 
industrialized countries. The question of why UNHCR sought to interpret its mandate in 
this fashion and what consequences followed is addressed in Part IV.
But the most immediate consequence of the broadened refugee definitions used 
by UNHCR and chaotic political circumstances in the developing world was a staggering 
increase in the aggregate number of refugees.  Asian and African nations in the 
population-rich but economically poor global South have seen the sharpest.  According to 
UNHCR estimates, the number of officially-recognized refugees essentially stayed 
relatively stable and even declined gradually until the mid-1960s, at which point UNHCR 
began making group-based determinations of refugee status in earnest.  From then on the 
number of refugees fluctuates but generally increases, driven especially by mass influx 
emergencies in Africa.  In the late 1970s, the world witnessed an order of magnitude 
increase in refugees, as the number of officially-recognized refugees in Africa continued 
to mushroom and the Afghanistan and Indochina crises begin displacing people in Asia.  
Between 1975 and 1985, the number of refugees (according to UNHCR) goes from just 
under 3 million to nearly 12 million.  In eight more years the refugee population jumps 
again, reaching 18 million by 1993 – before falling to just under 12 million by 1999.  
Even in the latter half of the 1990s, as the refugee population was falling, the total 
number of people “of concern” to UNHCR in Africa and Asia – and therefore eligible for 
assistance – generally continued to rise.89 While these totals obviously reflect UNHCR’s 
expansion in the scope of the refugee definition, they unquestionably also reflect political 
developments in the political world that tended to push up the number of refugees under 
almost any reasonable definition.
Much of the preceding account should sound at least vaguely familiar to scholars 
and policymakers following developments in transnational law and policy.  Other 
features of the refugee problem may be somewhat less familiar.  For instance, the modern 
refugee protection enterprise largely revolves around the creation, maintenance, and 
justification of “instant cities” in the fringe corners of the developing world.  More 
conventionally these sites are known as temporary refugee camps.  That appellation 
simply fails to do justice to the size and permanence of many such camps.  Even outside 
the context of a staggeringly rapid refugee movement like the one in the Great Lakes 
region in the 1990s, camps end up with the population of cities large and small.  For 
instance, 41,800 refugees live in a camp in Ghana’s Buduburam region (where 43% of 
residents are under the age of 18), 86,000 in Kakuma camp in Kenya (50% under 18), 
and nearly three quarters of a million in several camps in Pakistan’s frontier province 
89 See UNHCR REFUGEE STATISTICS YEARBOOK 2003 (2004).
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region bordering Afghanistan (58% under 18).90 Camps there originally set up to house 
people uprooted by the Soviet invasion of the 1970s have endured despite the fact that the 
invasion, and even the Soviet Union itself, have gone the way of the floppy disk.91  Some 
Palestinian refugee camps are welcoming a third (or even fourth) generation of 
inhabitants descended from the original camp arrivals.92  In fact, UNHCR itself admits 
that about 6.2 million refugees worldwide, not including the millions of Palestinian 
refugees in the Middle East under the separate mandate of the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine (UNRWA), find themselves in “protracted” refugee 
situations in Africa and the Middle East.  This amounts, under most estimates, to more 
than 50% of the world’s refugees.93  Many more refugees (or refugee-like) populations 
not defined as being in protracted situations arguably are in such situations – partly given 
that UNHCR’s measure of what is not a protracted refugee situation depends on its views 
about the success of repatriation, which are sometimes unduly optimistic.94
In contrast, African and Asian refugees flowing into the immigrant neighborhoods 
of prosperous industrialized countries constitute only a tiny slice of the global refugee 
population.  By far the largest number of refugees are so recognized as part of a prima 
facie (or generalized group determination) in some destitute Asian or African nation. 
Those nations tend to observe a non-expulsion norm with the arriving uprooted people.  
They are allowed to stay in camps, but they are almost never given access to full asylum.  
While some advocacy-oriented NGOs occasionally protest at the “warehousing” of 
refugees in camps,95 the camps are nonetheless the quintessential feature of the modern 
refugee protection system.  In 1999, for example, nearly 1.7 million refugees arrived as 
part of a mass influx into developing countries while just about 138,000 asylum seekers 
were allowed to stay in all advanced industrialized countries.96  Only a small proportion 
of asylum seekers are allowed to stay in the advanced industrialized countries where they 
seek protection, and the proportion has been falling somewhat in recent years.  
On the surface, host countries’ focus on camps nonetheless comports remarkably 
with the underlying structure of international law.  Not even the Refugee Convention 
requires states parties to offer durable asylum to refugees.97  Instead it commits 
signatories not to expel refugees and to provide them with certain limited social 
90 See id., Table 11.
91 See id.  In August 2005, UNHCR also provided the author with updated country-by- country refugee trend 
data (on file with author).
92 See BENJAMIN N. SCHIFF, REFUGEES UNTO THE THIRD GENERATION: UN AID TO PALESTINIANS 
(1995)(discussing the extent to which camps for Palestinians in the Middle East have become permanent 
encampments).
93
 For UNHCR’s own discussion of the problem, see Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s 
Programme, Protracted Refugee Situations, Doc. EC/54/SC/CRP.14 (Standing Committee, 30th
Meeting)(June 10, 2004)(avail. on http://www.unhcr.ch, last accessed October 26, 2005)(“Protracted 
Refugee Situations”).
94 See supra note__, at __ ( discussing the situation of Mozambican refugees and the difficulty in achieving 
successful repatriation).
95
 This has not gone entirely unnoticed by a small set of NGOs.  See G. Jeffrey MacDonald, “Warehoused 
Refugees Are Caught Between Conflict and Closed Doors,” Christian Science Monitor, July 24, 2004.
96 See UNHCR, Refugee Statistics Yearbook 2003 (2004).  In other years the gap is somewhat less striking, 
but refugees coming in through prima facie movements are always a substantially greater number.
97 See Refugee Conv., supra note__, at __ (provisions establishing asylum as discretionary).
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guarantees and economic opportunities.  States that are not parties to the Convention also 
routinely observe a norm of non-expulsion, often without having signed a formal 
agreement committing them to do this or to offer the guarantees the Convention requires, 
such as limited access to a state’s labor market.  Once these norms are considered 
alongside the prevalence of mass influx situations and the fragile political circumstances 
in many developing countries, there is little wonder how camps evolved into a touchstone 
of refugee protection.  Even leaving aside the considerable possibility for tensions 
between refugees and local populations, massive numbers of migrants fleeing conflict can 
present host countries with complicated social, economic, and political problems.98
B.  The Commitment to Refugees’ Physical Integrity and to the “Civilian and 
Humanitarian Character” of Asylum Under International Law 
The problems associated with massive numbers of arriving asylum-seekers in the 
developing world often implicate a facet of refugee law generally garnering less attention 
than the legal complexities governing asylum in wealthy countries or even material 
assistance to camps in poorer ones.  From the very beginning, the people and 
governments who worked together on creating the current system viewed it as a civilian, 
humanitarian endeavor, ostensibly designed to promote the physical security of protected 
refugees.99  Time and again, humanitarian workers since then have maintained this 
characteristic should be more than an empty slogan.100   Whether it applies to refugees 
given temporary asylum or granted access to longer-term resettlement, ensuring that the 
institution of asylum is civilian and humanitarian means it is not supposed to be a vehicle 
for combatants to prolong their armed struggle.  Refugees are not supposed to flee 
violence simply to end up being coerced, assaulted, and manipulated.101  Nor are 
international criminals or people threatening to host states supposed to use the refugee 
protection system as a way to escape.  To deal with these imperatives, the Refugee 
Convention itself lets countries exclude people who are international criminals, threaten 
the security of the host country, or have engaged in acts contrary to the purposes of the 
United Nations.102
98
 Sometimes those concern lead an erstwhile host country to forcibly repatriate the refugees or some group 
of them, as did India with East Pakistanis in 1971 and Thailand with some Cambodians during the 1980s.
99
 Indeed, before World War II governments, scholars, and lawyers debated the limits of nations’ rights to 
offer asylum, and a crucial assumption undergirding the recognition of such a right was that asylum could 
only be offered on civilian and humanitarian terms that would not interfere with the security of the asylees’ 
nation of origin (or any other nation).  See generally Alice Edwards, Human Rights, Refugees, and the 
Right ‘To Enjoy’ Asylum, 17 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 293, 300 ((discussing the history of the right of nations to 
offer asylum).
100 See Margaret E. McGuinness, Legal and Normative Dimensions of the Manipulation of Refugees, in 
REFUGEE MANIPULATION: WAR, POLITICS, AND THE ABUSE OF HUMAN SUFFERING 135-166 (Stephen John 
Stedman and Fred Tanner, eds. 2003), Rosa da Costa, Maintaining the Civilian and Humanitarian 
Character of Asylum, UNHCR DEP’T OF INT’L PROT.- LEGAL AND PROTECTION POLICY RES. SERIES
PPLA/2004/02 (June 2004); Stéphane, Jacquemet, Under What Circumstances Can a Person Who Has 
Taken an Active Part in the Hostilities of an International or a Non-International Armed Conflict Become 
an Asylum Seeker?, UNHCR DEP’T OF INT’L PROT.- LEGAL AND PROTECTION POLICY RES. SERIES
PPLA/2004/01 (June 2004).
101 See Jacquemet, supra note __, at __.
102 See Refugee Conv. supra note __, at __ (provisions governing exclusion and security guarantees).
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A more powerful normative basis for preserving asylum’s civilian and 
humanitarian character is found in the principles contained in three interlocking bodies of 
law, covering war and neutrality, humanitarian protections for civilians in conflict, and 
human rights protections for all people regardless of whether they are refugees.  The law 
of war and neutrality emphasizes nations’ duty to refrain from attacking other nations 
except in narrow circumstances that tend to involve self-defense.103  This duty 
increasingly appears to place limits, under both interpretations of treaty law and 
customary law, on the provision of indirect support of attacks by allowing the 
perpetrators to use the nation’s territory as a base.104  Humanitarian law protects refugees 
and other civilians from attack in international conflicts.105 Things are a little more 
complicated when the conflict is “internal,” rather than international.  By tradition, 
humanitarian law makes considerable distinctions between conflicts that are international, 
where the full panoply of Geneva Convention protections apply and those that are 
“internal,” where only limited protections apply.106  Although internal conflicts kill more 
people and destroy more lives,107 the protections available to civilians under the formal 
treaty regime covering international conflicts are far more extensive than those in the 
embryonic treaty regime that applies to internal ones.  In part because of this, refugee 
advocates have made a heroic effort to ground the humanitarian law of internal armed 
conflicts in customary law, and specifically in:
…a conclusion that a humanitarian norm initially designed for international armed 
conflicts should also apply in the case of a non-international armed conflict when 
such a norm has clearly a protective nature and is not regarded by States as an 
intolerable infringement upon their sovereignty.108
Although this statement is somewhat opaque, it comes close to describing the 
realities of the existing legal framework. If customary law is accepted as valid, the case 
for it as a source of humanitarian norms applying to internal conflicts is reasonably 
strong.109  Customary norms protecting civilians in or near conflict zones then overlap 
with guarantees lodged in human rights law, which is supposed to guarantee individuals’
103
 UN Chart., Art. 2, para. 4.
104 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 at 89-91 (June 27, 
1986)(hereinafter Nicaragua case).
105
 Humanitarian law doesn’t quite cover the question of what sort of legal status civilians fleeing an 
international conflict should have in the country to where they flee (that, presumably, is what refugee law is 
for).  But a plausible reading of the Conventions and complementary bodies of humanitarian law would 
emphasize the imperative of protecting civilians from conflict when it spills over to the country hosting 
them.  See PIETRO VERRI, DICTIONARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (ICRC 1992).
106 See Sonja Boelaert-Suominen, The Yugoslav Tribunal and the Common Core of Humanitarian Law 
Applicable to All Armed Conflicts, 13 Lieden Journal of International Law, 619 at 621 (2000).
107 See James D. Fearon and David Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 75 
(2003).
108 See Jaquemet, supra note __, at __ (citing Judgment, Trial Chamber, Kupreskic et al., IT-95-16 
Judgment (14 January 2000), para. 518.
109 See Judgment, Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Milan Martic, IT-95- 14/2-PT, Review of the Indictment 
Pursuant to rule 61, ICTY Trial Chamber (March 8, 1996)., para. 11. (noting that there is “a corpus of 
customary international law applicable to all armed conflicts irrespective of their characterization as 
international or non- international armed conflicts… [including] general… principles designed to protect the 
civilian population as well as rules governing means and methods of warfare.”).  See also PIETRO VERRI, 
DICTIONARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (ICRC 1992).
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basic dignity, and their opportunity to be free from unwarranted coercion.110  While their 
language is sometimes vague, human rights treaties have also served as the foundation for 
a conception of international security that could be termed “human security,” exemplified 
by the aforementioned Security Council resolutions recognizing that systematic threats to 
civilians undermine international peace and security.111
Together these separate layers of legal doctrine – applying to civilians generally, 
and particularly in conflict areas – complement the basic precepts of refugee law.112
Despite these prohibitions, refugee advocates and national governments may sometimes 
believe in the legitimacy of armed struggles such as those waged by the African National 
Congress against South Africa’s Apartheid regime.  Nonetheless, the militarization of 
camps undermines the range of protections guaranteed by refugee, humanitarian, and 
human rights law – and risks undermining the humanitarian character of asylum that has 
been so critical to building international support for refugee protection.113
It should come as no surprise that the guarantees associated with asylum’s 
peaceful, civilian, and humanitarian character unfortunately exist in some tension with 
the reality of ostensible refugee protection because of crucial features of the protection 
system’s institutional structure, including the size and ubiquity of refugee camps as the 
means of housing displaced refugees, the value of material assistance to combatants, and 
the incentives of key players such as host countries and UNHCR.  For the moment, we 
might leave aside those incentives to make a simple observation: at least in principle, 
virtually all the major players in refugee protection should recognize the relevance of the 
preceding legal doctrines. While the law does not precisely allocate responsibilities for 
the protection of refugees’ physical security, some measure of responsibility appears to 
 
110 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, Dec. 19, 1966.  See also UNHCR, 
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Sub-Committee of the Whole on 
International Protection, Informal Meeting on Military Attacks on Refugee Camps and Settlements in 
Southern Africa and Elsewhere, Doc. No. EC/SCP/27 (held on Thursday, April 28, 1983)(on file with 
author).  The document chronicled the discussions of the sub-committee to follow up on a report by former 
High Commissioner Felix Schnyder on the problem of military attacks on refugee camps.  The Chairman of 
the Executive Committee, H.E. Ibrahim Kharma of Lebanon, described the High Commissioner’s mandate 
thus:
The international protection mandate of the High Commissioner meant that he should ensure that 
refugees of his concern were protected and their fundamental rights as human beings safeguarded.  
The first and most fundamental right was the right to life, and by virtue of his mandate the High 
Commissioner had the moral obligation to safeguard the right to life as well as other basic rights 
of every refugee.  The fact that the international community had not provided him with concrete 
physical means to ensure the physical protection of refugees did not preclude the High 
Commissioner from using all the means at his disposal to fulfill this moral responsibility. 
[Emphasis added].
Id. at 2.
111 See S.C. Res. 1509, at ¶¶ 3(a)-(g), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1590 (2003).
112 See Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, supra note__, at 449 (“Whatever the 
historical reason, we are today required to ground a right to physical scurity for refugees not in the Refugee 
Convention itself, but instead in what has been described as a ‘criss-cross of rules which have some bearing 
on the subject’”).
113 See infra Part III for additional discussion.
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rest with at least four sets of actors: host country governments, combatants and their 
supporters, the refugees themselves, and UNHCR.  Many host states have explicitly 
assumed responsibilities for international protection of refugees (either under the 
Convention and Protocol or under more expansive instruments such as the OAU 
Convention).  Most have formally agreed to be bound by human rights treaties such as 
the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man.    Those imperatives exist alongside far-
reaching legal prohibitions on aggression lodged most notably in key provisions of the 
UN Charter, and are further supplemented by interpretations of that prohibition as also 
precluding subtler forms of aggressive activity through assistance to non-state actors.114 
The customary law of neutrality (reflecting acceptance of commitments initially 
enshrined in the Fifth Hague Convention of 1907) further precludes participation in the 
conflicts of other nations.  Together these doctrines suggest that host states have a 
responsibility to undertake a host of measures, such as endeavoring to separate armed 
elements from arriving asylum-seekers and providing a modicum of security in camps, to 
maintain the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum.  The doctrines also imply that 
combatants and the refugees themselves have a responsibility to cooperate with these 
measures.  Whether host states, combatants, and even refugees live up to these duties is 
another matter. 
UNHCR must also contend with its share of responsibility for advancing the 
physical security of the vulnerable populations that it is mandated to protect.   It should 
not be surprising that the UNHCR Statute, together with the myriad General Assembly 
resolutions that further fill in the scope of UNHCR’s mandate, clearly call for the agency 
to be concerned with the well-being of refugees and others in similar circumstances – 
concerns which would themselves be fairly empty ones if they did not encompass to 
some extent refugees’ own worries about their physical safety.115 UNHCR thus ought to 
care about refugee security because of a combination of its own Statute, General 
Assembly, and straightforward interpretations of the concept of refugee protection.  In 
effect, it ought to recognize that “safeguarding the personal security of refugees is 
implicit in the High Commissioner’s mandate of ‘providing international protection’”116 
So should host states who claim (or seek) to take the law seriously.  True, physical 
security’s not explicitly discussed in the Refugee Convention or regional instruments like 
the OAU Convention.  But concerns about physical security are implicit in these 
treaties.117 What’s more, once the rest of the applicable international laws – particularly 
humanitarian and human rights laws – are considered, it becomes ineluctable that host 
countries have no business participating in the refugee protection system if they don’t 
consider and try to mitigate the physical security problems affecting displaced people on 
their territory.   
 
114 See Nicaragua case, supra note__.
115 See Thematic Compilation, supra note__.
116 See Personal Security note, supra note__, at para. 23.  Rare as this language is in a UNHCR document, 
the note makes a compelling case for it.
117
 Article II of the OAU Convention, for example, notes that “the grant of asylum to refugees is a peaceful 
and humanitarian act,” and member states should not subject a person to measures  “…which would 
compel him to return to or remain in a territory where is life, physical integrity or liberty would be 
threatened.”
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If UNHCR’s mandate concerns protection (as it obviously does), then virtually 
any reasonable interpretation of it, at some level, requires it to care about security, even if 
its leaders believe host states have the primary responsibility for it.  Indeed, UNHCR 
itself occasionally emphasizes how much physical security is part of the “protection” 
function at the core of its mandate, even as it sometimes disavows responsibility for 
promoting such security.  Its Global Report in 2000 describes physical safety and 
security” as one of the mandates that UNHCR activities have “expanded” to include.118 
And an International Protection statement from 1993 explains at length how refugees’ 
“personal security” is central to what the organization tries to do.119 Even NGOs 
providing relief claim to be doing so in a humanitarian spirit that draws support from 
(and is consistent with) international law.120 
Nonetheless, the refugee agency often dances around the core issue, qualifying 
(particularly before the mid-1990s) the extent of its legal obligation in this area, as it did 
in this 1989 report: 
Although neither UNHCR’s Statute nor the Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees refer explicitly to the physical safety of refugees, it is well-appreciated 
that the safety and well-being of refugees constitute primary concerns for States 
and UNHCR.  References to physical safety and security in 26 Conclusions 
adopted by the Executive Committee over the last 13 years are ample testimony 
of this concern.  These conclusions cover all aspects of refugee protection and 
include departure, treatment in asylum-countries and durable solutions, notably 
voluntary repatriation.121 
Not only does UNHCR emphasize Executive Committee resolutions rather than financial 
or operational priorities in order to demonstrate its concern with physical safety, but it 
clearly resists a coordinating role in this area.  Instead it tends to emphasize the extent of 
state responsibilities.122 Thus, its own manual for handling emergencies emphasizes that 
“host governments are responsible for the security and safety of, assistance to, and law 
and order among refugees on their territory.”123 
The penchant of UNHCR staff for constantly qualifying their agency’s own 
responsibilities under law protecting physical security is perhaps understandable, but 
ought to be viewed with some skepticism.  It is obviously true that neither the symbiotic 
instruments of the Convention and Protocol or the UNHCR Statute mention “physical 
security.”.  But it’s also true those instruments rarely mention many of the other activities 
UNHCR and its partners have aggressively pursued in the name of protecting refugees 
and similarly-situated people.  The Convention and Protocol don’t mention specific forms 
of material assistance – such as health care.124 The UNHCR Statute doesn’t give the 
 
118 See UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES, 2000.
119 See UNHCR, Note on International Protection (Submitted by the High Commissioner), A/AC 
(1993)(UNHCR Archives)(copy on file with author).
120 See Interview with NGO Official # __ (CARE Official, Stanford, 2004).
121 See UNHCR, Note on International Protection (Submitted by the High Commissioner), A/AC.96/728 
(August 2, 1989).
122 See
123
 UNHCR Emergency Manual 4 (2000).
124 See 1951 Convention.
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agency blanket authority to funnel aid to internally displaced people.  Instead what’s 
happened is that a combination of agency-driven policy innovations and political 
demands from powerful countries, host countries, and international organizations have 
created conditions for UNHCR and its partners to assume important new responsibilities 
over the years – most notably for material assistance.125 The assumption of these 
responsibilities shows a consistent record of the organization mining the relevant bodies 
of law (particularly the “good offices” reference in the UNHCR Statute and General 
Assembly resolutions) for legal and moral authority to forge ahead.  That same authority 
unquestionably applies in the context of physical security and mitigation of manipulation.  
That is to say, even if there were no independent legal basis outside of refugee law for 
thinking that protection must encompass physical security, refugee law clearly allows the 
concept to encompass physical security.126 
Nonetheless, that external basis does exist.  Besides occasional references to 
“civilian, humanitarian, and non-political” values in refugee law, the rest of the 
applicable bodies of law protecting civilians in conflict call for protecting the physical 
security of refugees loud and clear.  Any country or organization that takes these bodies 
of law seriously will see that refugee law and asylum law make no sense without having 
protection encompass physical security, and – as a consequence – the mitigation of 
manipulation and insecurity.127 Whether these guarantees become a reality depends on 
the role different crucial actors play in the refugee security system and the structural 
features of that system, to which we turn next.
C.  Institutional Architecture: The Grand Compromise of Refugee Protection
The tangle of treaties, customary international law, domestic laws, administrative 
practices, and organizational units epitomizing that system are best understood not as the 
manifestation of a principled commitment to shield vulnerable population, but as the 
product of a grand compromise to let national governments simultaneously express 
humanitarian aspirations and limit the burdens from doing so.  The compromise is 
125 See Cuéllar, supra note__, at __.
126
 The flexibility in the concept of protection is clearly apparent, for example, in the different statements 
and resolutions from the UN General Assembly and the UNHCR ExCom involving the scope of 
“protection.”  See, e.g., Thematic Compilation.
127
 Refugee law purists may insist nonetheless that “protection” is a term of art.  Epistemic communities 
make this claim all the time, and of course there’s a grain of truth to it.  “Protection” means one thing to 
extorting mafiosi and another to UNHCR protection officers in a chaotic refugee camp.  But the crux of my 
claim here is not that protection doesn’t have a special meaning in the refugee context.  It’s that protection 
in the refugee context is best understood as being informed by two things that are both important: (a) a 
straightforward understanding of what refugees (and similar populations) actually need in order to enjoy 
any of the more prosaic components of protection; and (b) bodies of legal doctrine that apply to refugees, 
asylum seekrs, and similar civilian populations and explicitly aim to protect them from physical harm and 
exploitative manipulation.  Thus protection may have a specialized meaning in the refugee context, but 
trying to dientangle that mening from the value of physical security requires (I would say) a more heroic 
effort and is unlikely to succeed – unless one takes an unduly segregated and narrow-minded view of the 
refugee protection mandate.  And given the massive expansion of material assistance and aid to non-
refugees through the refugee protection system, that sort of narrow view simply fails to square with nearly 
any aspect of the current system.  Which is why the General Assembly (and, more occasionally, the 
Executive Committee of UNHCR) have promulgated dozens of resolutions and statements emphasizing the 
importance of physical security.  See, e.g., infra note 136 (discussing UNHCR’s “Thematic Compilation” 
of resolutions involving physical security, and sources therein).
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epitomized by relatively small asylum burdens on developed nations (relative either to 
the total number of refugees and internally displaced persons, or to global legal and 
illegal migration flows involving non-refugees), a proliferation of refugee camps around 
the world, material assistance, and persistent security problems.  That system is 
unquestionably a compromise because it’s not perfect from anyone’s point of view, 
perhaps least of all the refugees.  It is a grand compromise in the sense that the system 
has nonetheless achieved considerable legal and political feats.  These include the firm 
rooting of the refugee concept in the vast majority of the world’s legal systems and in the 
moral and visual imagination of the public in many industrialized nations, the
development of a non-expulsion (referred to as non-refoulement in the parlance of the 
Convention) norm that is surprisingly widespread, and the pronounced attention that 
scholars and policymakers afford to refugee issues.  How refugee security fits into the 
larger set of bargains defining refugee protection emerges more clearly if we scrutinize 
the grand compromise that refugee advocates, advanced industrialized nations, and host 
nations have built.  
i.  Limited Burdens for Advanced Industrialized Countries.
Controversy envelops the refugee protection system, but pragmatism defines it.  
In reality, the system imposes quite limited formal legal obligations on advanced 
industrialized countries.  Refugee protection controversies make more sense in light of 
internal contradictions and political divisions in wealthy countries, where people are 
sometimes genuinely divided about the relative merits of permissive asylum policies.  
The fact is that wealthy countries retain formal legal control over asylum and 
resettlement.  Over time, the U.S., Canada, and Europe have all adjusted their refugee 
status determination procedures, generally making it harder through legislation to obtain 
benefits and easier to disqualify people who apply for asylum.128  National governments 
retain the flexibility to adjust the amount of refugees accepted to suit domestic political 
and economic pressures.   Their judges can reconsider doctrinal interpretations of refugee 
law and the procedural system regulating asylum applications.129  Legislatures can alter 
the process of asylum adjudication or the benefits afforded refugees.130  Jurists and 
politicians tend toward extreme caution when the migration spigot is in their hands.  They 
tend to fear that permissive decisions about the scope of refugee status determinations 
will bring untold numbers of new permanent migrants.  Migration trends rooted in 
refugee law are kept in check because of that fear.  Where occasional courts, legislative 
majorities, and executive authorities make substantive standards governing matters such 
128
 In the United States, for example, statutory changes established a summary exclusion program in 1996 
commonly known as “expedited removal,” wherein potential asylum-seekers can be summarily removed if 
they do not explicitly request asylum when they enter the country or show they have a “credible fear.” 8 
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2000).  And rigid time limits require asylum seekers to file applications within a 
year of having arrived in the United States.  See Immigration and Naturalization Act § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2000).  For a discussion of these and many other techniques through which 
developed countries limit asylum applications, see STEPHEN LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW 
AND PROCEDURE 1095-1135 (2005).
129 See, e.g., Karen Musalo, Ruminations On In Re Kasinga:  The Decision’s Legacy, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & 
WOMEN’S STUD. 357 (1998).
130 See generally John Fredriksson, Bridging the Gap Between Rights and Responsibilities: Policy Changes 
Affecting Refugees and Immigrants in the United States Since 1996, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 757 (2000).
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as the definition of a “particular social group” more permissive, other actors stand ready 
to keep the burdens limited by changing another part of the substantive standard (such as 
what it means to be persecuted) or imposing procedural requirements (such as seeting 
time limits to govern when asylum seekers can file applications).131  No doubt part of the 
pressure to do this comes from the connection between refugee status and permanent 
immigration benefits in advanced industrialized countries.132  Thus, Haitian boat people 
started getting turned away by the U.S. without even a screening in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.133 This almost certainly went too far under even highly permissive readings 
of American international law commitments, as Guy Goodwin-Gill has pointed out in a 
penetrating critique.  
The larger point is that the grand compromise protects advanced industrialized 
countries from burdens because it ensures that the refugee protection system lacks an 
enforcement mechanism akin to that of the World Trade Organization.  Even if such 
enforcement were forthcoming, the existing structure of refugee laws plainly lets 
advanced industrialized countries limit what they do on behalf of refugees (as long as 
they observe the non-expulsion norm).  And with few exceptions, richer nations can 
avoid confronting the problems associated with mass influxes.134  Instead these nations 
benefit from the geographic, logistical, financial, and legal barriers making it difficult for 
large numbers of refugees to apply for asylum on the territory of such nations.  
ii.  Networks of Refugee Camps in the Developing World
Developing nations are in a different position.  In the arid plains and thick jungles 
of the global South, the demands wrought by mass influxes intersect with the structure of 
refugee law.  Host states are rarely willing to simply integrate the arriving foreigners into 
their population, and refugee law (to the extent it is relevant at all) merely requires them 
not to expel the arriving refugees.135  As a result, countries and refugee advocates respond 
by creating instant cities in the form of refugee camps.  As a result the camp, though 
131
 For a cogent discussion of restrictive trends in asylum law, see Legomsky, Immigration and Refugee 
Law, supra note__ For a discussion of the conditions likely to change this trend, see James C. Hathaway 
and Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again; A Proposal for Collectivized and 
Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. L.J. 115 (1997).  
132
 Strange as this connection seems, it’s probably more than just the result of advocacy from immigrant 
rights’ groups.  Most advanced industrial countries probably lack the infrastructure of internal control and 
surveillance necessary to track migrants who are (unlike people with truly temporary visas) admitted for 
several years at a time   Nor do admittees have much incentive to go home given economic opportunities in 
developed nations.  Without any change in that, temporary protection in developed countries would be 
difficult to implement).
133
 Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council , Inc., 509 U.S. 918 (1993). See Goodwin-Gill, supra note__, at __, for an 
articulate argument about the extent to which this policy conflicted with the Refugee Convention and 
international law.
134
 The United States is an obvious exception, given its proximity to countries such as Cuba and Haiti.  
Moreover, mass influxes can eventually lead to increased migration burdens on developed countries.  For 
example, the Great Lakes crisis eventually led to increased applications from that region in European 
countries.  The refugee crisis in Indochina initially impacted Thailand, Indonesia, and other nearby 
countries – but these nations eventually exerted successful pressure on the U.S., France, and other 
developed nations to take on more refugees.  These nations are unlikely to be entirely disinterested in mass 
influx situations – their governments may instead seek to promote the management of such crises to shape 
their impact and avoid longer-term indirect migration burdens.
135 See supra Part II.a.
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much decried early in the history of UNHCR, has become the lynchpin of the refugee 
protection system.  Official UNHCR estimates show at least several million refugees in 
camps in recent years, and varying but nearly always massive numbers of “prima facie” 
refugees (subject to group determinations and routinely arriving into camps) every year.  
But these figures tend to understate the numbers of refugees in camps, as many host 
countries use UNHCR help to maintain camps but do not adequately report information 
on them (something that seems to be borne out by looking at the numbers of prima facie 
refugee arrivals and considering the slower rate of resettlement, asylum grants, or 
repatriation that would reduce the total population in camps), and millions more on the 
verge of becoming refugees but for not having crossed a border (known as “internally 
displaced persons” or IDPs).
Arriving refugees encounter fluid refugee camps – hastily created ersatz urban 
agglomerations that become complex social, political, and economic entities.  As Figure 
2 shows, a massive number of people each year are subject to generalized, prima facie 
determinations and end up in the camps – and the figures below substantially understate 
the number of people in camps because they do not include the millions of Palestinian 
refugees living in camps under the mandate of UNRWA or the IDPs living in camps.  
The camps’ tendency to persist is exacerbated by at least three predictable factors that 
have little or nothing to do with continued well-founded fear of persecution.  Source 
countries often loathe the prospect of repatriating refugees, especially when vanquished 
rivals to the source country’s government lurk among them.  Refugees long for the 
opportunities to permanently resettle in wealthy countries which sometimes become 
available to camp residents, particularly when the host country obtains resettlement 
agreements at the outset of a mass influx, as did Thailand when it confronted masses of 
arriving Vietnamese and eventually, Cambodian, refugees.136 Finally, camps sometimes 
provide opportunities for desirable economic activity not available in the host country –
or, more often still, for material assistance that would not be available if they returned.  
FIGURE 2
Prima Facie Refugee Arrivals and the Total Refugee Population
136
 Refugees are almost certain to dramatically exaggerate that probability.  Cf. Alison Round, Introduction 
to Clinical Reasoning, 7 J. EVAL. CLINICAL PRACTICE 109, 110 (2001).
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iii.  Flows of Material Assistance
The source of that assistance shows 
how much the advocacy-centered work of 
the early UNHCR changed over time.  
Every year UNHCR and relief-oriented 
NGOs effectuate a massive transfer of resources from advanced industrial countries to 
refugees in developing countries.  This makes it somewhat more tolerable for host 
countries to recognize arriving migrants as refugees and to allow camps on their 
territory.137  Material deprivation still occurs in humanitarian emergencies.  But 
industrialized countries, through UNHCR, have nonetheless developed a mechanism of 
staggering capacity to channel food, shelter, medical care, and other components of 
material assistance to refugees, simultaneously, to camps in the Chad-Darfour border 
region, in Pakistan, in Guinea, Ethiopia, and dozens of other countries.  The emergency 
relief focus has permeated every aspect of the organization’s priorities and rhetoric since 
at least the Pakistan emergency of 1971, when UNHCR assumed a global relief 
coordinating role in that emergency.  
This placed the agency in the position to simultaneously undertake at least four 
interrelated functions that tied its work to the perceptions of wealthy industrialized 
countries: raising its own funds from voluntary government contributions, making 
appeals on behalf of the UN for funds that could be channeled to other UN agencies like 
the World Food Program and relief-oriented NGOs, overseeing the work of those entities, 
and executing its own operations in host countries across the world.  Aided by a vigorous 
fundraising operation and the image of the refugee as a blameless innocent, UNHCR and 
NGOs have together raised many billions of dollars to meet refugees’ material needs.  In 
this process they enlist movie stars like UNHCR’s “Goodwill Ambassador” Angelina 
Jolie.138  Humanitarian organizations like UNHCR, the WFP, and UNICEF use the legal 
machinery of the United Nations to make urgent appeals through the General Assembly.  
Increasingly, the public agencies are imitating the private humanitarian NGOs they help 
fund, by reaching out directly to the population of advanced industrialized countries, This 
almost certainly built political support for government donations and also garnering 
increased support for humanitarian activities directly from individuals.  Thus, UNHCR 
helps ensure a steady supply of images visually dramatizing the material deprivation of 
displaced people, and it even makes web-based “video games” available for people in 
advanced industrialized countries to better understand the plight of refugees.139
137
 But not tolerable enough in many instances where the size of the incoming flow or the nature of the 
political context makes receiving country governments perceive the refugees as a particularly acute 
political threat – as did India in the case of arriving East Pakistani refugees in 1970 and 1971.  See
Loescher, supra note__, at160 (discussing India’s expulsion of the East Pakistanis by invading what 
became Bangladesh).
138 See, e.g., UNHCR News Release, Goodwill Ambassador Angelina Jolie, March 9, 2004.
139
 UNHCR News Release, UNHCR Introduces Web-Based Video Game in Sweden, June 15, 2005.
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iv.  Risks of Neglected Security Problems
Recall that the law defines a set of security guarantees for refugees as such, for 
civilians in or near conflict zones, and for people in general through human rights law.140
What it fails to do is precisely allocate the extent of responsibility for those guarantees.  
Who then “owns” refugee security problems in the fluid environment that is so likely to 
produce such problems?  Refugees have a responsibility to cooperate in maintaining the 
civilian and humanitarian character of asylum and order in their encampments, but may 
collectively support militarization or face individual incentives to engage in criminal 
activities that foster instability.  While host countries may often have an interest in 
policing refugee camps and reducing militarization, cash-starved governments in the 
developing may be unable to provide security services.  Host country governments may 
also be unwilling to provide security services if, for example, the leaders of the host state 
support political groups seeking to coerce refugees.141 Even wealthy industrialized 
nations may be directly implicated.  Sometimes their policies deliberately undermine the 
civilian and humanitarian character of asylum by fomenting refugee militarization, as did 
the U.S. with Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Nicaraguans in Honduras.142
Thus, despite the fact that security problems merit attention from host countries, 
donor countries, and the refugees themselves, UNHCR generally fails to call attention to 
and address festering security problems.  But in the present refugee protection scheme, 
this may be too much to ask.  UNHCR focuses its appeals for funds and its description of 
its day-to-day work on the provision of material assistance and making legal 
determinations about who merits “protection,”143 not on raising resources for niches not 
filled by relief-oriented NGOs, involving police, camp security, dispute resolution and 
adjudication.  As a relief-oriented agency, UNHCR is subject to a measure of pressure 
from donors that may not harbor an interest in resolving security problems.  Staff trying 
to call attention to the security problems in camps that may seem flush with material 
resources in comparison to surrounding areas may face obstacles arising from the 
agency’s heavy institutional investment in providing and coordinating material assistance 
 
140 See infra notes __ (discussing refugee, humanitarian, and human rights law).
141 See infra notes __ (discussing how host state actions may exacerbate coercion and state-in-exile 
problems).
142 See Mari-Luci Jaramillo, National Guard Refugees in Honduras, U.S. Embassy, Honduras, Cable/Secret 
(July 30, 1979)(Digital National Security Archive, Nicaragua Collection)(copy on file with 
author)(discussing how former members of the Nicaraguan National Guard sought support from the U.S. 
Embassy in Honduras as they recruited counterrevolutionaries from among Nicaraguan refugees in 
Honduras).
143 See Interview with UNHCR Senior Official # 3 (Geneva, 2005)(“It’s UNHCR’s problem when there’s 
low-level violence; when you get politicized violence, it’s harder.  During the Great Lakes when things got 
worse UNHCR went to a mercenary company – they would do it for $10 million.  But we hadn’t raised 
funds for this.”).  An examination of UNHCR’s annual Global Appeal publication, the core fundraising 
document used to galvanize support from government, organizational, and individual, is also instructive.  It 
is hard to draw inferences from the overall strategic goals because of their vagueness (i.e., “Support 
governments in the creation and maintenance of an international protection regime”).  But examining the 
details of the expected accomplishments (and particularly the “indicators of achievement” that UNHCR 
offers the donors) reveals only a scant number of lines devoted to anything remotely related to refugee 
security.  For instance, the 2005 Global Appeal has one “indicator of achievement” associated with security 
buried on page 9, which states the indicator as “Continued work to implement ExCom Conclusion No. 94 
on the Civilian and Humanitarian  Character of Asylum.”  UNHCR, GLOBAL APPEAL 2005 9 (2004).
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to refugee-like populations.  On the surface, it certainly appears as though this is the case.  
Security problems in their various forms are a predictable and pervasive result of the 
creation of refugee camps and the provision of assistance to their population.  They have 
afflicted millions of refugees in four continents since the 1950s, when UNHCR and the 
modern refugee protection system was created.  And UNHCR lacks a dedicated 
bureaucratic unit to deal with refugee security.144 As Figure 3 indicates, major public 
proclamations on the issue from the General Assembly didn’t start until the 1980s and 
1990s.  Those involving material assistance and general “protection” were common long 
before that.145 
FIGURE 3
Number of Times General Assembly Resolutions Mention Selected Refugee-Related 
Concerns
144
 As Part IV documents, the historical record is instead replete with half-completed efforts and examples 
of neglect in efforts to create a bureaucratic unit focused on refugee security matters.  One official observed 
that: 
There was an explicit effort to task a unit for responsibility with [security].  Probably where it 
didn’t work out is they didn’t get the buy-in from the protection people.  That new unit was going 
to be part of operations, and I know there has always been a big dispute between protection and 
operations about refugee security.  Quite a few years ago, mid-1990s, we were asked to set up a 
working group on refugee security.  For 3-4 months that we were working on that, the protection 
unit didn’t show up or sent a different person to each meeting.
Interview with Senior UNHCR Official # 3 (Geneva, 2005).  Others emphasized the extent to which the 
organization devoted attention to physical security concerns following the problems with Rwandan 
refugees.  One official demonstrated in the process the organization’s tendency confound discussions of 
routine provision of law enforcement services with discussions of camp militarization: “I would say that 
this issue [of security] got on the screen as a result of Rwanda.  The Interhamwe were in the camps, and aid 
was being diverted.  Refugees were being coerced – forced to stay in the camps.…Which gets you to some 
fascinating legal questions that we’ve only recently begun to actually consider.”  Interview with UNHCR 
Protection Official # 2 (Geneva, 2004).  Both senior officials and rank-and-file staff were miffed as to why 
UNHCR had taken so long to begin developing separation guidelines and similar initiatives.  See  Interview 
with UNHCR Protection Official # 1 (Geneva, 2004).  Which did not surprise an NGO official that 
frequently observes conditions at refugee camps, who observed that “UNHCR sometimes seems to forget 
that it has both a protection and an assistance mandate.  They act like it’s all just assistance.” Interview with 
NGO Official # 3 (Stanford, 2004).
145
 Resolutions were coded using UNHCR-compiled lists of General Assembly resolutions, available at 
www.unhcr.ch.  See UNHCR, Thematic Compilations: Assistance, Physical Security of Refugees; 
International Protection; and Camps (all on file with author).  The pattern in the figure almost certainly 
reflects some combination of strategic action by powerful countries and UNHCR lobbying that can (in both 
cases) command the support of a majority of UN member states -- tends to show much greater concern with 
assistance than any aspect of physical security; also shows that beginning in the 1980s, General Assembly 
activity nonetheless strengthened the legal (if not the political) basis for UNHCR and other actors in the 
refugee protection system to devote resources and attention to mitigating security problems.
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It would be hard to make the case that staff-level interest in security has kept the 
issue alive within the refugee agency, its NGO partners, and the United Nations.  Even its 
efforts in writing guidelines for separating combatants from refugees or hiring 
humanitarian security offers didn’t begin in earnest until the organization had been 
operating for four decades.  This is not to say that refugee advocates and aid workers 
within UNHCR and its major NGOs have reason to uniformly disregard security.146 Yet 
the staff are likely to operate in an environment posing substantial risks that refugee 
security problems will be neglected.  The current system emphasizes the need to keep the 
refugee burden on wealthy countries low, and also relies heavily on the presence of 
camps and material assistance in developing countries – where combatants and criminals 
have plenty of opportunities to manipulate refugee communities.  Not all host countries 
are likely to have the incentive or capacity to mitigate the security problems, and 
advanced industrialized countries are likely to find it far easier to ignore security 
problems because they so rarely have to deal with encampments on their own soil (or, as 
with some host countries, they may even have a strategic interest in abetting 
militarization).  Meanwhile, UNHCR has carved an attractive niche for itself providing 
material assistance that is not obviously compatible with efforts to mitigate security 
problems or to restrict assistance to militarized refugee camps illegally using those 
resources to continue engaging in an armed conflict.  As a result, refugees and their 
advocates face an environment where refugee security problems are common but efforts 
to mitigate such problems may be quite rare.   
Ultimately, the full picture of how UNHCR and its NGO partners respond to 
security may be considerably more intricate than it appears on the surface – as there may 
be subtler actions they have taken to cope with the reality of security problems, and it’s 
not obvious that there was or is much that could be done about the violence affecting 
refugees or the regions where camps exist.  To get a better sense of what lurks beneath 
the surface, though, we must first understand the complexities associated with distinct 
security problems affecting refugees and the measures that could be taken to mitigate 
them. 
III.  THE DEPTH OF THE PROBLEM: THE ROOTS OF REFUGEE INSECURITY  
Thus far we have established that the grand compromise of refugee protection 
creates an institutional architecture along the following lines.  Millions of refugees and
similar populations receive a place in a refugee camp in the developing world.  They 
146 See infra Part IV.
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obtain shelter, food, water, some access to medical care, and often the provision of 
education and other social services.  Hundreds of millions of dollars a year are spent on 
providing these.  In material terms,147 the resulting life is often better than what the 
refugees might have back in their own countries.  On the other hand, the combination of 
available material resources, the lack of opportunities for the most desirable “durable” 
solutions, and genuine fear that the refugees have about returning to their countries of 
origin renders the refugee camps long-term features of the global landscape.  There, the 
refugees sometimes confront lethal diseases,148 simmering tensions with surrounding 
populations viewing them with distrust or envying their higher living standards,149
proximity to armed conflict, and generalized disorder in chaotic refugee camps.150
This Part shows how the structure of the current refugee protection system makes 
various kinds of security problems not only likely but a reality, given the incentives of 
combatants and the refugees themselves, along with the frequent pattern of interests 
exhibited by host country governments.  Despite the absence of direct quantitative 
measures, a combination of indirect measures (such as those drawn from UNHCR’s own 
news reports) and insights about the structure of the existing protection system lead to the 
conclusion that security problems are relatively endemic, and have been since the early 
days of the refugee protection system.  The discussion then addresses how the various 
kinds of security problems – ranging from generalized disorder to coercive exploitation 
and to the existence of aggressive states-in-exile ensconced in refugee camps – are 
similar and different, how they affect civil conflict in surrounding regions, and what 
factors exacerbate the particularly nettlesome security problems involving coercion and 
states in exile.  Finally, the analysis in this Part suggests that it is not impossible, at least 
in principle, to see how security problems may be mitigated despite being deeply rooted 
in the existing refugee protection system.  This will lead us to then recast the focus of the 
analysis, Part IV, on what UNHCR has actually managed to accomplish with regard to 
physical security problems, and on what forces have shaped its reaction to such a critical 
dimension of refugee protection over the course of its history.  
A.  The Long-Term Presence of Security Problems 
During a single week in May 2005, for instance, UNHCR’s own news reports 
indicate that violence broke out at a camp in Chad after the arrest of refugees selling 
plastic sheeting at a local market,151 the Burundian military reportedly broke into refugee 
147
 Loescher describes the following incident:
[W]hen one UNHCR official visited a Laotian refugee camp, he noted that the camp canteen was 
serving Peking Duck for lunch!  Some of the medical facilities at Indo-Chinese refugee camps 
were so sophisticated that the doctors could perform open heart surgery.
Loescher, supra note__, at 240 n.2 (quoting Interview with Zia Rizvi, UNHCR, New York, 1983).
148 See R. Degni-Segui, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda, at 4, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1995/12 (Aug. 12, 1994)(describing the spread of cholera in refugee camps.
149 See Crisp, State of Insecurity, supra note __, at __ (alluding to instances where refugees often live at 
least as well, or better, than people in the surrounding community).
150 See supra  Part II.d.iv.
151 UNHCR Seeks to Ease Tension in Chad’s Camps, UNHCR NEWS (May 11, 2005) (avail. at 
http://www.unhcr.ch)(on file with author).
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shelters to beat refugees and threaten them if they did not leave the country,152 and 
displaced people at camps in Colombia faced murders, sexual abuse, and forced 
recruitment into armed groups.153  Such problems recur with disturbing regularity across 
geographic settings and time periods: rapes, assaults, economic exploitation, and law 
enforcement problems afflicting the camps and their thousands of inhabitants; coercive 
manipulation including the forcible recruitment of military age men (and sometimes 
children); and the operation of a war economy by states-in-exile bent on achieving 
military victory and often boasting considerable support from refugees themselves.154
More examples arise with each passing month.  
Despite the absence of detailed historical figures, available sources suggest that, 
since the 1950s, refugee encampments have routinely faced problems of internal order, 
coercion, and external attack.155 What these problems have in common is that (a) they 
eventually come to threaten the refugees’ physical integrity, (b) they generally foster 
broader instability in the entire region where the refugee camps are located, and (c) they 
have not been solved.  
Remarkably, even in recent years UNHCR and NGOs have not developed precise 
estimates of violence in various refugee camps across time and space.  According to the 
one United Nations report directly addressing the subject in the aggregate, by Sarah 
Kenyon Lischer, millions of refugees a year during the late 1980s and 1990s were 
affected by violence while they were stuck in camps.156  Despite its restrictive focus on 
“political violence,” the study revealed that the proportion of refugees affected by such 
violence was as high as 60% in some years between 1987 and 1998, and affecting an 
average of about five million refugees a year.157  This amounts to roughly to the number 
of refugees living in camps, which in turn tend to be located in the developing African 
and Asian nations that most exhibit the “political violence” that the report studies.158
152 Intimidation Reported as Rwandans Return from Burundi, UNHCR NEWS (May 13, 2005) (avail. at 
http://www.unhcr.ch)(on file with author).
153 Colombia’s Displaced Youth Face Violence, Forced Recruitment in Cities, Warns UNHCR, UNHCR 
NEWS (May 17, 2005) (avail. at http://www.unhcr.ch)(on file with author).
154 See supra Part II.b.
155 See id.  See also Hathaway, Rights of Refugees, supra note__, at __.
156 See Lischer, Political Violence, supra note__.
157 See id. at 7-8.  The proportion of refugees involved in or affected by violence, according to her 
methodology, fluctuated between 60% in 1987 and about 33% in 1998 – despite the fact that the dataset 
entirely excludes acts “of violence such as an assault or a murder that [are] described as originating from 
personal motivations or criminal activity.”  Id. at 3 n.8.  Although Lischer describes the observed pattern as 
a decline, she acknowledges that the number of states impacted by refugees grew during the relevant time 
period.  Much of the decline, moreover, in the purported number of refugees affected by violence (as 
derived by the news report-driven methodology of the study) is attributable to fluctuations in reported 
violence involving Afghan and Palestinian refugees.   See id. at 9-10.
158
 While Lischer notes that “100 receiving states reported no violence at all during the 12 year period” she 
studied, id. at 18, this is somewhat misleading as most such states only accept a small number of refugees a 
year.  For example, in 1999, Somalia reported a total of 130 refugees, Mauritania reported 220, Niger 350, 
Sri Lanka 20, Qatar 10, and so on.  UNHCR, REFUGEES AND OTHERS OF CONCERN TO UNHCR: 1999 
STATISTICAL OVERVIEW 7-8, Table I.2 (2000).  If we examine only states hosting more than 100,000 
refugees in a given year (where most refugees find themselves), between 75% and 33% of those states were 
classified as violent under Lischer’s methodology (which, as explained above, only includes states where 
refugees are associated with sustained “political violence”).  See Lischer, Political Violence, supra note __, 
at 10 (Chart 3).
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Indeed, virtually all the refugee situations that UNHCR describes as “protracted” are 
among those that Lischer identifies as exhibiting the most intense political violence.159
The average proportion of the refugee population receiving assistance from UNHCR, 
moreover, is strikingly higher where refugees are associated with the most intense 
political violence.160
A similarly striking picture emerges from examining UNHCR news reports 
available in UNHCR’s database (encompassing approximately the last nine years), which 
supplement the conclusions of the aforementioned report.  Enough attacks occur each 
year to prompt UNHCR to mention security problems in a growing number of news 
reports.161  The attacks generally occur in crowded refugee camps.  Despite UNHCR’s 
disproportionate attention to problems involving staff security, sexual or gender based 
violence, and attacks that displace people in the first place, refugee security problems in 
the camps are more widespread and less localized.  The story is all the more striking 
because it is perforce biased against revealing the full picture of threats to refugees’ 
physical security.  UNHCR news reports are likely to drastically understate the scope of 
security problems because the organization does not keep detailed records of security 
incidents across the world, and (as the reader will see) official attention to the security 
issue is not likely to be bureaucratically rewarded.  Despite this, there were comparable 
numbers of news reports regarding problems involving refugee security (815, of which 
673 focused on security problems affecting refugees after they had initially fled their 
country or region of origin) to those involving matters to which UNHCR devotes 
considerably more organizational attention, such as health or medical care (763); or 
schools, teachers, and education (678).  These figures, along with Lischer’s 
aforementioned study, make it hard to accept the notion that security problems involve 
isolated crises.
B.  The Political Economy of Refugee Security Problems Under the Grand Compromise 
The staggering degree of insecurity afflicting refugee communities is partly 
rooted in the value of material assistance and the prospects for exploiting refugee 
159 Compare Lischer, Political Violence, at 20 with UNHCR, Protracted Refugee Situations, supra note__, 
at 10.  Ironically, the UNHCR document describes these protracted situations as those where refugees’ 
“lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs 
remain unfulfilled after years in exile.”  Id. at 1, ¶ 3.
160
 In 1993 (one of the only years for which data on the proportion of refugees assisted by UNHCR and 
Lischer’s coding on intense political violence were simultaneously available) for example, UNHCR 
assisted an average of about 40% of refugees in nations hosting refugees that did not experience intense 
political violence.  The corresponding proportion for host nations experiencing intense political violence 
was 80%.  Assistance rates calculated from data in UNHCR, POPULATIONS OF CONCERN TO UNHCR: A 
STATISTICAL OVERVIEW, Table 3 (1994).  An exploratory binary logistic regression analysis, moreover, 
suggests that reports of political violence are associated with a country’s average refugee population (1987-
1998) and the proportion of refugees assisted by UNHCR (binary logistic regression; Cox & Snell r-
squared = .158, Nagelkerke r-squared = .215).  Analyses substituting intense political violence (according 
to Lischer’s coding scheme) as the dependent variable returned similar results, as did analyses restricted to 
countries with more than 50,000 or 100,000 refugees on average during the years 1987-1998. 
161
 The reported results are based on a population of all documents in UNHCR’s News Database between 
1995 and 2005 containing references to “attacks” (singular or plural), “criminal” activity or “crime,” 
“violence,” and “camp security.”  Documents referring to the same incident, or not referring to any aspect 
of refugees’ physical security, were excluded.  None of the 815 reports mentioned the search terms 
primarily to emphasize UNHCR’s success in combating the problem.
39
populations.  Suppose there are people who want to carry on a conflict amidst uprooted 
communities and one places them close to sites providing shelter, food, and medical care.  
Suppose further that those sites also house people who can be used as resources for 
exploitation, for imbuing the conflict with the legitimacy that comes from claiming to 
represent people, for recruiting combatants (or as hostages).  Suppose finally that there is 
minimal security provided by host staes or anyone else, there is little or no penalty for 
taking over those sites, or even for individual residents to engage in violent behavior as 
they compete for resources or seek to exploit other refugees.  Predictably enough, 
physical insecurity tends to emerge as a pervasive challenge.  Combatants intermingle 
with the refugee population. Guerrillas repeatedly did so with American support in camps 
along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border during the 1980s after the Soviet invasion.162  In 
the tropical jungles of Central America, the U.S. government sought to staunch precisely 
what it was encouraging on the other side of the world, as left-leaning Salvadoran 
guerrillas planned attacks that would “originate from refugee camps and safe havens,”163
and where, “while in the camps… guerrillas do not register with the UNHCR but do 
benefit from the food, clothing, shelter, medicines, and protection which the camps 
offer.”164  Or they take over: as in Mozambique-Tanzania, Cambodia-Thailand, Rwanda-
Congo, and Liberia-Sierra Leone.  Or individuals in the camps and surrounding areas 
assault refugees, plunder the resources in camps or even kidnap people in them to engage 
in human trafficking, as in Northern Kenya.165
As these examples demonstrate, the presence of material resources and uprooted 
populations in the developing world gives rise to three distinct types of security 
problems: generalized instability and crime control, coercion, and states-in-exile.  
Consider each in turn.
i.  Problem # 1: Generalized Instability and Crime Control
The most common security problem is implicit in the creation of the ersatz urban 
agglomerations that lie at the core of the modern refugee protection system.  Even the 
most peaceful and prosperous cities need police.  Though refugee camps tend to be cities 
in all respects except their name, they are unlikely to be peaceful or economically 
prosperous, their initial population faces chaotic conditions, the extent of law 
enforcement services to be provided is uncertain or meager, and the location is routinely 
close to areas of violent conflict.  This creates predictable challenges even when host 
162 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Pakistan Faces a Dangerous and 
Puzzling World, Report/Secret 1 (May 20, 1980)(Digital National Security Archive, Afghanistan 
Collection)(copy on file with author)( “[T]he Pakistanis seek to… satisfy their own domestic pressures by 
providing assistance to the Afghan rebels” in refugee camps); Deane R. Hinton, Discussion Between 
Congressman Charlie Wilson and Pakistani Officials on the State of Afghan Refugees, Cable/Secret: U.S. 
Embassy, Pakistan (January 12, 1983)(Digital National Security Archive, Afghanistan Collection)Icopy on 
file with author)(discussing the proximity of weapons storage sites for Afghan guerrillas near refugee 
camps).
163
 Office of the Defense Attaché, Plan “Saigon” – The FMLN: Strategic Plan, U.S. Embassy, Honduras, 
Cable/Secret 02912 2 (March 5, 1987)(Digital National Security Archive, El Salvador 1980-94 
Collection)(copy on file with author).
164
 John H. Penfold, FMLN uses of Colomocagua/Mesa Grande Salvadoran Refugee Camps in Honduras, 
U.S. Embassy, Honduras, Cable/Secret 16533 2 (Oct. 1, 1987)(Digital National Security Archive, El 
Salvador 1980-94 Collection)(copy on file with author).
165 See generally Crisp, State of Insecurity, supra note__, at __.
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states ostensibly manage to provide security services at UNHCR-sponsored camps, and 
even then, ethnic rivalries, property crime, sexual assault, and conflict economies can 
cause spiraling breakdowns in security conditions at the camps.  
Northern Kenya is one example of where such a spiral occurred.166  The early 
1990’s marked the beginning of a mass influx of refugees into the country.  By the end of 
1992, there were at least 420,000 refugees in Kenya, 30 times more than the country 
hosted two years before.167  Many of the Somali and Sudanese refugees pouring into the 
country were placed in camps in the North.  Sudanese refugees made up the majority of 
the approximate 75,000 refugees that inhabited Kakuma in 1999, while Somalis 
accounted for about 105,000 of the 110,000 refugees in Dadaab.  Ethiopians made up 
most of the remainder in both camps.  Both camps have been plagued by rape and assault 
on a “daily and nightly” basis that humanitarian workers anecdotally consider to be worse 
than in similarly-sized camps in Africa or Asia.168  In response, UNHCR belatedly sought 
to supplement the wages of local police officers and train them on refugee law.  
Humanitarian staff achieved little progress by 1999, when the refugee agency attempted 
one of its rare analyses of security problems in specific camps.169  Conflict and disorder 
continues to disrupt the camps and to spill into Kenyan areas around both camps, 
allowing rebel groups to easily continue using the camps as a base.170
ii.  Problem # 2: Coercion
Still more troubling security problems involve situations where refugees are 
subject to the organized use of force, involving coercion by combatants in their midst, or 
external attacks on camps that the refugees were unable to escape because they were 
being coerced to remain.  Rwandan refugees in the Great Lakes region faced such 
coercion.  Both problems also afflicted Cambodians in Thailand during the 1980s.171
From a refugee perspective, Indochina was a perpetual disaster between the mid-
1970s and the early 1990s.  Successive waves of armed conflict engulfed the region 
virtually without end beginning with the Vietnamese war of independence against the 
French in the early 1950s, and continuing through a second Indochina war pitting 
Americans against North Vietnamese troops and guerrillas as well as civil conflicts and 
war between Vietnam and China.172 By the late 1970s, thousands of refugees sought to 
enter Thailand from Vietnam and Cambodia.  When Vietnam invaded Cambodia to 
vanquish its brutal Khmer Rouge adversaries, the steady flow of Cambodians trudging 
through the mountainous jungle into Thailand became a flood.  UNHCR initially resisted 
involvement with many of the refugees, which eventually led the United States and its 
allies to sponsor a separate United Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) to supply 
166 See id., at __ (discussing efforts to improve conditions to reduce sexual and gender-based violence in the 
refugee  camps, especially in Northern Kenya).
167 See id., at __.
168 See id., at __.
169 See id., at __.
170 See U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, Kenya: Country Report, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 
(2003)(avail. at www.refugees.org, last accessed October 10, 2005).
171 See infra notes __ (discussing Thailand).  
172 See generally Terry, supra note__, at __ (discussing the deterioration of refugee conditions in Thailand).
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and administer camps immediately on the Thai-Cambodian border.173  Eventually U.S. 
pressure and the size of the influx resulted in UNHCR’s provision of assistance services. 
UNHCR ran a holding center further back from the border where some Cambodian 
refugees awaited resettlement.  Before long the Khmer Rouge, backed by multilateral, 
American, and (covertly supplied) Thai aid, controlled many of the camps and the 
refugees within them.  Some refugees managed to escape.  Many more were held against 
their will.
The Thai government, meanwhile, seemed bent on either letting the border camps 
remain in the grip of Khmer Rouge fighters or forcing civilian refugees back to 
Cambodia.  In a single incident on night during the soggy month of June in 1979, the 
Thai military forcibly moved 40,000 encamped Cambodians across the border to 
Cambodia.  Thousands died from exploding mines and military gunfire as they sought to 
return, and more still died of malaria and starvation.174  In autumn 1979, warnings of 
impending starvation in Cambodia, an the promise of international aid money coaxed the 
Thais into allowing the refugees to be held at closed camps run by UNHCR.  The Thais 
fought efforts to resettle refugees in the U.S. and other Western countries, fearing such a 
program would attract still more refugees that the Western nations would ultimately fail 
to resettle.175
C.  Problem # 3: Militarized States-in-Exile
Perhaps the thorniest security problem involves populations of refugees 
determined to support combatants ensconced in the camps with them.  Unlike situations 
involving coercion, states-in-exile often command substantial, and even enthusiastic, 
support from rank and file refugees.
Untold thousands of Mozambican refugees did precisely this in Tanzanian camps 
during the middle of the 20th century, as did South African refugees throughout southern 
Africa.  During the late 1950s and 1960s the Portugese sought to harden their grip on 
power in the southern African nation through violent attacks on opposition groups and 
legal restrictions on dissent.  Anti-resistance groups then reaped additional support, 
bolstered by perverse reaction to the restrictive measures among the Mozambican 
population, and revolts in the Portugese colony of Angola.  In the fall of 1964, the 
Mozambique Liberation Front, FRELIMO,176 launched a military offensive against the 
Portuguese in Mozambique.  Having begun with a paltry 250 trained and equipped men 
in 1964, the movement grew to 8,000 by 1967.177  Portugal took notice of the actions of 
the Tanzanian government and the FRELIMO troops and began periodic attack raids on 
173 See Loescher, supra note __, at __ (discussing Indochina).
174 See id., at 211, 213 (“As it turned out, refugees did not return home for nearly twelve years but remained 
pawns of Khmer military groups who used and abused the refugees at will.”).
175 See Terry, supra note__, at __ (discussing the Thai government’s reluctance to allow the refugees to 
come).  Troubling as the Thai government’s actions were from a humanitarian perspective, the question of 
whether Thai behavior was legal is more complex.  Thailand did not sign the Refugee Convention and 
Protocol.  The legality of its actions therefore depend on contested inferences about the extent to which 
non-refoulement had attained the status of a norm of customary international law at the time.  For a 
discussion of the customary law question, see generally Goodwin-Gill, supra note__, at __.
176 See MARK F. CHINGONO, VIOLENCE AND DEVELOPMENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR IN 
MOZAMBIQUE, 1975-1992 (1996).
177 See EDUARDO MONDLANE, THE STRUGGLE FOR MOZAMBIQUE (1960).
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Tanzanian camps.  They also lined the border between Tanzania and Mozambique with 
mines.178  At UNHCR, High Commissioner Schnyder “felt that it was not the job of the 
High Commissioner to resolve the bigger political problems… stress[ing] that the High 
Commissioner’s role was to ease tensions between states by assisting refugees and 
[helping] governments resolve refugee problems.”179 As aid continued to flow, the 
estimated number of Mozambican refugees in Tanzania soon grew to tens of thousands.180
The new refugee flows yielded fresh recruits and resources for FRELIMO, but also brutal 
reprisal attacks on the refugee camps by the Portugese army.181  The army’s broader 
response consisted of forcibly relocating over a million people within Mozambique into 
“fortified villages.”  By the time this "protected village" policy ended in 1972, about 1.25 
million had been relocated.  The local backlash against this forced displacement fed 
FRELIMO’s growth.  Its guerrillas continued advancing on the Portuguese, assisted from 
its refugee-camp bases by rank-and-file refugees.  The deterioration of the Portugese 
military’s position eventually helped fuel a coup in Lisbon.  Its new military government 
agreed to liberate Mozambique within one year.182
A similar situation developed involving South Africans.  Combatants and their 
refugee supporters sought to dislodge the Apartheid regime.  UNHCR staff continued 
supplying the camps despite their obvious militarization.183  The South African 
government responded by aggressively targeting the camps.184  The violence afflicting
Mozambicans, South Africans, and similar refugee populations thus involves not 
generalized disorder or pervasive coercion of by irregular bands of combatants.  Instead, 
the violence enveloping the camps tends to involve the armed activities of a virtual state-
in-exile, often operating with substantial support from the population of refugees, where 
the imperative of distributing aid to needy refugees necessarily conflicts with laws 
requiring that asylum remain “civilian and humanitarian.”185
C.  Mitigating Refugee Security Problems
The preceding description makes it clear why a refugee protection system relying 
on camps in chaotic regions in the world is likely to confront distinct kinds of security 
problems.  At the same time, the various types of threats to refugees’ physical security 
also reflect important commonalities.  Chaotic disorder in the camps, like coercion and 
military states-in-exile, directly involves risks to refugees’ physical integrity that offend 
guarantees enshrined in international.  All security problems have the potential for 
spillover effects exacerbating the risks of civil conflict in regions where refugees are 
178 See Loescher, supra note__, at __.
179 See id., at 117.
180
 Zambia also hosted between 2,000 and 5,000 registered refugee.  See Loescher, supra note__, at __.  See 
also UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees , supra note __, at __.
181 See UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees, supra note __, at __ (discussing Portugese attacks against 
Mozambican refugees).
182 See MARIO JOAQUIM AZEVEDO, TRAGEDY AND TRIUMPH: MOZAMBIQUE REFUGES IN AFRICA, 1977-2001 
(2002).
183 See Interview with Senior UNHCR Official # 3 (Geneva, 2005).
184 See UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees, supra note__, at __ (discussing infiltrated camps of South 
African refugees); Ely-Elikunda, supra note__, at 92-93.
185 See supra Part I.b.
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housed.186  And, as will become clear, each of the security problems have been neglected 
to some extent by UNHCR and its partners.
But it is another potential similarity among these problems could prove most 
disturbing to refugee advocates, and that is that little or nothing can be done about 
them.187  The sense of futility might loom even larger given the fact that the problems are 
partly rooted in the structure of the refugee protection system itself.  Nonetheless, not all 
security problems lack plausible solutions.
The most predictable and recurring problem involves keeping order in the camps, 
which turns out to resemble the problem of controlling criminal activity in some domestic 
public housing projects.188  At its core, this problem involves enforcing rules of criminal 
justice in what becomes an instant city.  It is exacerbated by some of the conditions of 
refugee camps, which seem all but carefully crafted to catalyze crime.  These conditions 
include a displaced population, a hastily developed physical environment, its 
characteristic as a site for distribution of valuable resources, and the blending of 
populations that have some pre-existing or recently-developed propensity for conflict 
(ethnic or otherwise) with each other.  If left unchecked, the generalized instability can 
also contribute to regional instability and to the spread of conflict, because combatants 
not infrequently mix their activities with criminal pursuits and coercion to enhance their 
resources.
189
On occasion, UNHCR has made efforts to fund security-related activities by the 
host country,190 but for the most part it continues to insist that this is part of the host 
state’s responsibilities.191  The principled case for neglect here is almost impossible to 
make. The humanitarian character of asylum seems close to meaningless as a legal 
principle if generalized lawlessness overwhelms refugee security.  Not only is this 
problem entirely possible to anticipate, but UNHCR’s resources presumably allow it to 
do something about it – to raise funds for it, finance it, engage in research and evaluation, 
and hire technical experts knowledgeable about this all to a degree far greater than what 
it’s done.  Host state responsibility does not extinguish UNHCR’s role.  Thus, UNHCR 
186 See Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, supra note__ (discussing how coercion and states-in-exile can 
exacerbate the risk of wider conflict).  See also interview with UNHCR Senior Official # 3, supra note__ 
(discussing how generalized disorder and instability can create problems for surrounding communities 
close to refugee encampments).
187 See, e.g., Ogata, supra note__, at 353 (noting that UNHCR “deploy[s] our own staff, unarmed 
humanitarian workers, to dangerous and isolated duty stations [and]… in most parts of the world where 
UNHCR and its humanitarian partners are called upon to operate, mechanisms to address security problems 
are slow-moving, unwieldy, and not adapted to the new type of conflicts”); Interview with NGO Official # 
3, supra note__; Interview with UNHCR Protection Official # 4, supra note__.
188 Cf. Dennis W. Roncek, Ralph Bell, and Jeffrey M.A. Francik, Housing Projects and Crime: Testing a 
Proximity Hypothesis, 29 SOC. PROBLEMS 151, 163 (1981)(Finding that “the size of the housing projects 
has a small but positive and statistically significant effect on the distribution of crime across all the 
residential blocks in Cleveland…” and that “[c]oncentrating public housing results in more crime on the 
blocks where the projects are located”).
189 See Lischer, supra note__, at __.
190 See infra notes (describing instances where UNHCR has made limited efforts to help fund security 
operations, as in Eastern Congo in the mid-1990s or in early 2002 in Northern Kenya).
191 See Ogata, supra note __, at __ (suggesting that most security problems can be fixed if host countries 
face up to their responsibilities).
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staff could build on current dispute resolution training efforts in camps to focus on 
funding, evaluation, logistical support, and providing incentives for host country.
Such steps need not imply a wholesale divestment of operational responsibilities 
for material assistance. Although there is a palpable conceptual tension between 
advancing such a security agenda and delivering material assistance, the agency’s 
capacity to mitigate violence and exploitation may ironically depend on understanding 
the intricate interrelationship between material assistance and the political economy of 
security problems in the camps.  Refugee advocates sometimes insist on emphasizing that 
providing material assistance amounts to providing security.  This conception ironically 
rings simultaneously hollow and true.  While it may be unconvincing to argue that the 
agency’s contribution to security is legally sufficient simply because it provides relief, 
material assistance is nonetheless often tightly interwoven with security problems.  I have 
already discussed how assistance can attract and exacerbate security problems by making 
refugee camps valuable to combatants.  The flip side is that changes in the flow of 
material resources to camps with a settled population may spark crime and conflict for 
which the agency ought to prepare a response.  An example: 
One time we had a 40% drop in our food supply because the WFP had a problem 
with the food pipeline.  Like that, a drop of 40%.  And then we found prostitution 
went up.  Women were prostituting themselves because they wanted food.  
Domestic violence went up because the men weren’t bringing home the food.  
Women got involved in convincing us to change the structure of food distribution 
within the camps so we could get the food directly to them.  It never occurred to 
us that the men wouldn’t bring the food home.  Then the young men started 
getting violent, joining militias.  The rumor started going around that if you slept 
with a virgin you became invincible.  Who would have thought that the rape of an 
eight year old girl would have been connected to a 40% drop in the food 
supply?192
It is tempting to view this spike in lawless chaos at a camp as support for the 
contention that assuring the flow of material assistance resolves security problems. But 
the example suggests a more intricate relationship between economic and physical 
security.  Material assistance can subsidize conflict and violence just as it can assuage 
chaos borne from deprivation.  Changes in material assistance flows may tend to have 
predictable security implications connected to the political economy of resource 
distribution in the camps, which in turn suggests that UNHCR can learn to anticipate how 
best to allocate scarce resources to support law enforcement efforts aimed at controlling 
instability linked to changes in the delivery of material assistance.193
Coercion and state-in-exile problems raise more profound complexities, because 
of the magnitude of military or civilian policing capacity necessary to implement lasting 
solutions and the possibility (in the case of states-in-exile) that the refugees themselves 
may support goals plainly at odds with refugee law.  To understand why refugee 
advocates can mitigate these particularly severe security problems, we must investigate
192
 Interview with UNHCR Official # 4 (New York, 2004).
193
 See infra Part IV for a discussion of the extent to which UNHCR currently fails to do this.
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what conditions enable these problems to arise and grow in severity. In dozens of refugee 
emergencies over the last five decades, a pattern of coercion and militarization emerges 
to undermine refugee security.  Dozens more give rise to incidents of sufficient intensity 
that they are chronicled in UNHCR news reports.194  These situations contrast with a host 
of others were refugee camps (indeed, sometimes from the same countries of origin, or in 
the same host country, as those previously described) prove altogether more peaceful – at 
least according to the small scholarly literature on the subject and some of the officials I 
interviewed.  These include Rwandans in Tanzania in the 1990s, Liberians and Sierra 
Leonians in Guinea in the late 1990s and today, Afghans in Iran in the 1980s, and camps 
in Kenya today outside its northern provinces.  As one UNHCR official noted: 
Over the years sometimes we’ve had workable collaborations with states to help 
them undertake their responsibility for law and order, and we also assist them in 
separation and internment.  Good examples include Sierra Leone, Zambia…  
Sometimes the presence of UNHCR has been critical, because there’s a lot of 
learning that goes into this process of resolving disputes peacefully in the camps.  
We seem to have learned some valuable things particularly with sexual and 
gender-based violence.  We support a lot of groups to offer education, but we also 
try to foster dialogue… In the larger camps we’ve helped committees come up 
with a set of camp rules, and regulations, including a code of conduct for security 
volunteers.195
So what helps explain situations where violence and threats to refugees’ personal 
integrity engulf a camp?  
A major problem in answering the question directly is the paucity of reliable time-
series data on violent incidents in the camps, and the lack of quantitative data on laws and 
policies governing them.196 Available data nonetheless yield a complex, though 
necessarily tentative, picture.197  Many of the most severe security problems – involving 
coercion and states-in-exile – seem to be exacerbated by the availability of resources to 
fuel conflict, the camps’ proximity to pre-existing zones of conflict, the extent of political 
organization among arriving refugee communities, support for civil conflict among 
refugees, the role of host states in solving or exacerbating security problems, and the 
strategies used by UNHCR and its partners to mitigate the risk of violence.  Consider 
each of these in turn.
An initial factor is the availability of economic resources that combatants and 
criminals can exploit in refugee communities.  From the plains of Africa to the thick 
Andean forests, economic resources prove central to armed conflict.  Fighters know 
194 See supra Part II.d.iv.
195
 Interview with UNHCR Operations Official # 2, supra note__.
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 The Lischer UNHCR study and the preceding analysis of UNHCR news reports contained in this article 
appear to constitute the most extensive quantitative efforts thus far.
197 To obtain that picture, I drew on interviews discussing instances where security was perceived as being a 
particularly severe or mild problem by staff, the small existing literature on refugee security problems, and 
an analysis of five cases that humanitarian staff at UNHCR and NGOs repeatedly identified as representing 
major breakdowns in the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum.  These involved Afghans in 
Pakistan in the 1980s, the Great Lakes crisis in the 1990s, Cambodians in Thailand in the 1980s, South 
Africans throughout southern Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, and Nicaraguans in Honduras in the 1980s.
46
conflict to be costly and risky.  Foot soldiers must be fed, their families sheltered, and 
their wounds dressed.  Individual combatants may harbor complex, overlapping 
ideological motivations underlying decisions to fight.  But groups desire to prevail in the 
recurring competition for economic resources can be a powerful inducement to fight, and 
their initial access to economic resources can be a crucial determinant of their viability.198
It is repeatedly the case that an intimate link develops between aid, physical security 
problems, and manipulation.  Other things being equal, less aid seems to make particular 
populations or geographic sites less attractive to combatants, and greater aid makes 
control of these populations (and their resources) more valuable.  The pattern of 
combatants diverting aid and establishing military operations in refugee camps has 
therefore arisen frequently, in location such as Thailand (with Cambodian refugees), in 
Honduras (with Salvadoran and  Nicaraguan refugees), in Southern Africa (with South 
African refugees, as well as Zimbabweans and Mozambicans), and a host of other 
settings.  Resources may also be available where combatants come to control natural 
resources (like diamond or gold deposits) or assert control over what would otherwise be 
licit, as well as illicit, trade.199  The synergy between these financial resources, as well as 
the organizational, material, and legitimacy advantages of camps, can exacerbate security 
and manipulation problems.200
So can proximity to pre-existing conflict zones.  Even UNHCR admits that 
relative proximity to conflict zones makes things worse.  Its guideline of building camps 
at least 50 kilometers from national borders is sometimes simply honored in the breach.201
And indeed, sometimes 50 kilometers or more of distance from the border are not enough 
to prevent the deterioration of security in a camp.  But the presence of pre-existing 
conflict makes it easier for various parties in the conflict to manipulate the refugees, to 
use them as a convenient proxy target, or to exploit their resources to feed a pre-existing 
war economy.202
The refugee community’s extent of political organization is a filter for the impact 
of geography and the quest for resources.  A full state-in-exile, such as the Rwandan 
Hutu Regime in Eastern Congo or Palestinians in Lebanon, exacerbates risk of violence, 
both in the form of greater risks of violent aggression against refugee populations, and 
(more significantly) greater likelihood of militarized activity based in refugee camps 
drawing violent reprisals.  Ironically, sometimes UNHCR has encouraged the political 
control of a state-in-exile, as have advocates working at UNRWA with Palestinian 
refugees.  Humanitarian relief workers may see this strategy as a means of minimizing 
198 See Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, WORLD BANK RES. PAPER. 
(avail. at http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/greedandgrievance.htm)(last accessed Oct. 31, 
2005).
199 Cf. Reno, supra note__, at __ (discussing the link between private gain and conflict in African states).
200 See Terry, supra note__, at __, and Lischer, supra note__, at __.
201 See Interview with UNHCR Official # 3.
202 In Honduras during the 1980s, for example, the left-leaning FMLN refugees had relatively low degrees 
of political organization and no support from the Honduran government, but the camps’ proximity to 
conflict zones heightened the extent to which guerrillas easily recruited from the camps and used them to 
their advantage.  See, e.g., John D. Negroponte, Salvadoran Refugees: Guerrillas Mine Trails Used by 
Refugees, U.S. Embassy, Honduras, Cable/Unclassified (June 7, 1984)(Digital National Security Archive, 
El Salvador 1977-1984 Collection)(copy on file with author).
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the risk of generalized lawlessness.203  But it is a costly bargain.204  Violence associated 
with an ongoing war breaches the legal character of asylum.  It may be especially 
protracted and lethal.  UNHCR has nonetheless often encouraged reliance on the existing 
structure of social control from the regions that the refugees fled – even if it involves 
leaders committed to continuing an armed struggle – because it simplifies camp 
administration and because disrupting it would consume resources.  The extent to which 
this makes sense, though, depends in part on what one considers the goal of the refugee 
protection system.  Serious concern about security appears to make reliance on pre-
existing political structures problematic, particularly in situations where there is no 
obvious evidence that refugees themselves support that structure.
But sometimes they do.  Keeping refugees safe surely becomes more difficult 
when the refugees themselves actively support the continuation of conflict.  UNHCR and 
many other NGOs simultaneously emphasize their commitment to the civilian and 
humanitarian character of asylum while insisting on the crucial importance of refugee 
self-determination.205  It’s a mirage to think that one routinely goes with the other.  
Refugees can intensely support armed conflict, as did Tutsis in Uganda in 1990, or 
Mozambicans in Tanzania in the 1960s.206  Even if support is initially weak, the presence 
of combatants in camps tends to draw reprisal attacks.  In the right circumstances, as with 
Algerian refugees in Morocco and Tunisia in the late 1950s, such attacks help build 
support for combatants in the camps.  Coercion may continue too, as it did in Algeria, 
which shows how compulsion can blend with and become easier when there is some 
support among civilian refugees.  How the refugee protection system should respond is a 
difficult question.  The answer depends in part on the value one assigns to compliance 
with the law and the ideals espoused therein.  Nonetheless, while sometimes refugees are 
brutally coerced, security breakdowns can also be aided and abetted by rank and file 
refugees.207
As with the generalized crime-control problems, host state behavior can 
exacerbate the risk of coercion or militarization.208 Thailand actively encouraged Khmer 
Rouge control of border refugee camps.209  So did Tanzanian authorities sympathetic to 
the Mozambican independence movement.210  When states are mired in chaos and have 
203 See Lischer, supra note__, at __ (discussing states-in-exile).
204
 Any consequentialist defense of the use of states-in-exile to control generalized lawlessness in refugee 
camps must contend with the fact that institutional pressures likely to distort UNHCR’s own analysis of the 
merits of such a bargain.  See infra Part IV.c.
205 Compare, e.g., Ruma Mandal, Political Rights of Refugees, DEP’T OF INT’L PROT., LEGAL & PROT. 
POLCY RES. SERIES, Doc. No. PPLA/2003/04 (Nov. 2003)(emphasizing the value of refugee self-
determination), and UNHCR, COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR FIELD STAFF 41 
(1997)(“UNHCR and implementing partner staff will have a role to play to ensure that refugee 
representatives are truly representative”) with UNHCR, ExCom Conclusion 94, supra note__ (emphasizing 
the central importance of the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum).
206 See Loescher, supra note __, at __ (discussing states-in-exile involving refugee support).
207 See infra Part III (discussing refugees’ support for combatants).
208 See Lischer, supra note__, at __ (discussing the impact of refugee organization and host state support on 
militarization).
209 See Terry, supra note __, at __ (discussing Thailand’s active support of the Khmer Rouge, either from 
Fiona Terry).  
210 See infra notes __ (discussing Tanzanian support for Mozambicans).
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more restricted capabilities to provide security in the camps, as in Eastern Congo and the 
Horn of Africa, the predictable consequence is that it lowers the cost for armed elements 
and criminals to take greater control in the camps.  Not all instances of militarization or 
manipulation occur with host state support.  Indeed, the fact that some host states attack 
the refugees themselves serves as an indication of that.  But any comprehensive effort to 
address security problems must contend with the importance of changing the incentives 
of many host states.  The same can be said for security capacity-building in chaotic host 
states like the Congo, or to acquiesce for their provision by the international community.  
In the absence of such services, the situation in the camps can quickly deteriorate.  All of 
which provides some support for UNHCR’s recurring emphasis on the behavior of host 
states.211
But only some support.  In fact, the preceding analysis also supports the view that 
UNHCR and its partners can impact even the more nettlesome coercion and state-in-exile 
refugee security problems at the margin.  As some observers (including UNHCR 
officials) have only recently and occasionally recognized, the agency has the power to 
reduce or eliminate material assistance in settings where aid merely supports combatants 
who are coercing refugees.212
Admittedly, circumstances are rarely so clear-cut.  Some situations where 
refugees initially appear to face violent coercion instead involve state-in-exile situations 
commanding substantial refugee support.  But even these problems may not be 
impossible to mitigate.  In an ideal world, military detachments and civilian police units 
would disarm arriving refugees and prevent those arriving from being coerced.  As 
officials of UNHCR itself have occasionally recognized, the absence of such resources 
does not eliminate the possibility of mitigating coercion problems.  Despite the frequent 
absence of support from peacekeepers or international civil policing contingents, 
UNHCR has shown itself not to be entirely powerless to confront security problems –
particularly those involving sexual and gender-based violence and (occasionally) the 
provision of law enforcement services.  On occasion UNHCR has helped pay for 
policing, it has (belatedly) provided technical assistance to promote peaceful dispute 
resolution within the camps, and it has helped countries run screening programs to 
separate combatants from refugees.213  Among the crucial goals that UNHCR can 
211
 The problem is not with the agency’s calls for host states to assume responsibility. It is instead with the 
assumption that such calls, by themselves, are likely to make a dramatic difference over time; and the focus 
on host states as part of a pattern where the organization generally minimizes the scope of its own 
responsibility to mitigate security problems within its competence, or to attract attention to them from the 
larger set of players shaping the refugee protection system.
212 See Stedman, supra note __ (discussing UNHCR’s power to reduce funding to militarized refugee 
encampments).  But see Ogata, infra note__ at __ (insisting, though ultimately unpersuasively, that 
UNHCR’s mandate does not allow it to restrict aid in such a manner).
213
 Other episodes also show how observers in the field believe that some UNHCR-assisted (or UNHCR-
led) security initiatives have a beneficial effect.  Some examples: changing the location of single women in 
refugee camps throughout the world to prevent sexual assaults (Interivew with UNHCR Operations Official 
# 3 (Bushra Halepota, New York, 2004); funding police in Northern Kenya, see Crisp, State of Insecurity, 
supra note__, at __; technical assistance to the Central African Republic in separating combatants from 
refugees, see HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, REFUGEES, REBELS AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE (2002); and 
initiatives in Western Africa to increase monitoring at key refugee camps in Guinea and Sierra Leone, see 
Interview with UNHCR Operations Official # 2, supra note__.
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materially assist in achieving – and indeed, that are mandated by the legal imperative of 
keeping asylum “civilian and humanitarian” – the most obvious are disarmament and 
separation, for which existing law provides a framework.  In the past UNHCR has 
occasionally offered technical assistance and money for separation (as in the African 
region of Zongo), but the range of situations that call for such assistance appears to be 
greater than the historical record of assistance provided.214  Camp locations and 
organization (as noted earlier) can probably reduce their attractiveness to combatants.215
Using expertise and information, UNHCR could create and invest in a high-quality 
monitoring system to track progress, to take advantage of natural experiments, and to 
plan some partially-controlled experiments. It could also avoid the housing of refugees 
with substantial ethnic conflicts in or near the same camp (as did not happen in Kenya).  
Training sessions for refugee women, men, and NGO camp workers appeared to have 
had some positive effect, though no systematic empirical analysis seems to have been 
attempted.216  Several UNHCR employees gave detailed examples of how changes in 
camp organization had enhanced security prospects by placing single women and young 
girls in places where they were less likely to be threatened.217
At the same time, principled action in this domain depends on recognizing there is 
no technocratic fix for some of the most severe coercion and state-in-exile problems, 
particularly the latter situations that command substantial support from refugees.  Unless 
rare scenarios arise can be entirely separated and interned, as with Rwandans in 
Tanzania, neither UNHCR nor relief NGOs can use a scalpel to separate legally 
acceptable recipients from bad ones.  Even if they could, the refugees themselves would 
constantly try to undermine that separation as supporters of the armed struggle among the 
civilian population did their best to funnel resources to their armed brethren.  If the 
combatants are intensely supported by the refugee population among which they are 
based, then it’s exceedingly difficult if not impossible to draw distinctions among 
recipients of aid.  It’s as if the camp refugees had (democratically) elected to support the 
war effort.  On the one hand, there may be a principled justification for simply ignoring 
the security problems and implementing a principle privileging the short-term prevention 
(or postponement) of starvation or within-country slaughter of potential refugees.  From 
this perspective, simply cutting off aid has immediate consequences that are so dire from 
a humanitarian perspective that the option should essentially be removed from the table.  
This was former High Commissioner Ogata’s perspective during the Great Lakes 
debacle:  
214 Although Tanzanian camps housing Rwandan Hutus are a reasonably cogent example of mitigation 
techniques helping to reduce insecurity, they were certainly assisted in part by the direct support of a 
functioning government.  Such government support was less forthcoming in Guinea and a few other 
countries, where mitigation techniques also appear (by some accounts) to have had an effect.  See Lisa Yu, 
Separating Ex-Combatants and Refugees in Zongo, DRC: Peacekeepers and UNHCR’s “Ladder of 
Options”,  UNHCR: NEW ISSUES IN REFUGEE RESEARCH, WORKING PAPER NO. 60 (August 2002).
215
 Though Lischer disputes the extent to which camp size matters in militarization, a number of UNHCR 
officials I interviewed suggested that larger camps are more prone to control by armed elements.  Interview 
with UNHCR Operations Official # 2, supra note__.  Vastly larger camps (i.e., those of more than 50,000 
inhabitants) almost certainly pose more complex law enforcement problems as well.
216 See Interview with NGO Official # 2, supra note__, at __.
217 See Interview with UNHCR Operations Official # 3 (New York, 2004).
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On September 29 Médecins sans Frontières representatives called on me to 
express their concern about the undesirable situation of the camps controlled by 
the former Rwandese regime and to inform me that they were thinking of 
withdrawing.  I shared their analysis, but my mandate would not allow us to leave 
the refugees. The group stated it had to take a definite stand that its ‘presence 
would continue to be used by the leaders to legitimize their past and future 
power.’218
Staff and the organizations they work for might also bolster this sort of norm through 
reference to the justness of the cause involved.219
This account no doubt reflects the extraordinary pressures that High 
Commissioner Ogata faced at the time.  But it also elides disquieting problems implicit in 
modern refugee protection.  While it would be nearly impossible for principled refugee 
advocates to argue for the continued provision of aid to combatants who are blatantly 
coercing refugees, many may find it tempting to look the other way when a state-in-exile 
garners refugee support.  Nonetheless, if refugee advocates continue providing aid to a 
militarized state-in-exile as a means of making it viable for refugees to leave their host 
countries, at a minimum, they should recognize that such a move exists in stark tension 
with what the law requires, that it is likely to undermine support for asylum in the long 
run, and that it almost inevitably places refugees in danger of reprisal attacks.  Given 
these risks and the forces likely to distort UNHCR’s capacity to make reasoned 
judgments in this area, it is hard to see the merit in a blanket policy of providing aid to 
states-in-exile merely because they are supported by refugees.
In short, the challenges associated with mitigating physical security problems for 
refugees are difficult and persistent because of a powerful political and economic logic
feeding such problems.  The problems themselves are different in crucial ways even 
though they also implicate related concerns, and there are at least some plausible avenues 
for refugee advocates – particularly UNHCR – to mitigate them.  Indeed, this last point 
helped motivate both the organization’s leadership and staff to compile lists of various 
measures that could be implemented to mitigate such problems in the past (particularly 
after crises).  Which raises the question of whether such mitigation has actually occurred, 
and (if so) how this potential mission has interacted with the other major roles of 
218 See Ogata, supra note__, at 203.  The High Commissioner’s view about the legal constraints governing 
UNHCR during this operation is questionable.  Neither the UNHCR Statute nor any other legal instrument 
prevents UNHCR from assessing the extent to which potential recipients of assistance and nominal 
protection are in fact appropriate recipients.  In part for this reason, UNHCR has withdrawn assistance or 
avoided providing it in the first place in a number of instances (though certainly only a small fraction of the 
total) where camps are essentially bases of military activity.  Moreover, the legal basis for providing 
refugee protection of any kind – including assistance – becomes increasingly questionable the higher the 
probability that the assistance essentially involves the support of active combatants and the continuation of 
conflict.  Former combatants may naturally become eligible for refugee status under certain circumstances, 
but they must renounce armed struggle to do so.  There may be some room for principled debate about this 
requirement, but as I noted earlier, its existence is hard to dispute.  This suggests that the former High 
Commissioner was either engaging in a somewhat facile oversimplification of the legal and ethical issues, 
or (more likely) she was giving voice to a competing normative imperative akin to what I have defined as 
the principle of “preventing the immediate slaughter.”
219 See Interview with NGO Official # 2, supra note__ (insisting that judgment calls are difficult and there’s 
something to be said for not disengaging from a refugee emergency that is militarized).
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UNHCR and its partners – the provision of assistance to refugees and refugee-like 
populations, and the extension of formal legal protection through certifications of refugee 
status.  We turn to these matters next.
IV.  THE EVOLUTION OF UNHCR AND ITS IMPACT ON THE GRAND COMPROMISE 
Our journey through the refugee protection system has demonstrated how much 
protection depends not only on the behavior of host country governments and their 
advanced industrialized counterparts, but also on how UNHCR and its partners manage 
refugee camps.  This reality raises the critical question of what priorities most define the 
work of UNHCR and its partners, and how they came about.  This Part sheds light on 
these questions.  It does so by tracing the history of the modern UNHCR and surveying 
its relatively meager institute-wide efforts to address the various manifestations of threats 
to refugees’ physical security in the evolving refugee protection system.
The historical narrative reveals a resilient agency with a capacity for significant,
semi-autonomous, policy innovation.  That capacity has emerged despite the constraints 
placed on it by the national governments who continue providing most of its funds and 
the host country governments that house the refugees under its care.  The organization 
also exhibits a tendency to respond to political and budgetary crises by expanding the 
scope of the agency’s responsibilities (thereby helping to grow the public and 
governmental constituencies supporting its work) and developing particular expertise in 
massive relief operations (thereby reducing the risk of embarrassing failures in the arena 
with which it became increasingly identified).  On the other hand, the relative 
marginalization of the agency’s mandate for providing “legal protection” to refugees 
(which it has primarily pursued by providing determinations of refugee status) showcases 
the tensions that exist between the agency’s newly-central assistance mission – which is 
generally advanced by more widespread distributions of aid to populations that appear 
blameless and worth of aid – and competing tasks that depend on drawing distinctions 
between worth and less-worthy recipients of international attention.  As will become 
plain, this tension has also worked against the agency’s limited activities focused on 
promoting refugees’ physical security in the encampments where most of them live.
The analysis begins from the premise that UNHCR shares two essential 
characteristics with a host of other domestic and international bureaucracies such as the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the Office of Foreign Assets 
Control, and the World Health Organization.  Each is burdened with an ambitious legal 
mandate.  And each possesses scarce resources to carry out that mandate.  As a result, 
doing more of one thing almost inevitably means doing less of another.  At NHTSA, 
more product recalls meant fewer resources devoted to prospective regulation.220  Before 
September 11, 2001 the FBI’s focus on elaborate transnational drug enforcement
consumed resources that might have otherwise been devoted to counter-terrorism.221
When organizations such as UNHCR prioritize certain activities, they make it easier to 
pursue goals complementing those priorities and harder to pursue goals conflicting with 
220 See generally JERRY MASHAW AND DAVID HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990).
221 See generally REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED 
STATES (2003).
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them.  Given the tensions between organizations’ existing interpretations of their legal 
and policy mandates and potential ones, it is impossible to give a coherent account of 
UNHCR’s responses to security-related problems without understanding how it has
interpreted its legal mandate over time, how it has come play the role that it does – and to 
do the work that it does – within the refugee protection system.  In short, to understand 
the legal and organizational realities affecting refugees’ physical security, we must 
understand how the major refugee advocate came to prioritize its current functions. 
A.  Tracing the Evolution of UNHCR 
The evolution of UNHCR during the last half-century is epitomized by 
entrepreneurial expansions in its responsibilities and resource accumulation following 
deliberate choices by its leaders to deal with organizational crises in this manner.  
Organizational expansion at the agency played out in symbiotic evolution with the 
refugee protection system as a whole alongside UNHCR, where the agency and the 
sprawling global system of NGOs, national priorities, treaties, and domestic laws 
reciprocally affected the availability of material assistance to displaced populations.  The 
agency’s earliest days, however, provided scarcely a hint of the global scope that lay in 
its future, of the massive legal and bureaucratic machinery of refugee protection implicit 
in the grand compromise described earlier.  
When the Office opened its doors in 1950, it boasted only a few dozen employees, 
limited funds, restrictions on raising voluntary contributions from governments or 
individuals, an unclear mandate, and no proven track record of effectively solving any 
sort of problem for any important constituency.  The soon-to-be finished Refugee 
Convention had the makings not of a foundational pillar of the postwar international legal 
order but of an expedient legal instrument to solve a narrow problem – involving 
European refugees who had been displaced during and immediately after World War II.  
It certainly showed no signs of furnishing the new refugee agency with a legal basis to 
protect refugees across the globe – and in any case the agency lacked the resources to do 
much of anything even in Europe at the time.  What the Office did have – at least on 
paper – was an ambitious freestanding statutory mandate to:
…assume the function of providing international protection, under the auspices of 
the United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope of the present Statute 
and of seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees by assisting 
governments and, subject to the approval of the governments concerned, private 
organizations to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or their 
assimilation within new national communities.222
Initially, the expansive protection mandate only applied to a narrow class of 
forced migrants.  Only those displaced within Europe on account of race, religion, 
political opinion, or nationality before 1950 qualified for protection.223 The system then 
was largely preoccupied with resettling displaced Europeans, in many cases to Latin 
American countries eager to supplement their populations with European migrants.  Until 
222
 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. res. 428 (V), annex, 5 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950), Ch. 1, para. 1.
223
 This implied, of course, that there was widespread priority given to dealing with refugees from Europe.
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shortly after World War II, colonialism and the difficulty of travel had contributed to a 
self-regulating system preventing massive movements of people across international 
borders in the developing world.  That would change during the latter half of the 20th
century.  At the time, however, the embryonic UNHCR was more concerned with 
activities such as helping Chile resettle 406 European refugees from Germany between 
1952 and 1954,224 or helping Venezuela care for some of the 21,000 refugees from Europe 
it received by 1954.225
But even the Europe-focused work was difficult given the early organization’s  
precarious position.  Specifically, Gerrit Jan van Heuven Goerhart – a former Dutch 
refugee serving as the first High Commissioner – confronted three challenges in his new 
position, each complicated by the developing Cold War divisions of the former wartime 
allies.  First, he sought to promote solutions for European refugees.  Second, he tried to 
ensure the Office’s permanence and capacity by building a staff that would help address 
technical problems relating to refugee determinations and to assist him in the process of 
making diplomatic entreaties aimed at advancing his vision of the Office as “primarily as 
the representative of the refugees and, as such, responsible for defending their 
interests.”226  He also lobbied for and succeeded in extending the life of the Office after its 
initial three-year mandate expired.  Finally, the new High Commissioner confronted the 
doctrinal, practical, and political difficulties inherent in taking a refugee status framework 
that was based on individual-level determinations and applying it to groups.227
When subsequent leaders sought to address these challenges, they tried to raise 
the organization’s profile still further.  The key was to expand the scope of services the 
agency could provide donor nations.  Swiss Diplomat Auguste Lindt took over in 1956 
and promptly encountered an opportunity a sterling opportunity to raise the agency’s 
profile. West Berlin experienced the arrival of a growing number of refugees from the 
East.  UNHCR responded swiftly with an unprecedented operation to deliver supplies and 
assist West Berlin in coping with the influx of refugees, even though it was not clear that 
they were technically within the organization’s then-narrow mandate.228  The Berlin crisis, 
as it came to be known, showed at least three things.  First, crises involving the arrival of 
large numbers of asylum seekers were likely to arise even in places like Europe; not 
surprisingly, they were also likely to include at least some people quite clearly beyond 
the scope of the office’s mandate.229  Second, despite the legal complications associated 
224 See Holborn, supra note __, at 658.
225 Id. at 641.
226
 Holborn, supra note__, at 105.
227 See Holborn, supra note __, at __ (discussing van Heuven Goedhart’s early days as High 
Commissioner).
228 See Loescher, supra note __, at __ (discussing the Berlin Crisis and UNHCR’s response). 
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 At the time, UNHCR was working under significant legal strictures that no longer apply to the modern 
entity.  The terms of its statute denied it the power to raise funds on its own, and the United Nations itself 
only provided it with a small cache of resources.  This left the organization in a position to emphasize 
diplomatic, advocacy-based protection, and filling gaps – such as those involving the provision of water or 
physical protection at camps -- not addressed by NGOs instead of focusing on generalized material 
assistance.  In response, Lindt’s speeches emphasized the need to focus on the humanitarian needs of 
refugees covered by UNHCR’s limited mandate as well as others (whom the High Commissioner also 
sometimes referred to as refugees).  Though these were “legally very clearly separated… they are closely 
inter-related as far as their need is concerned.”  Auguste Lindt, High Commissioner’s Statement to the 
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with assisting people in such situations at the time (i.e., where UNHCR’s own 
competence was not entirely clear given the constraints of its statute), key staff and 
organizational leaders saw value in placing the organization at the forefront of the 
response to such a crisis.  As the Berlin crisis played out, for example, one of the High 
Commissioner’s top advisers explicitly noted in a memo that the organization could gain 
relevance in global politics by demonstrating its capacity to rapidly coordinate the 
provision of massive assistance resources.230  This prospect appealed to the High 
Commissioner, whose vision for UNHCR was to grow its importance as a political 
entity.231  Third, it appeared as though disaster relief operations could in fact bring the 
organiation considerable acclaim.232   When another mass influx situation presented itself 
in Europe as a result of tumult in Hungary, UNHCR moved with similarly aggressive 
resolve to provide assistance in addition to playing the role of diplomatic advocate for 
refugees and architect of longer-term solutions.233
Lindt viewed the Berlin and Hungary operations as successful; so did the United 
States and its allies among Western European governments.234  Despite this, it was no 
easy task for UNHCR to build the capacity to routinely handle mass emergencies at a 
time when most of its work still focused on advocating for smaller, discrete groups of 
refugees and promoting resettlement of European refugees.  Thus, up until the mid-
1960s, the agency had only achieved limited success in developing the capacity to 
respond rapidly in major crises with relief operations.  Here the problem was in part the 
Economic and Social Council (July 1960)(on file with author).  “Here,” he contined “a close division 
appears sometimes invidious, and very often unjust.”  At every turn, the High Commissioner and his aides 
emphasized the interrelated needs of mandate and non-mandate refugees to strengthen their case for 
removing some of the legal strictures that (in their view) hobbled UNHCR’s response.
230 See Loescher, supra note__, at __ (discussing a staff memo addressed to the High Commissioner, 
making an impassioned case for whyUNHCR should get involved in the Berlin crisis).
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to the United Nations.  Their nation’s best prospect for directly influencing world events was through its 
participation in international organizations such as UNHCR, something that may have swayed them to 
think in exceedingly ambitious terms about the scope of the organization’s mandate and powers.  It’s also 
possible Lindt and his allies thought that increasing the organization’s visibility was the best way of 
avoiding the fate of the abolished International Refugee Organization. 
232 See Holborn, supra note__, at __ (discussing the acclaim won by UNHCR as a result of the Berlin 
operation and similar ones).
233 See id., at __ (discussing the Hungarian emergency).  UNHCR’s leadership received acclaim not only for 
the swiftness of its response to this crisis but for the deft manner in which it handled the complex politics of 
dealing with Western bloc countries in promoting asylum and resettlement opportunities for many 
Hungarians, as well as the Eastern Bloc countries who sought repatriation (and who appreciated UNHCR’s 
successful effort to persuade thousands of refugees to accept repatriation).  
234 See generally UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees, supra note__, at __ (discussing the widespread 
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individual-focused structure of the refugee definition, which made it hard for UNHCR to 
insist on a certain standard of treatment from countries when it was not even clear that the 
arriving people were within its mandate to protect.235   Gradually, UNHCR gained some 
flexibility to use its “good offices” to assist and protect refugees.236  It also obtained the 
power to raise voluntary contributions from countries and individuals rather than simply 
relying on a small yearly allocation of resources from the United Nations, something that 
would later prove to be crucial to the development of the entire refugee protection 
system.237
Less clear was what exactly that protection would get for anyone, especially in 
mass influx situations in the developing world, where individual adjudication was 
basically impossible and where UNHCR had little ability to demand that nations do 
something about the arriving asylum-seekers.238  When a major refugee emergency ensued 
in Morocco and Tunisia as Algerian refugees fled the brutal fighting between pro-
independence militias and French forces, Lindt and his senior staff were torn.  On the one 
hand, independent UNHCR support of the bereaved asylum seekers risked alienating the 
French government, one of the Office’s crucial Western European constituents.  Even the 
agency’s advocacy on behalf of these displaced persons was complicated by the absence 
of a legal framework establishing the host countries’ responsibilities to the arriving 
asylum seekers outside the narrow European context.  On the other hand, the nascent staff 
and leadership interest in promoting the office’s capacity to handle assistance operations 
combined with a genuine humanitarian concern for the arriving asylum seekers.  In the 
end the Office quietly helped fund some assistance efforts from its meager budget and, 
after complex negotiations, with France’s tacit approval.  But neither existing refugee law 
nor UNHCR’s organizational priorities were yet firmly trained on the possibility of a 
large number of simultaneous mass influx emergencies in developing countries.
Key to resolving questions about the organization’s role in the developing world 
was Lindt’s politically astute successor, Swiss diplomat Felix Schnyder.  Instead of 
turning away from the developing world in light of the difficulties UNHCR had faced 
with the Algerian refugees, Schhnyder embraced it.  In contrast to its previously tentative 
moves in this area, UNHCR now focused considerable resources on consolidating its 
authority to use its “good offices” to help refugees and others previously not within its 
mandate.  In part at the insistence of UNHCR, between 1957 and 1959, the General 
Assembly passed a number of resolutions further emphasizing the parameters of the 
“good offices” framework.239  These allowed UNHCR to become involved in providing 
235
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countries were broadly sympathetic to the arriving refugees.
236 See generally Goodwin-Gill, supra note__, at __ (providing a cogent account of the evolution of the 
good offices power).
237 See Holborn, supra note__ at __ (discussinghow UNHCR developed the authority to raise its own funds 
instead of just relying on the UN’s allocation).
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material assistance to Chinese refugees in Hong Kong as well as Algerians in Tunisia and 
Morocco.  Shortly thereafter, Schnyder’s aides vigorously sought and received formal 
approval to use the funds over which the High Commissioner had greatest flexibility  --
the emergency fund – for non-mandate refugees in Togo, Cambodia, and Congo 
(Kinshasa).240  Although the organization’s lawyers initially distinguished between the 
agency’s powers to protect those refugees coming directly within its mandate and those 
merely receiving assistance through “good offices,”241 Schnyder and his aides eventually 
extended the scope of “good offices” to encompass protection by emphasizing the extent 
to which refugees initially assisted under the “good offices” framework might later be 
found to be refugees under the traditional parameters of the UNHCR Statute.242  In Africa 
and elsewhere in the developing world, where refugees increasingly appeared, the 
agency’s lawyers and staff increasingly posited a connection between material assistance 
and international protection, which had heretofore been primarily associated with 
individual determinations but increasingly seemed to call for formal, though of necessity 
prima facie, group eligibility determinations.  
Back in Geneva, the bureaucratic machinery of UNHCR increasingly accepted the 
need for making group-wide refugee status determinations.  Schnyder responded by 
deftly pressing his staff to identify the precedents supporting this practice, thereby 
bolstering the High Commissioner’s efforts to make prima facie determinations appear as 
a long-established core means of dealing with refugees.  Thus, in a 1965 speech before 
the Hague Academy of International Law, Schnyder noted that:
Following the exodus of some 200,000 Hungarian refuges from their country, the 
High Commissioner’s Office resorted to the concept of prima facie eligibility in 
order to avert the paralysis which would have resulted from a strict interpretation 
of the mandate.  The concept of prima facie eligibility was applied collectively to 
this group of refugees as a whole and no longer, as is customary, to isolated 
individuals…  There is nothing to prevent the High Commissioner’s Office from 
following the same course again, whenever the conditions of eligibility appeared 
to be a priori fulfilled.243
Through such statements and internal policies conveying an equivalent message 
within the organization, Schnyder did his best to cement perceptions that prima facie
determinations were routine functions of the Office rather than exceptional reactions to 
an unusual circumstance.  
With frenetic bursts of fundraising, diplomacy, and rhetorical skill, Schnyder 
gradually formalized UNHCR’s role in helping displaced people in the developing world.  
His approach reflected three basic premises that had an abiding impact on the agency.  
First, prioritize emergency material assistance over the more amorphous and complicated 
mission of “protection,” which at the time was taken to mean primarily aggressive 
240 Id. at 440.
241 See id.
242 See id., at 443.  
243
 Felix Schnyder, Speech to the Hague Academy of International Law, The Good Offices and the 
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diplomatic advocacy on behalf of refugees.244  The Office was specifically charged with 
advocating on behalf of refugees.  Yet, at a time when crises producing asylum seekers 
were beginning to emerge in large numbers in the developing world, Schnyder had his 
doubts about whether it was possible for a High Commissioner to be appropriately 
neutral if he assumed the equivalent of a lawyerly role advocating for the resolution of 
refugee problems with governments around the world.245  The High Commissioner and his 
staff seemed to recognize that politically and economically powerful donor countries 
sought a predictable coordination mechanism for funneling material assistance to regions 
hit with refugee emergencies.246  UNHCR’s focus on material assistance was also likely to 
be attractive to host countries, who wanted to concentrate refugees at their borders and 
the resources to manage them there.247  The second premise was to prioritize the raising of 
major sums of money (in comparison to UNHCR’s budget in the 1950s, rather than 
calling on NGOs to raise funds themselves.  The third premise was the importance of 
downplaying expectations and ambitions about what UNHCR could accomplish with 
respect to everything else besides relief, including (for example) reductions of root cause 
problems and mitigation of violence.248  Predictably, the strategy had immediate payoffs 
for UNHCR’s capacity to funnel material assistance in a growing number of mass influx 
situations in Africa.  What it did not address were instances where physical security 
problems afflicted refugee populations, even during the 1960s.249
At first, Schnyder’s lawyerly arguments sought to enshrine a conception of 
international protection that could subsume within it the role of providing material 
assistance.  “The work of the High Commissioner is an organic whole,” he insisted while 
speaking to a committee of the United Nations General Assembly, “in which legal 
protection and material assistance complement one another, although in a given situation 
one of these functions may become more important than the other.”250  Over time, 
delivering assistance to large numbers of people appeared to dilute the quasi-
adjudicatory, technical aspect of the organization’s mission that had once crucially 
244 See generally Holborn, supra note__, at __ (discussing what “protection” by UNHCR was taken to mean 
in the early 1960s).
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relevant to resolving global problems powerfully fed the urge to focus on material assistance].
246 See Loescher, supra note__, at 126.  Even in the 1960s, such emergencies were increasingly visible to 
the populations of wealthier countries.  Although it was not as obvious at the time, the existence of a 
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depended on separating individuals on the basis of whether they were encompassed by 
the organization’s mandate.  The more the agency sought to dispense assistance to 
expanding populations of displaced persons, the less the agency concerned itself with 
narrow eligibility determinations.  
Together with his advisers, Schnyder thus aggressively reoriented the 
organization towards generalized relief work, and away from diplomatic advocacy, filling 
gaps in the work of NGOs and other organizations, and issuing carefully crafted legal 
determinations about refugee status.  These changes immediately enhanced UNHCR’s 
relevance to the humanitarian emergencies breaking out in the developing world at a time 
when more such emergencies loomed just over the horizon.  With East and West vying 
for influence in the developing world and Western donor governments viewing aid as a 
means of managing instability in the developing world, UNHCR found receptive ears 
when it made pleas for more funds.251  Today Schnyder’s agenda seems less dramatic 
because it is familiar.  That agenda was considerably less familiar at the time it was 
implemented, in the early 1960s.  Despite some high-profile relief operations in Europe 
like the Berlin crisis and the response to the massive arrivals of Hungarian refugees, the 
agency still conceived of its role primarily in terms of making fine-grained legal 
determinations of individual and group legal status, searching for diplomatic solutions to 
the plight of those people that the organization judged to be within its sphere of 
competence, filling gaps, and watching over relief efforts undertaken by NGOs.252
This growing attention to disaster relief did not happen in a vacuum.  Van Heuven 
Goedhart and Lindt had already demonstrated that coordinating disaster assistance could 
raise the organization’s profile.  In response to lobbying from the organization, 
governments of advanced industrialized countries increasingly appreciated the value of 
providing material assistance visibly demonstrating their concern while contributing to 
the management of refugee problems away from their borders.  The Cold War also 
limited some paths to political and practical relevance just like it opened such paths for 
certain other organizations at the time.  While Schnyder buoyed UNHCR’s disaster relief 
capacity in Geneva, the International Atomic Energy Agency, headquartered a few 
hundred miles away in Vienna, faced a very different Cold War environment.  Both 
superpowers encouraged its development as a repository of valuable expertise.  Both 
generally valued the prospect of neutral source of reliable technical information about 
whether other countries were developing dual use nuclear technologies,253 and developing 
countries benefited from some of its training and technical capacity building activities.  
Because of this, the IAEA more easily developed networks of esteem and support among 
scientists and some government officials even though its work concerned an extremely 
complex and inherently controversial security issue.254  In contrast, Schynder’s UNHCR 
did not have the clout or authority to make countries accept its determinations regarding 
251 See Loescher, supra note__, at 123.
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who deserved asylum.  The Cold War limited the scope of its capacity to resolve refugee 
problems through diplomacy or advocacy, and also dampened the possibility that United 
Nations-led action could address the security problems arising in or around refugee 
camps.  Nor did UNHCR have the specialized technical knowledge that developing or 
more advanced countries would tend to find inherently valuable.  In this environment, it 
was little wonder that the organization’s leadership – committed as it was not only to the 
organization’s survival, but to the enhancement of its relevance to international politics,255
accelerated implementation of a strategy giving UNHCR access to money for emergency 
relief with which to buy a seat at the international table.  Yet, by placing the organization 
in a position to raise and spend considerable sums, UNHCR’s leadership also increased 
the agency’s dependence on its sources of funding.256
From their newly-purchased seat at the table of global politics, UNHCR’s leaders 
during the mid-1960s could now discern certain patterns.  Refugee protection activities 
were playing out in an uncertain international environment involving Cold War rivalries, 
growing instability in the developing world often tied to de-colonization, and changing 
priorities for High Commissioners and major donor countries making it possible for an 
entrepreneurial organization like UNHCR to finance material assistance operations.  The 
UNHCR’s legal position was enhanced by several important legal changes that happened 
during this period and immediately following it.  UNHCR gained the ability to raise 
voluntary contributions directly from national governments.257  The agency’s leadership 
consolidated its authority to provide assistance to two groups of people – “refugees” who
did not explicitly qualify as such under the Convention or the UNHCR statute, and 
“people of concern” in refugee-like situations who might qualify for help under 
UNHCR’s “good offices,” including people who had simply fled disasters across borders 
or occasionally internally displaced persons.258  In the succeeding years, the world 
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witnessed significant legal expansions of the scope of the refugee definition largely 
driven by the efforts of UNHCR officials themselves, working with networks of 
supportive NGO officials and representatives of national governments seeking to head off 
more radical changes in refugee protection.  The agency’s efforts to collaborate with 
refugee advocates in expanding the scope of refugee protection culminated most notably 
in two treaties.  The 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention expanding the geographic 
and temporal scope of the refugee definition, garnering the support of much of the 
world’s nations, and leading to the development of elaborate individualized adjudication 
systems in much of the advanced industrialized world.259  The 1969 Organization for 
African Unity Convention on Refugees explicitly accepted a broader definition of refugee 
to encompass people fleeing man-made disasters, and increasingly comporting with how 
UNHCR itself was making group-based determinations.260  With its fundraising 
independence and the legal basis to expand its network of assistance and legal protection, 
UNHCR’s leadership could raise money to provide assistance and expand its global 
reach.  And it seemed like just in time: while UNHCR’s earliest task of resettling 
Europeans was largely winding down, wars and conflict were displacing millions of 
people in the developing world whose fate could not be simply left to the emerging 
individualized adjudication systems in the developing world.
As the third-world refugee flows accelerated, the next High Commissioner, Prince 
Sadruddin Aga Khan, aggressively continued the pattern Schnyder established as the 
third-world refugee flows accelerated.   The continuity was no surprise to the staff.  Aga 
Khan, a dashing figure from the wealthy family that led a sect of Shia Imami Ismaili 
Muslims, served as Deputy High Commissioner during the term of the expansionist 
Swiss diplomat.  His wealth and extensive global network emboldened Aga Khan to 
disagree occasionally with American positions, even as his ambition of one day serving 
as Secretary General of the United Nations worked in precisely the opposite direction.261
Although he initially showed some caution in making refugee legal status determinations, 
thereby keeping UNHCR out of relief efforts for internally displaced persons in some 
violent African conflicts, he harbored an expansionist view of UNHCR and was 
ultimately even more willing than Schnyder to engage in entrepreneurial expansions in 
the scope of the organization’s mandate.  Indeed, during his term, UNHCR’s work on 
behalf of massive agglomerations of displaced peoples in Africa and Asia accelerated.  
So did its potential to appeal to developed western nations as a mechanism for containing 
and managing those populations of displaced peoples near their source countries.  As 
transportation and economic links between third and first world proliferated, some chunk 
of those displaced populations might be expected to find its way to the frontiers of 
developed countries that valued their legal commitment to refugee protection (in part 
because of pressure from domestic constituencies).262  UNHCR’s involvement in 
259 See 1967 Protocol, supra note__, at __.
260 See Organization of African Unity: 1969 Convention on the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
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managing the displacement also provided some potential opportunities to mitigate the 
risks of regional instability and conflict that might otherwise accompany a more chaotic 
flow of refugees.263
But the chaos persisted during the late 1960s and 1970s, as UNHCR increasingly 
plunged into the relief role.264   Torrential flows of refugees, defined as such in UNHCR-
driven prima facie determinations, moved across borders in Asia and Africa.  In Sudan, 
Aga Khan personally intervened to seek the return of refugees to their homes.  Though 
some of his efforts eventually paid off,265 UNHCR’s more immediate focus was on 
keeping the flow of relief supplies going to the refugees and keeping its place as 
coordinator of emergency United Nations relief.  In the new camps sprouting up between 
southern Africa and the Indian subcontinent, refugees not only experienced intermittent 
attacks from bandits and criminals, but also sustained punishing blows from guerrillas, 
host governments, and countries of origin.  Humanitarian staff professed faith in the 
simple legal assumption that the hosts were responsible for meeting the asserted needs of 
refugees.266  The hosts rarely acted accordingly.  In response, UNHCR’s leadership 
cemented the agency’s lynchpin role providing assistance to internationally-displaced 
people.267  At the same time, these violent conflicts sometimes occurred in regions where 
UNHCR’s funder nations, such as the United States and France, had more than a passing 
interest in the nature of the conflict, which created a sometimes irresistible temptation to 
manage their refugee influxes in a way that would redound to the benefit of the 
combatants favored by the host countries.268
UNHCR needed financial resources to seize those opportunities.  As Figure 4 
indicates, it found them.  The combination of turmoil in the developing world, the 
relative absence of other establish conduits for developed nations to visibly mitigate the 
condition of displaced people, and emphatic UNHCR appeals for funds resulted in 
spectacular resource increases for the agency during the ten years between 1971 and 1981 
in constant (1983) dollars, transforming it from a coordinator of assistance into a major 
operator.  Resources in real terms tripled between 1979 and 1981, rising from $200 
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million to $600 million.  Even before then, The agency’s resources grew dramatically, 
from less than $25 million in 1971 to over $150 million by 1977, when Sadruddin Aga 
Khan left the High Commissioner’s Office.  Although this somewhat understates the full 
range of resources UNHCR commanded since the early 1970s because of its role 
coordinating other relief efforts, it nonetheless gives a picture of the funds over which the 
agency had the most control.  
On the other hand, UNHCR’s constant dollar resources fell by a third, from $600 
million to about $400 million, between 1981 and 1983.  Although UNHCR could 
influence the use of other relief resources (as it did in places like Indochina and Africa), 
the resources per refugee that UNHCR directly controlled fell between 1980 and 1983 
from about $72 per refugee per year to about $37 per refugee per year in 1983.  Once the
agency had begun engineering its daily routines, its performance measures, its promotion 
paths, and its hiring practices to reflect the priority placed on raising and spending relief 
dollars, it would have likely been quite hard for it to turn away from this approach and 
return to a lawyerly focus on advocacy of refugee protection.  Though advocacy certainly 
continued through the 1970s and 1980s, the agency faced both new and recurring 
constraints in the process.269
FIGURE 4
UNHCR Core Budget in Millions of Constant (1983) Dollars 
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The agency’s success in using the legal flexibility it had acquired to raise and 
spend money ironically brought problems along with promise.  The next High 
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Commissioner, Paul Hartling, and his advisors even managed to dramatically expand the 
organization’s financial resources, to the point that its funds now actually outstripped its 
ability to spend the resources.  Growing in staff and budgets, the agency assumed more 
direct operational functions, expanded the services refugees were provided at camps, and 
encouraged staff to spend more of the $70 to $80 million in funds left from the previous 
year. 270  The heady days proved emphemeral.  By the end of Hartling’s term, donors were 
far less interested in supporting the buildup of funds in UNHCR.  Yet the number and 
complexity of refugee emergencies and people considered within its mandate had grown 
markedly.271 As he consolidated the assistance-focused work of UNHCR, Aga Khan 
achieved dramatic increases in funding for the agency throughout the 1970s despite his 
occasional policy disagreements with the organization’s major donor, the United States.  
Figure 5 shows the pattern in terms of percent changes in agency resources, adjusted for 
inflation.  Although agency budgets remained at roughly the same order of magnitude in 
the 1980s and 1990s, the agency encountered occasional declines in resources most 
directly under its control.  Throughout this period, the organization also continued 
coordinating resources provided as either in-kind contributions or direct relief by other 
entities, including United Nations entities such as the World Food Program, advanced 
industrialized countries, NGOs, and occasionally the host countries themselves.  While 
the new reality of the organization at the hub of the international refugee protection 
system reflected considerable economic resources to engage in operational activities, it 
also made the agency’s position more fragile because of the difficulty of coping with 
downward swings in those resources – which tends to be difficult for most organizations 
with large budgets.272  Despite donors’ insistence on asserting greater control over 
UNHCR following the staggering resource increases under Hartling, the agency showed a 
remarkable track record in raising financial resources and funneling them into conflict-
stricken regions in the developing world.273
That remarkable track record did not, however, engender universal enthusiasm 
among the staff for expanding every aspect of the organization’s work.  Even before 
UNHCR began weathering the full extent of the sharp declines in resources-per-refugee 
during the mid-1980s, the headquarters staff was intent on avoiding some of the thorniest 
270 See Loescher, supra note__, at 202.
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refugee protection problems, such as what to do about refugees detained by host states 
allegedly for security reasons.  The case of Somalia is illustrative.  Between 1977 and 
1987 Somalia had an average annual refugee population hovering near one million.274 The 
apogee of the nation’s refugee crisis came around 1980, when the Somali state hosted 
approximately 2 million refugees at a time when the government faced external threats 
and with internal civil conflict.  UNHCR’s Mogadishu-based staff soon received reports 
that the Somali government was detaining scores of refugees and holding them as 
prisoners of war.  When the Mogadishu office appealed to headquarters for guidance, the 
Director of International Protection replied in a cable that:
[I]t is not within the competence of UNHCR to concern itself with a “prisoners of 
war” situation unless it is clearly apparent that refugees are involved.  Information 
as to the presence of refugees would emerge from the findings of the International 
Committeee of Red Cross [sic] (ICRC) in the context of its monitoring function 
under the above-mentioned instruments [the Geneva Conventions and Protocol].275
The cable’s argument rested on a spate of implicit (and therefore undefended) 
assumptions tantamount to a belief in an unarticulated “common law” of refugee 
protection generally excluding conflict-related matters from UNHCR’s purview.  Under 
this view, it was the ICRC that functioned as custodian of humanitarian law, and the 
Geneva Conventions where so much of that law was enshrined.  Because “prisoner of 
war situations” were covered by the Geneva Conventions, such situations were primarily 
the ICRC’s responsibility.  The assertion in the headquarters memo was not moored to 
the UNHCR Statute or any other source of binding law governing the agency.  Its 
analysis sidestepped the possibility that the ICRC would not prioritize refugee concerns 
or indeed, that the ICRC might not be operating at all in the country in question.276 Such 
measured reluctance to assume responsibility even for a relatively prosaic portion of the 
refugee protection mission stood in sharp contrast the entrepreneurial expansion of 
operational responsibilities that UNHCR demonstrated most sharply at times when its 
political and economic fortunes were uncertain.
UNHCR’s entrepreneurship reached its high point during Sadako Ogata’s 
eventful tenure as High Commissioner.  A Japanese university administrator and 
Berkeley-trained scholar of international relations, Ogata entered UNHCR determined to 
reinvigorate morale and restore the organization’s capacity to achieve steady increases in 
resources.  She sought to do this by demonstrating the agency’s relevance to global 
political developments.277  Her approach is borne out not only by the perceptions of 
protection officers and operations staff during her tenure, but by Ogata’s own 
recollection: 
274 See UNHCR Statistical Office, Annual Refugee Statistics 1960-2004, supra note__.
275
 Memorandum from P.M Moussalli, Director of Protection, to the Representative, UNHCR Branch 
Office, Somalia, Detention of Refugees in Somalia, Doc. No. HAS/1502 (17 Sept. 1982)(UNHCR 
Archives)(on file with author).
276
 This turned out to be the situation in Somalia.  Memorandum from Arthur A. DeFehr, Representative, 
UNHCR Branch Office Mogadishu to P.M. Moussalli, Director of Protection, UNHCR Headquarters 
Geneva, Detention of Refugees, Doc. No. SOM/HQ/615 (3 Oct. 1982)(UNHCR Archives)(on file with 
author).
277 See Ogata, supra note__, at __.
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I realized that something crucial was going to happen to very key elements of the 
refugee equation – to borders, to wars, to the way people fled and the world 
responded.  I had to think very quickly… UNHCR would end if it remained a 
slow, static conservative organization.  If UNHCR was to stay relevant… then it 
had to be quick, smart, effective, and adaptable to a fast-changing environment.278
FIGURE 5
Percent Change in UNHCR Resources, Adjusted for Inflation
The new High 
Commissioner’s sense of urgency reflected not only an increasingly demoralized staff 
and uncertainty about the organization’s core competence, but also stagnant resources.  
As Figure 4 shows, the agency’s resources on a dollars per refugee basis had fallen from 
nearly $100 in 1980 to less than $40 in 1989.  The dramatic increases in resources in 
percentage terms between 1970 and 1980 shown in Figure 8 evaporated during the 1980s. 
In response, the new High Commissioner’s brand of dynamism soon appeared to rekindle 
the organization’s entrepreneurial approach to raising funds and expanding the scope of 
its work.  During her tenure, for instance, UNHCR again began growing its budget in 
response to both Ogata’s advocacy and high-profile crises like those in the Balkans.  As a 
proportion of total United Nations core resources, UNHCR went from just over 6% in 
1990 to nearly 14% by 1996.279
To attack the financial and morale problems, Ogata aggressively embraced 
seemingly novel missions, such as the provision of material assistance to individuals who 
had yet to flee their homes in the Balkans.  She altered promotion paths, making it easier 
for staff with operational experience rather than familiarity with the intricacies of refugee 
law to rise through the ranks.280  Yet in some respects, Ogata simply optimized some of 
the agency’s internal structures to carry out these practices.  Thus UNHCR delivered 
278 Id., at 344-45.
279
 Sources: Encyclopedia of the UN and International Agreements; United Nations Association 
(Germany)(UNHCR figures through 1995); UNHCR budget and expenditure estimates (1995 to 2004).
280 See Loescher, supra note __, at __.
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assistance and conferred legitimacy to people stuck in Bosnia while a war raged, assisted 
many IDPs elsewhere, stepped up relief operations, and promoted younger officers with 
more discretion that built up the organization’s capacity to rapidly deploy resources.281
One UNHCR official who worked noted that she invested in “some people in the 
bureaucracy, and lived off them.  We thought the decade of the ‘90s would be the decade 
of repatriation.  But it became the decade of emergencies.  She relied on people whose 
core experiences and conceptions of the organization were forged in the midst of high-
profile emergencies.”282
Despite the focus on humanitarian emergencies, problems of coercive 
manipulation and violence appear to have been initially neglected in the history of the 
organization, particularly before Rwanda.283  As a consequence, the organization was 
almost entirely unprepared when the Rwanda crisis did emerge and confronted the 
organization with the scale of carnage, the rapid flight of humanity, and the impact of all 
this on the physical security of people caught up in the conflict.  Many of the 
consequences were disastrous.284 The Great Lakes crisis was widely perceived to be a 
debacle for UNHCR both within and outside the organization, resulting in considerable 
hand-wringing and soul-searching, about how best to implement the agency’s legal 
mandate in a deeply flawed world constantly assailing the system’s integrity.285
* * *
The preceding narrative of UNHCR’s evolution reveals how an organization came 
to implement, reassess, and ultimately redefine its own mandate by actively participating 
in creating a global legal regime.  It shows how that implementation gradually came to 
embody the grand compromise discussed at the end of Part II, and characterized by 
accommodation of developed countries receiving refugees, refugee camps primarily in 
developing countries hosting mass, along with the growth of a massive relief-oriented 
281 See Rieff, supra note__, at 135. (““While little or no aid reached the eastern Bosnian enclaves of 
Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Zepa, and much that did reach people in the area known as the Boanska Krajina 
was stolen by the Serbs, an astonishing amount did reach those who needed it.”)
282
 Interview with UNHCR Protection Official # 4 (New York, 2004); Interview with UNHCR Operations 
Official # 1 (Geneva, 2004)(“Ogata understood that emergencies were difficult but also a useful tool for 
building up institutions and defining them…  [She fomented the advancement of] a generation of people 
who cut their teeth in the midst of an emergency requiring UNHCR to mobilize massive resources to deal 
with a situation that was not obviously within its mandate.”).
283
 For instance, a widely praised report within the organization following the Great Lakes debacle listed a 
number of recommendations that UNHCR should interpret as it discharged its legal responsibility of 
protecting refugees.  Some of these recommendations are most striking because of what they imply about 
how the organization was implementing its legal mandate before December 1996 (the date of the report).  
For example, the recommendations included that UNHCR “…ensure that the protection aspect of 
UNHCR’s emergency response capacity is greatly strengthened by ensuring high level decision-making on 
protection policy at the outset of emergencies…” and to “develop and adopt for the purpose of emergency 
preparedness and contingency planning, a range of policy options and measures which may be adopted 
swiftly to improve camp security in emergencies.  UNHCR, Lessons Learned from the Rwanda and 
Burundi Emergencies 5 (December 1, 1996).
284 See UNHCR, Camp Security Report, supra note__.
285 See, e.g., Ogata, supra note__, at __ (discussing the Great Lakes crisis).  See also Interview with 
UNHCR Protection Official # 2 (Geneva, 2004)(“This got on the screen because of Rwanda”); Interview 
with UNHCR Senior Official # 5 (New York, 2004)(“What happened in Africa around the Great Lakes was 
the First World War of Africa”).
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bureaucracy focused primarily on raising and distributing disaster relief assistance.  The 
agency became such an important lynchpin of this system because of its financial 
resources and expanded mandate, both of which enhanced UNHCR’s relevance in an 
uncertain environment where its future was once threatened.   As the features of the grand 
compromise gradually emerged, the organization confronted periodic crises in the form 
of reductions in the flow of financial resources (which became increasingly essential as 
the agency prioritized relief work), tensions with crucial wealthy donor governments 
(particularly the United States), and political shocks such as the decolonization wars that 
swept Africa and eventually displaced millions of people.  In virtually all these cases, the 
agency’s leaders responded to crises by simultaneously expanding the agency’s mandate 
and raising additional resources.  This tactic sometimes led to growth in overall agency
resources that did not entirely keep pace with the growing scope of beneficiaries.286  It 
allowed the agency to engage in politically sensitive missions such as administering 
dramatic relief convoys to Bosnian Muslim enclaves under siege but constantly moved 
further afield from its core mission of tending to the needs of people who met earlier, 
narrower refugee definitions.  
In short, as UNHCR navigated the second half of the 20th century, the agency shed 
its primary identity as a legal and diplomatic advocate for refugee protection to forge a 
new role as a disaster relief entity.  As it performed more operational functions associated 
with generalized relief programs, UNHCR came to perform less of other functions.  It 
became less of a diplomatic and legal advocate, in contrast to entities such as the United 
Nations Environment Program eschewing most operational responsibilities to preserve 
their independence.  It did not follow the path, more characteristic of the IAEA or the 
WHO, of limiting its core competency to filling genuine gaps in areas (such as 
evaluation, best practices in camp location and access to water, and security 
enhancements) likely to remain even in light of the work of NGOs, host countries, and 
other transnational bureaucratic organizations.  And because of the centrality of its hefty 
operational responsibilities, the organization’s dependence on streams of funding from 
developed nations almost certainly dampened its ability to forcefully criticize the refugee 
policies of those nations.287 Strategic efforts to fill gaps in refugee protection and 
assistance gave way to routinized responses to global emergencies.  
Had the agency retained its original role or something close to it, it would be more 
understandable for its leaders and staff to treat security problems as breakdowns of legal 
protection primarily meriting forceful exhortations.  Even in that counterfactual world, it 
would be baffling if the agency copiously reported on multiple facets of refugee 
protection without assessing refugees’ physical security.  Yet ironically, the instrumental 
success of UNHCR’s institutional transformation – when viewed alongside legal texts 
establishing the nature of refugee protection and global human rights protecting – in 
286
 Hence the drop in resources per refugee documented in Figure 7; recall that the total number of refugees 
is not just a function of global political trends, but also of UNHCR legal interpretations that grew 
increasingly flexible between the 1960s and the 1990s.
287
 Thus, while the ability of the agency’s leaders to build up UNHCR’s operational capacity is arguably an 
example of the agency’s autonomy from the nations that designed it and (in the case of the United States) 
initially resisted the growth of its operational role, once the agency had built up its capacity to provide 
relief its dependence on funding almost certainly diminished that autonomy.
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principle seems to bolster, not weaken, the case that the organization is invested with 
some responsibility for promoting the physical security of refugees.  If the agency staff 
were deprived of the argument that its refugee protection mandate ought to be read so 
narrowly as to exclude any operational responsibility (an argument vitiated by its existing 
role in refugee assistance), their only remaining ground for excluding security 
responsibilities from its mandate depends on the view that it is futile for it to take 
ownership of such problems.  Once again, the picture that emerges from studying 
UNHCR’s own belated, incremental steps (discussed below) is more complicated.  
B.  Analyzing UNHCR’s Responses to Security Problems
Chaotic circumstances enveloped much of the developing world during the time 
that UNHCR transformed itself refugee advocate with a modest budget and mandate for 
targeted interventions into a major relief provider.  Decolonization, the spread of civil 
conflict, and the realities of uprooted disorder in refugee camps left refugees and similar 
populations of asylum-seekers to confront a proliferation of threats to their physical 
security.  As a result, refugees confronted a proliferation of the now-familiar threats to 
their physical security.  Having traced the evolution of UNHCR in detail, we can better 
evaluate its responses to the crime-control, coercion, and state-in-exile problems that 
have marred refugees’ physical security since the 1950s.
i.  Before the Great Lakes Crisis
The agency’s newer disaster-relief mandate greatly complicated any move 
towards emphasizing safety and security. Managing security is virtually impossible 
without some framework for excluding people, but this would be expensive, and would 
reduce the number of people who receive assistance.  Since the mere presence of 
assistance can exacerbate conflict and security problems, emphasizing security could
conflict with guaranteeing assistance flows.  For UNHCR’s staff and leaders, focusing on 
security could also complicate the relationship with the U.S. and some of its allies.  
These forces almost certainly set UNHCR on a path toward neglecting security 
problems before the Great Lakes crisis.  Despite some heroic efforts from individual staff 
members and occasional ad hoc security assessments, many refugee emergencies in the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s neglected the various types of security threats that could affect 
refugees’ physical integrity.  Refugee security emergencies  such as post-colonial African 
wars in the 1960s produced no appreciable ExCom or General Assembly statements, 
which generally result largely from UNHCR’s own lobbying.  UNHCR itself participated 
in the forced repatriation of Burmese refugees from Bangladesh to Burma in the 1970s 
and 1980s.288  In a host of other crises many security-enhancing initiatives seem to reflect 
primarily individual staff initiatives, while the organization itself appears to have been 
de-emphasizing its protection work.  Although the agency avoided directly funding some 
Khmer Rouge border camps in Thailand in the 1980s and withdrew assistance to some 
rebel groups in Zimbabwe, the agency otherwise overlooked militarization in a host of 
camps it sponsored.289  No bureaucratic structure focused exclusively on refugee (as 
288 See Loescher, supra note__, at __ (discussing the forced repatriation of Burmese refugees).
289 See Terry, supra note__, at __ (discussing UNHCR’s mixed role with respect to Cambodians in 
Thailand).
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opposed to staff) security, either within the Department of International Protection, 
within Operations, or standing alone.290  In part as a consequence of the bureaucratic 
structure, historically UNHCR developed no guidelines for separation of combatants and 
civilian refugees despite the recurrence of the problem, nor any special unit to promote 
the acquisition of personnel or technical capabilities to facilitate this.291
In the early 1980s, UNHCR finally commissioned a report from Felix Schnyder 
on one aspect of security problems – armed attacks on refugees.  Schnyder’s brief was to:
[E]xamine the serious humanitarian problems resulting from military attacks on 
refugee camps and settelements which are the concern of UNHCR, and the need 
for special measures to protect and ensure the safety of such refugees.292
The High Commissioner requested the analysis in response to attacks on camps in 
Southern Africa. In it, Schnyder acknowledged the existence of a security problem in a 
growing number of camps.293  Beginning in the 1980s, General Assembly resolutions 
occasionally made reference to the civilian and humanitarian character of asylum, and to 
security issues.  Nonetheless, despite such resolutions and the Schnyder report, there was 
a protracted debate about whether ExCom should condemn attacks on camps, and what 
form that statement should take.  The United States in particular was leery of any 
pronouncement regarding attacks on refugee camps, as such a move was likely to invite 
scrutiny and condemnation of American initiatives supporting the militarization of 
refugee camps in Pakistan, Indochina, and Central America.  Other ExCom nations, 
recognizing that such militarization was already common in settings such as Palestinian 
Camps in the Middle East, were reluctant to raise questions about their own right to 
respond to militarized camps.  As a result, no explicit condemnation ensued ensued from 
the ExCom.294
The pattern continued.  In succeeding years, the agency’s leadership, its ExCom, 
and the General Assembly remained generally silent about the problem.295  To the extent 
that pronouncements were made about refugee security within the organization, much of 
the focus was on emphasizing the responsibility of host states, with limited or no 
attention to the ability of UNHCR to make a difference in this area.296  Operational staff 
290 See Interview with Senior UNHCR Official # 3, supra note__.
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 These things were entirely within its capacity without requiring attention from the Security Council or 
external nations willing to support peacekeeping, and could have helped generate information about how 
best to organize aid distribution, camp locations, relations with host governments, refugee education, and 
rudimentary security (in the absence of something better) in a manner that would promote security.
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 Letter from Amb. Felix Schnyder to Mr. Poul Hartling, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
1 (Sept. 29, 1982)(UNHCR Archives)(copy on file with author).
293 See Felix Schnyder, Military Attacks on Refugee Camps and Settlements in Southern Africa and 
Elsewhere, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Sub-Committee of the Whole 
on Int’l Prot., Doc. No. Ec/SCP/26 (March 15, 1983).
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 In the realm of material assistance, UNHCR rarely allowed such a stalemate to slow down policy 
innovation.  See infra Part IV.a.
295 See supra Part II.d.iv.
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 There were a few exceptions, the most notable one being an internal note analyzing physical security 
produced by the Department of International Protection in 1993, emphasizing that UNHCR itself had the 
authority and responsibility to promote security.  See UNHCR, The Personal Security of Refugees, 
International Protection (SCIP), Doc. No. EC/1993/SCP/CRP.3 ¶ 23 (May 5, 1993)(“Safeguarding the 
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began exhibiting concern with mitigating sexual and gender based violence problems 
sometime between 1985 and 1988.  The attention responded to pressure from advocacy 
NGOs, and was bolstered by legal analyses from the protection staff linking such 
attention to human rights guarantees owed to refugees.297  The same degree of attention 
was not forthcoming for the problems posed by frequent, sometimes blatant violations of 
the “security and humanitarian character of asylum” rage on in Pakistan and Thailand, 
with attacks and recruiting continuing in a number of cases in Africa.  In fact, there do 
not appear to have been any high-level investigation of the problem of attacks on refugee 
camps.  The Schnyder report was one of only two notable exceptions.  The other involved 
a protracted ExCom debate over something as limited as the adoption of a resolution 
condemning attacks – which was finally achieved in 1987.298  This distribution of 
attention indelibly shaped the agendas of dozens of NGOs that worked with UNHCR 
over the years providing assistance, allowing them to continue largely ignoring the 
ethical, legal, and practical dilemmas arising from the intimate association between aid 
and security problems.299
Thus, the historical record before the Great Lakes crisis shows not nuanced 
thinking about security dilemmas but something more akin to willful blindness.  Return 
to the Schnyder report of  the early 1980s.300  The former High Commissioner report 
amounts to a pithy restatement of how UNHCR then viewed, and continues to view, its 
legal mandate.  The lawyerly Schnyder emphasized how UNHCR’s work had to be 
strictly humanitarian and non-political. “First and foremost,” Schnyder noted, attacks 
were violations of the host state’s territorial sovereignty.301  What he does not directly 
discuss is the intimate connection between those attacks and the use of internationally 
assisted refugee sanctuaries by combatants to carry on those attacks.  The omission is 
surprising.  At the same time Schnyder was writing his report, UNHCR was hard at work 
stocking camps with combatants struggling against the South African government in Sub-
Saharan Africa, and was letting the Pakistani government condition the distribution of 
internationally provided food on the basis of whether refugees joined parties supporting 
armed struggle against the government in Afghanistan.302 Schnyder did not grapple with 
the thorniest questions in his report, or even in his private correspondence with then-High 
Commissioner Hartling discussing his work.  Neither did he consider the inexorable logic 
tending to make internationally-funded refugee camps attractive as combatant bases, and 
tending to make camps targets of attacks from the combatants enemies.  Instead Schnyder 
personal security of refugees is implicit in the High Commissioner’s mandate of ‘providing international 
protection’”).
297 See Interview with UNHCR Operations Official # 3, supra note__.  See also note__ (indicating that 
sexual and gender based violence issues were the only aspects of security included in UNHCR’s new camp 
indicator reporting system).
298 See Interview with Senior UNHCR Official # 4 (New York, 2004)(indicating no separate archival 
records existed for documents relating to violence and security problems).
299 See Interview with NGO Official # 2 (New York, 2005).
300 See Schnyder, supra note__.
301 See id. (discussing how attacks on refugee camps tend to constitute violations of host state’s territorial 
sovereignty).  Notice how this position seems to sidestep the difficulties arising where elements of the host 
state are allied with the attackers and, indeed, conceivably welcome the intrusion from the attacking forces.
302 See supra notes __ (discussing Pakistani support for recruitment of rebel combatants among Afghan 
refugees in the camps).
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elided the fundamental dilemma at the heart of UNHCR’s work in any relief operation 
where a state-in-exile carries on an armed struggle with support from refugees 
themselves.  Refugee protection then becomes a subsidy to catalyze conflict.  Perhaps 
Schnyder could not help but confront this dilemma as a former High Commissioner, too 
invested in the system he helped forge to fully appreciate its contradictions.  Perhaps his 
analysis reflects his admittedly heavy reliance on information provided by UNHCR itself.  
Whatever the reasons, the Schnyder report was another missed opportunity for refugee 
advocates to confront intricate ethical, legal, and political questions about security 
implicit in their daily routines.  
The pattern of relative neglect appears to have continued as High Commissioner 
Ogata sought to catalyze the organization’s morale and extend its mandate more 
decisively in the Former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.  Instead of endeavoring to help 
persecuted individuals leave the settings where they faced pronounced physical security 
threats, the agency provided the relief to help keep potential where they were, surrounded 
by such threats.  While the energetic activities of UNHCR unquestionably confounded 
the lethargic image of the United Nations system, some observers have argued that these 
activities probably made it easier for the United States and its European allies to postpone 
action in Bosnia.303  The muscular relief operations carried on by UNHCR staff provided 
a visually compelling and highly salient response to domestic and international publics, 
and it helped undermine efforts to promote ethnic cleansing by uprooting Bosnian 
Muslims and driving them, en masse, into exile.304  The role UNHCR could play to 
dampen the urgency of intervention was not lost on the fragile Bosnian government, 
which sought to force UNHCR convoys heading into Sarajevo to use a narrower road into 
the besieged city – a road that could not “accommodate the tonnage [sic] required to feed 
Sarajevo.”305  Disagreements about the merits of UNHCR’s involvement continue.306
Ironically, the organization administered and executed an operation designed 
precisely to keep potential refugees in the location where they would be most exposed to 
threats to their physical security.  Pressure from funders almost certainly compounded the 
agency’s enthusiastic response to what the High Commissioner and her top aides viewed 
as an enticing opportunity to emphasize UNHCR’s relevance.  The complexities of the 
Balkan nightmare perhaps make it easier for some erstwhile observers to justify 
UNHCR’s bold interpretation of its mandate to reach from protecting those forced to flee 
to making it feasible for people not to flee.  Still, an undeniable corollary of the agency’s 
legal interpretation was that the UNHCR of convoys to Sarajevo plainly did not use its 
seat at the table to press for the safety of (current or potential) refugees.  Its lot was cast 
with those governments who shared the potentially noble but discordant goal of ensuring 
303 See Rieff, supra note__, at __ (discussing the problems associated with UNHCR’s involvement in the 
Balkans).
304 See Hathaway, Reconsideration, supra note__, at __.  See also Zolberg et al., supra note__, at __.
305 A/S Shattuck Meeting with UNHCR, U.S. Mission, Geneva, Cable/Confidential 2 (August 3, 1995)(U.S. 
State Dep’t FOIA Electronic Reading Room, avail. at http://www.state.gov, last accessed October 9, 
2005)(copy on file with author).
306 Compare Rieff, supra note__, at __ (criticizing UNHCR’s Balkan involvement) and James A. Hathaway, 
New Directions to Avoid Hard Problems: The Distortion of the Palliative Role of Refugee Protection, 11 J. 
REFUGEE STUD. 350 (1998)(viewing UNHCR’s “palliative” role in the Balkans as a “distortion”) with 
Ogata, supra note__, at __ (defending UNHCR’s involvement).
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that Bosnian Muslims not be cleansed from the valleys of central Bosnia.  Even among 
the protection staff, there was a widespread embrace of the Balkan intervention with little 
dissent.307  There was therefore a marked contrast between UNHCR’s organizational 
priorities on security issues affecting refugees and the way organizations tend to approach 
activities that their leaders and staff have managed genuinely to prioritize.  But the Great 
Lakes crisis changed all that.
ii. Since the Great Lakes Crisis: Limited Capacity-Building Activities and Slow Implementation 
of Security-Related Priorities.
Or did it?  The magnitude of the Great Lakes crisis made it nearly impossible for 
UNHCR or other organizations in the humanitarian world to ignore the security 
dimensions of refugee crises, and how these can be worsened with international 
assistance.  But for reasons that help explain the previous record of neglect, actual change 
has been surprisingly slow in coming.  The beginning of this phase of the refugee security 
timeline was marked by dramatic observations and declarations from the High 
Commissioner and key staff, recognizing that states occasionally fail to live up to their 
legal responsibilities but pinning most of the responsibility on the United Nations 
Security Council, DPKO, and neglect from the governments of powerful nations.308  At 
the staff and mid-level manager levels, there were occasionally swift responses involving 
changes in camp organization or funding for the provision of security services in Eastern 
Congo.  The agency belatedly sought to pay Congolese army to guard refugee camps.309
UNHCR provided some funds to Tanzanians for police services.310  A few successful 
initiatives resulted from a mix of staff initiative, fortuitous opportunity (such as the 
presence of peacekeepers near the community of Zongo), and the concern expressed by 
higher-level officials in the organization, certain humanitarian organizations, and by 
United Nations organs.311  Several internal and external evaluations, moreover, made 
recommendations for substantial changes within UNHCR (such as obtaining greater 
security expertise, making fundraising appeals focused on security).312
After High Commissioner Ogata introduced a “Ladder of Options” to address 
future instances reflecting breakdowns in the civilian and humanitarian character of 
asylum,313 a separate document sought to operationalize it with respect to UNHCR’s own 
307 See Interview with UNHCR Operations Official # 1 __ (Geneva, 2004).
308 See Ogata, supra note__, at 
309 See UNHCR, Lessons Learned, supra note__, at __; Ogata, supra note__, at __ (describing problems she 
perceived with trying to pay for private security firms to provide security in the camps).
310 See Ogata, supra note__, at __ (discussing limited support provided by UNHCR for Tanzanian security 
operations).
311 See Yu, supra note__, at __.
312
 The proliferation of evaluation reports following the Great Lakes crisis showcase the gap between 
UNHCR’s performance during and immediately before the refugee emergency associated with the 
Rwandan genocide, and the scope of policies UNHCR had the capacity to pursue to mitigate security 
problems (otherwise, there would have been few if any recommendations to make in the reports).  See
UNHCR, Refugee Security, supra note__; UNHCR, Lessons Learned, supra note__.
313 See UNHCR, The Security and Civilian and Humanitarian Character of Refugee Camps and 
Settlements, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Standing Committee, 14th
Meeting, Doc. No. EC/49/SC/INF.2 (January 14, 1999); Ogata, supra note__, at __ (discussing the “ladder 
of options”).
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functions.314  Many of the recommendations made in reports following the Great Lakes 
crisis found their way into this operational document.  Even taking into account the fact 
that the original Ladder of Options continued the emphasis of blaming host countries for 
refugee security problems, the resulting operational document evinced a surprising lack 
of organizational ambition to deal with the problem.  It called for the hiring of two staff 
members to focus on refugee (as opposed to staff) security at a time when hundreds of 
camps holding millions of refugees continued to be at risk of security breakdowns and 
manipulation.315  Its focus remained on encouraging host states to comply with their 
security responsibilities under the law by simply calling on them to do it.316  Nor did the 
operational plans call for redirecting fundraising appeals to create resources for the few 
modest operational changes that the document did call for, like the deployment of 
“humanitarian security officers” (HSOs) in conflict regions to help assess the security 
situation.317
Even these goals have been implemented at a glacial pace.  As of the middle of 
2004, the agency had only one staff member devoted exclusively to focusing on refugee 
security issues, and a smattering of others who focus on specific sub-sets on a part-time 
basis in addition to their core responsibility, such as monitoring refugee developments in 
a particular country.318  UNHCR’ deployment of HSOs has stalled.319  The agency’s 
budget documents, setting forth new priorities and performance measures, fluctuate in the 
attention devoted to refugee security issues, but mostly include vague standards making 
reference back to the priorities in the operational document described above.  The writing 
of guidelines for separating combatants from civilian asylum seekers admittedly calls for 
consultation and deliberation by experts.  But the process has stretched out over nearly a 
half-decade since the operational document was promulgated and more than a decade 
after the Great Lakes emergency began.  It continues to this day.320  An analysis of 
evaluation reports over the last ten years shows how only six out of 77 address security 
problems affecting refugees in any substantial way.  In contrast, nearly seven times that 
number of reports focus primarily on material assistance and how to enhance it.  Of the 
tiny handful of reports focusing primarily on security, half or so deal with sexual and 
gender-based violence.  An additional 19 reports mention security in passing, and most 
do so only to note problems and shortcomings in existing arrangements to provide 
314 See UNHCR, The Security, Civilian, and Humanitarian Character of Refugee Camps and Settlements: 
Operationalizing the Ladder of Options, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, 
Standing Committee, 185h Meeting, Doc. No. EC/50/SC/INF.4 (June 27, 2000).
315 Id., at  ¶ 20 (“Two professional staff members in ERS [Emergency Response Service] will be dedicated 
to the security function”)(emphasis added).
316 Id., ¶ 5 (“It is a well established principle in international law that host States have primary responsibility 
for the physical protection of refugees…”).  As I note in Part II.b., supra, the notion that states have 
“primary” responsibility is only consistent with existing doctrine inasmuch as it does not extinguish the 
responsibilities of other players – particularly UNHCR – for refugee security.
317 Id., at ¶ 13 (discussing “humanitarian security officers”).
318 See Interview with UNHCR Operations Official # 2, supra note__.
319
 Four years after HSOs were initially proposed, UNHCR’s budget and performance measure document 
still listed initiating the deployment of HSOs as a new priority.  See Interview with UNHCR Operations 
Official # 2, supra note__.
320
 Neither the “Operationalizing” document discussed above nor the expert consultations appear to have 
produced any statements involving child soldiers.
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refugee security.321  These figures suggest that security was not among the top priorities of 
the agency’s evaluation unit, at least was not during the ten years during and after the 
allegedly watershed Great Lakes crisis.  
The need for improvement is not lost on everyone in the organization.  Employees 
in protection, operations, and managerial positions who did not simply assert that security
was beyond UNHCR’s legal mandate believed there was considerable room for 
improvement on the organization’s performance providing security, even after the Great 
Lakes debacle.  As one UNHCR official noted:
The level of effectiveness in security reporting from camp to camp is 
questionable… What we have found from the camps is that sometimes they just 
report generalities – they might say that because there was relocation of refugees 
away from the border in Sierra Leone, that security problems have ‘been 
addressed.’  When we press by asking, ‘can you describe situations involving 
serious crimes, like rape,’ we get some pretty pathetic answers that raise concerns 
about the level of confidence in any reporting.  The camp personnel might say 
‘Wasn’t there one back in October?’ When we ask, ‘can you show us your 
records,’ they might say ‘we don’t have any.  I’m probably sharing with you 
frustrations for which UNHCR is partly to blame.322
Nor does the agency describe the proportion of its budget devoted specifically to 
studying and improving refugee security rather than staff security.323  Even the most 
recent issue of the UNHCR’s Refugees magazine, which focuses on security, ironically 
provides a picture of the organization’s specific priorities in this area.  While it touts the 
creation of an elaborate system for staff security and the overall scope of security 
problems affecting refugees, there is little information specifically describing statistics on 
refugee camp attacks, because these figures do not appear to exist.324
As before the sordid Rwandan drama, the organizational record of UNHCR is not 
one of complete neglect of security concerns.  The organization took gradual and belated 
steps to promote law and order in the sprawling cities that refugee camps have become, 
such as paying for host country security services on occasion, or establishing rudimentary 
peace education programs in some camps (but not in others).  Its operations and 
protection staff have continued taking steps to improve responses to sexual and gender-
based violence through training, camp planning, and special assistance programs.325 But 
what is most remarkable is how little things changed.  Reforms that were supposed to be 
321 See UNHCR Website – Evaluation (avail. at http://www.unhcr.ch/evaluation, last accessed October 1, 
2005).
322
 Interview with UNHCR Operations Official # 2.
323 See UNHCR, Refugee Security at a Glance, REFUGEES MAGAZINE, (July 2005)(on file with author).
324 See id.
325 See Interview with UNHCR Operations Official # 2 (Geneva 2004)(discussing the impact of NGOs on 
UNHCR’s attention to sexual and gender-based violence).  Another UNHCR official put it thus: “Pressure 
from outside groups increasingly leads to the creation of specialized units – we have one now to deal with 
gender, and another to deal with the environment, and so on.  This complicates the agenda.” Interview with 
Senior UNHCR Official # 3.  This contrasts with the behavior of advocacy NGOs such as Human Rights 
Watch.  See Interview with NGO Official # 3 (advocacy NGOs perform a valuable function by calling 
attention to deficiencies).  MSF is an interesting but rare exception exhibiting considerable independence 
despite its operational role.  See Rieff, supra note__, at __ (discussing MSF).
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instituted, such as hiring people with security expertise, have stalled.  Few evaluation 
reports discuss security issues.  An executive committee conclusion on the civilian and 
humanitarian character of asylum wasn’t finished until eight years after the Great Lakes 
debacle.  As of 2004, there was still no bureaucratic unit devoted to refugee security or 
violence prevention, and only about 2 people in the entire organization (of 5,000 full-time 
employees) worked on that issue full time.326
History, in short, confirms how UNHCR has constructed an elaborate mandate 
that was supposed to advance the goal of providing “protection” to refugees enshrined in 
its Statute without prioritizing security. As of 2004, the organization keeps no systematic 
statistics of security problems.  Only occasionally did it focus on gathering data when 
there’s an ineluctable sense that there’s a problem (as with the camps in Dadaab in 
Northern Kenya) – but this is rare and is likely to paint a misleading picture without the 
context of the full range of problems.  Many personnel interviewed insist this is 
essentially not their responsibility.  Its Emergencies Manual said little about how staff 
should manage the complex legal and practical problems associated with promoting 
security.  UNHCR’s priorities occasionally appeared to evince a willingness to de-
emphasize the importance of asylum’s “civilian and humanitarian character” and security 
for refugees in comparison to other considerations, as evidenced by continued funding for 
camps in Southern Africa in the late 1970s and early 1980s knowing they were 
essentially militarized, the Negroponte memo on Honduras situation in the 1980s, and the 
Balkans intervention to prop up safe areas in the 1990s.  
Indeed, the security problems have stubbornly persisted for nearly five decades, 
in: (a) wars over colonialism in Africa and Asia; (b) cold war-related conflicts in 
Afghanistan, Indochina, and Central America; (c) ethnic and political economy conflicts 
in Africa.  The reports on security issues then emerging from the Great Lakes debacle in 
the mid-to-late 1990s offer a striking chronicle of policy and legal initiatives that the 
organization had yet to take nearly four decades after refugee security problems had 
emerged.  As late as the end of the 1990s, for instance, internal UNHCR reports were 
urgently recommending basic training programs on security for staff, inclusion of a 
section on security in the Emergencies Handbook, recruitment of security experts into 
UNHCR, and measures to improve penitentiary capacity in host countries.327  As late as 
2000, another evaluation report (one of the few explicitly discussing security) called on 
the agency to “clarify” its responsibility for providing physical security.328 This pattern 
reflects an implicit notion (sometimes made explicit) that protection can be kept 
conceptually separate from refugees’ physical security, when the legal texts in question 
support precisely the opposite conclusion.329
The pattern also reflects the evolution of UNHCR traced earlier.  The implication 
of the analysis is not that UNHCR would have vanquished refugee security problems 
under different circumstances.  Instead, more nuanced analysis points to the 
consequences of the road not taken by an organization that moved from lawyerly 
326 See Interview with UNHCR Operations Official # 2, supra note__.
327
 UNHCR, Camp Security Report, supra note__, at 4-6.
328
 UNHCR, Kosovo Report, supra note__, at xv.
329 See supra Part II.b. (discussing the agency’s legal mandate).
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advocacy and strategic filling of gaps within a larger refugee protection system to 
massive relief operations.  First, in turning its attention to massive relief operations, over 
time the organization had fewer resources to devote to filling strategic gaps that were left 
by host states as well as the coterie of NGOs and other transnational agencies concerned 
with refugees and humanitarian emergencies.  As an advocate and overseer of the refugee 
protection system (rather than an operational player), UNHCR would have evolved into a 
more forceful advocate for refugee security and the technical solutions necessary to 
mitigate such problems.  Ironically, once the agency embarked on an operational path, its 
security-related responsibilities should have been understood to increase as it acquired 
expertise and responsibility in domains (such as administering refugee camps) that could 
directly impact security.  Although gaps in the provision of security services and 
expertise are perhaps not as easily solved as those involving (for example) the provision 
of water, the organization’s reorientation away from strategically filling gaps almost 
certainly made it easier for it to avoid the problem altogether.  Part IV discusses legal 
interpretations and programmatic steps that UNHCR could adopt to make a dent in the 
problem.
Second, the focus on disaster relief and material assistance not only diminished 
the organization’s flexibility to fill gaps in security, but became part of a cycle of locked-
in organizational goals that diminished the agency’s capacity to acquire expertise and 
capabilities to make incremental contributions to security.  As UNHCR was affected by 
such locked-in goals and became more dependent on funds to undertake material 
assistance operations, its capacity to serve as an organizational whistleblower was 
diminished, thus changing the problems that became the focus of legal and policy debates 
regarding refugees.  Its capacity to call attention to the inextricable relationship between 
the system designed to provide refugee protection and the reality of refugee insecurity 
has therefore deprived the world of an emphatic advocate for reform of the very system 
that UNHCR ostensibly oversees.
C. Explaining UNHCR’s Evolution and Priorities: The Organizational Logic of Legal 
Mandates
Why did UNHCR’s own behavior evolve the way it did given the larger context 
of the grand compromise?  This section explores several factors that appear to answer the 
question.  Specifically, the factors exhibit the following characteristics.  First, their 
influence is plausible given knowledge gleaned from previous empirical and theoretical 
work about law and organizations in other contexts.   Second, assigning important to the 
factors below is consistent with the available evidence.  Third, these influences are not 
mutually exclusive – and in some cases are self-reinforcing.  The section concludes by 
analyzing several other plausible explanations that do not fit the available evidence.330
330
 This analysis reflects, as it must, certain basic premises about organizations’ behavior.  It deploys what 
could be broadly termed a “bounded rationality” perspective in the tradition pioneered by Simon and by 
Cyert and March in the middle part of the last century.  In a classic work challenging existing neoclassical 
conventions for explaining the behavior of firms, the latter described their approach as being grounded on 
“a perspective that sees firms as coalitions of multiple, conflicting, interests using standard rules and 
procedures to operate under conditions of bounded rationality.”  See Cyert and March, supra note __, at xii.  
Using this perspective as a point of departure, the discussion below also considers the implications of work 
in institutional sociology focusing on organizational routines and informal social networks.  See, e.g., 
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i.  External Political Context and Funding Dependence
The path of refugee protection over the last half-century almost certainly would 
have been different if UNHCR had been blessed with a stable, independent source of 
funding to smooth out the jagged edges apparent in Figure 5, or if the powerful nations 
affecting its work had simply encouraged it to prioritize the strategic filling of gaps in 
protection –such as those involving refugee security in the developing world – over 
generalized material assistance.  Instead the young international organization faced 
considerable external pressures as it sought to carry out its difficult legal mandate.   Its 
early political context limited its options for developing autonomy and relevance through 
the accumulation of valuable scientific and technical expertise, an option that was
available to at least some transnational agencies with similarly demanding legal 
mandates, like the IAEA and the WHO.331  The agency’s context also indicated demand 
for a disaster and emergency relief agency.332  Meanwhile, its dependence on key 
international actors like the United States and Western European nations for funding has 
exacerbated the difficulty the agency faces in criticizing these nations.333  And its more 
recent political context, where countries are cautious about providing resources and 
political commitments associated with the security of developing nations where they lack 
a powerful strategic interest, probably continues makes the organization reluctant to 
assume responsibility for issue areas that present considerable difficulties.334
Laws take shape through administrative decisions and legal interpretation rooted 
in agency practices.  When choosing these practices, agencies seldom escape the 
influence of their external context.335  People within any organization are affected by the 
costs and benefits of their actions.  They are likely to be concerned about how external 
pressures can affect the survival, success, and prestige of the organization where they 
work.336   This makes it hard to see how the behavior of agencies can be explained 
DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, AND DEVIANCE 
AT NASA 409-410 (1996). As the reader will see, this research program does not contradict, and in fact 
complements, the larger body of work on bounded rationality, which in turn arguably helps provide a 
cogent explanation for some of the phenomena that institutional sociologists richly describe.
331 See Fischer, supra note__, at __ (discussing expectations of the IAEA’s scientific and technical 
competence from national governments); LEO A. KAPIRO, FORTY YEARS OF WHO IN EUROPE: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON HEALTH POLICY (1991)(highlighting the World Health Organization’s 
development of scientific expertise and links to public health communities in nations throughout Europe).
332 See supra notes __ (describing how the agency received support for its disaster relief mission, and why 
its plea for such resources found support among some advanced industrialized nations).
333 Cf. B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 85 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 801 (1991)(implying that bureaucracies subject to budgetary controls cannot easily 
criticize some of their funders).  But note that the agency has nonetheless experienced periods of 
considerable conflict with its donors as well.  See infra note__, at __.
334 See infra Part V.b.
335 See Mashaw and Harfst, supra note__, at __; Wilson, supra note__, at 113-37, 235-95; ROBERT A. 
KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001); McNollgast, The Political 
Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J. LAW ECON. & ORG. 180 (1999); Michael N. Barrett and 
Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations, 53 INT’L ORG. 
699 (1999).
336
 There is obviously some variation in the extent to which individuals’ own concern about experiencing 
costs or achieving gains makes them concerned about the organization.  But during much of its history, 
given the fairly long-term tenure of many employees and the potential long-term opportunities of High 
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without paying serious attention to both the strategic behavior of people with agendas 
inside and outside the organization, as well as the institutional rules of the game affecting 
how the agency does what it does.  This is true regardless of whether the focus is on 
domestic agencies like the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,337 the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,338 and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives; or whether it is on international organizations like the International Atomic 
Energy Agency,339 the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations,340 or the 
Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.341  In all of these cases, 
people and organizations have fought with tremendous intensity over the structure of the 
agency, and they continue competing over how its work should be done after the 
structure is fixed.  Consequently, observers bear a heavy burden if they try to explain the 
evolution of public organizations without considering the external political context, or the 
extent to which an agency’s internal structure increases its dependence on external 
factors, as does (for example) UNHCR’s dependence on member governments for 
funding.
UNHCR’s history plainly bears out the impact of its external context.  
Throughout its early years, the agency was subject to pressure, perhaps especially under 
Messrs. Goedhart and Lindt, to do more of some things and less of others.342  In its 
earliest days the Office not only lacked a budget but permanence, which heightened the 
need for the agency to be sensitive to its political context.343  Nations such as the United 
Kingdom and France eventually supported UNHCR’s efforts to gain the authority to raise 
funds, for which it had to lobby intensely in the General Assembly, and then began 
funding its work because they saw it as valuable for a host of reasons.  All of which 
added up to constraints shaping the organization’s evolution.  While it is true that every 
organization experiences some kind of constraint, whether from politics or economic 
scarcity, perhaps under different circumstances those constraints could have pointed in 
different directions.  
ii.  Early Strategic Choices by Leaders and Staff
Even in light of the external constraints just discussed, the earliest leaders of the 
organization acted as though they possessed some flexibility to chart the organization’s 
course.  They did.  Some early High Commissioners differed among themselves in their 
priorities, in ways not obviously or pervasively linked to the immediate political context.  
Commissioners and their senior staff, it’s hard to tell a story where UNHCR’s leadership and staff could 
insulate themselves from the fate of the organization where they worked.
337 See Mashaw and Harfst, supra note __, at __.
338 See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 452-
53 (2005).
339 See Fischer, supra note__, at __.
340 See Paul F. Diehl, Daniel Druckman, and James Wall, International Peacekeeping and Conflict 
Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications, 42 J. CONFLICT RES. 33 (1998).
341 See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The International Criminal Court and the Political Economy of 
Antitreaty Discourse, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1597 (2003).
342 See Hathaway, Reconsideration, supra note__, at __ (discussing pressures not to focus on asylum-
seekers undesirable for Western nations, such as those displaced in the developing world).
343 See Mone et al., supra note__, at __ (describing leaders’ efforts to avoid the dissolution of their 
organizations); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY (1990)(discussing organizational leaders’ incentives to 
avoid scenarios undermining organizations’ valuable reputations).
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The agency also showed some early independence from wealthy, politically powerful 
nations, as evidenced by its decisions to pursue activities like relief to Algerians that 
drew the ire of some major donors like France,344 and its active and successful advocacy 
for greater powers in the United Nations at a time when some key nations (including the 
United States) initially had concerns about this.345  By most accounts, even subsequent 
leaders continue to possess enough discretion to make their political choices matter 
separately from the constraints of the political context, as shown by disagreements 
between High Commissioners like Aga Khan and Hocké and the United States, and by 
some United States complaints about UNHCR’s lack of sufficient concern about refugee 
safety.346  Because neither donor countries nor other outside interests were in a position to 
entirely squelch the organization’s discretion to shape its quotidian agenda, strategic 
choices by leaders affected what the organization prioritized.  Scarce resources and staff 
responses, in turn, had some effect on the viability of the leaders’ strategic choices.  
In retrospect, it appears that UNHCR’s early leadership navigated the intricate 
political environment by making strategic choices calculated to enhance the 
organization’s prospects for survival and its relevance to international politics.  In the 
1950s, one of High Commissioner Lindt’s advisors explicitly urged his boss to support a 
UNHCR role in providing relief in Berlin in order to show the agency’s relevance to the 
concern of Western nations, despite the fact that the arriving asylum seekers did not seem 
to fall under UNHCR’s mandate.347  Although there was certainly some demand among 
those nations for UNHCR to play a relief-focused role, Schnyder’s emphatic focus on 
such activities seems aggressively entrepreneurial in retrospect, even pushing the limits 
of that existing demand by emphasizing the agency’s potential role in emergency relief 
and economic development.348  Schnyder also did his best in public speeches and 
statements to downplay the organization’s role in the political settlement of refugee 
situations.349  Long after the agency’s survival seemed assured, High Commissioners Aga 
Khan and Hartling still made haste to raise money and develop the system of making 
global appeals in response to mass crises.350 Later, High Commissioner Ogtata remained 
eager to plunge into relief situations increasingly attenuated from the agency’s core 
refugee protection mandate (for example, in Bosina and Albania) in order to emphasize 
the agency’s relevance and utility to major powers.351
Superficially, it might seem as though a recognition of UNHCR’s political 
constraints would be incompatible with the view that the agency acted autonomously.  
344 See UNHCR, State of the World’s Refugees, supra note__, at __ (discussing French objections to 
UNHCR’s activities on behalf of Algerian refugees).
345 See Holborn, supra note 100-107 (discussing how the United States and some of its European allies 
initially objected to giving UNHCR the open-ended power to raise and spend resources without direct UN 
oversight).
346 See, e.g., Agency staff response also matters because it can presumably change the leaders’ costs of 
imposing particular strategies (as shown by the High Commissioners’ eagerness to find supportive staff 
within the organization and promote their careers, as Ogata did – according to my interviews).
347 See Loescher, supra note__, at __ (discussing the Berlin memo from UNHCR staff).
348 See supra notes__ (describing the context of High Commissioner Scnhyder’s effort to emphasize the role 
of economic development in refugee operations).
349 See id.
350 See supra notes __ (discussing Aga Khan’s and Hartling’s priorities).
351 See supra notes __ (discussing Ogata’s priorities).
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This is not the case.  If autonomy is understood to encompass the limited ability of the 
agency leadership to materially change the organization’s political circumstances, then it 
appears the agency gradually achieved a measure of such ability.  True, early in its 
history UNHCR’s leaders faced not only shortfalls in funding but legal constraints on 
their ability to raise resources. United States opposition to providing the agency with an 
unconstrained ability to raise funds from national governments exacerbated the problem.   
But the agency made a deliberate, and ultimately successful, effort to simultaneously 
broaden the scope of potential beneficiaries, remove financial constraints, and hone a 
generalized relief function that changed its role in transnational law and politics.  When 
the agency first sought this role it did not enjoy the support of most advanced 
industrialized nations.  Eventually it secured the backing of the United States government 
and its European allies.  In effect, UNHCR’s early leaders faced a situation where neither 
Western European governments nor the United States generally supported its desire for 
additional funds and relevance, and turned it into a situation where these governments 
generally (and sometimes vigorously) supported giving the agency greater funds and 
political relevance after it made crucial changes in its legal structure and priorities.352
These changes do not bear the hallmarks of an agency that reflexively moved, 
marionet-like, in response to the desires of advanced industrialized countries.  No doubt 
those governments constrained the choices of UNHCR’s leaders.  But the agency 
nonetheless achieved a limited autonomy amidst the real constraints that its donors and 
practical circumstances imposed.  It vigorously insisted (sometimes over initial 
reluctance from national governments) in expanding the concept of “good offices” 
through legal interpretations and General Assembly resolutions.  It catalyzed efforts to 
promulgate changes in treaty law (as with the 1967 Protocol and the OAU Convention) 
that expanded the scope of beneficiaries.  It then positioned itself to serve as a provider of 
generalized relief to limit chaos in developing regions of the world and to serve as a 
conduit for funds that wealthy nations wanted (for humanitarian or strategic reasons) 
delivered to the chaotic global periphery.  Although such autonomy may not rise to the 
level enjoyed by certain domestic and international agencies at other times, it was enough 
to allow UNHCR to transform the legal mechanisms through which refugees were 
protected and its specific role in that system.  In effect, UNHCR’s early leaders refused to 
simply accept the small role previously assigned to the agency and instead introduced a 
new relief-oriented dimension into the political debate about its role.  When its resources 
dropped (or the rate of their growth did), the organization responded by further 
broadening the class of beneficiaries and aggressively moving still further along the 
disaster relief dimension. 
The agency’s success in convincing donors about the value of that new dimension 
its work helps explain the staggering increases in UNHCR’s resources, documented 
earlier.  While such increases did not eliminate the pressures the agency faced when it 
confronted troughs in the trend, the overall pattern made possible by its leaders’ choices 
allowed the agency to transform itself from a policymaking and advocacy entity into a 
massive relief provider.  UNHCR’s success in securing such resources were especially 
352
 For a more extensive analysis of the political economy of this transformation, see Mariano-Florentino 
Cuéllar, The UNHCR and the Political Economy of Institutional Redefinition, STANFORD PUBLIC LAW & 
LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER (January 2006).
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stark in comparison to the growth in resources at other United Nations agencies with 
policymaking responsibilities, such as the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). Between 1975 and 1995, 
UNEP’s expenditures in nominal dollars grew from $20.7 million to $154.4 million 
(approximately a 750% increase), and UNFPA’s jumped from $71.2 million to $312.1 
million (about a 440% increase).  During the same period, UNHCR’s core expenditures 
grew from $69 million to nearly $1.2 billion (a staggering 16,000 % increase).353  Even 
United Nations relief and development funds such as the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) and the World Food Programme (WFP) showed far less dramatic rates 
of growth in nominal expenditures during the same period.  Expenditures at the WFP 
grew by 365%, at UNDP, an entity with global responsibility for development, by 265%.
In part, the funding increases for UNHCR achieved reflect the fact that by the 
mid-1960s, its staff did not reject, and indeed, embraced the leadership’s efforts to 
become and remain the preeminent disaster relief coordinator.  The agency’s 
preeminence in the field was demonstrated not only in the employees’ perceptions of 
their agency, but in massive regional relief operations such as those along the East 
Pakistan-India border under Aga Khan and in Bosnia under Ogata.354 The staff supported 
their leadership’s successful efforts to undermine moves to create rival agencies 
occupying the disaster relief role during Aga Khan’s time,355 and in subsequent efforts to 
reduce the influence of the modern-day United Nations Office for Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, whose budget UNHCR still dwarfs.356
This picture of UNHCR’s evolution contrasts with more deterministic accounts, 
viewing transnational organizations as mere appendages of wealthy or hegemonic 
nations.357  UNHCR indeed faced constraints when interpreting its legal mandate.  If 
UNHCR had no flexibility, it is hard to see how it could have come to be at such 
loggerheads with some of its major donors at various points in its history (such as when 
Lindt contemplated and ultimately pursued the provision of assistance to Algerian 
refugees, initially over pronounced French opposition; when Aga Khan argued with the 
United States about UNHCR’s role in conflicts where the U.S. had major strategic 
interests, and where the U.S. complained about the safety of some Central American 
refugees in Honduran camps).  But its discretion proved enough to allow its leaders and 
staff a narrow but essential opportunity to shape the agency’s destiny.  This arrangement 
brought with it burdens along with benefits.  UNHCR lost independence to be a forceful 
advocate for refugees, and complicated a crucial part of its core mandate – which was to 
353 See Klaus Hüfner, Expenditures of Special Organs, 1971-1995, Res. Council, United Nations Assoc., 
Germany (revised October 1997)(avail. at http://www.globalpolicy.org/finance/tables/finorgan.htm, last 
accessed October 21, 2005).
354 See UNHCR, Lessons Learned, supra note__, at ¶ 8 (focusing on the need for UNHCR to “retain its 
international lead” in emergency response capacity).
355 See Loescher, supra note__, at __ (discussing unsuccessful efforts to create an alternative relief 
organization, particularly in connection with Bangladesh operation).
356 See supra note__ and accompanying text for trends on the UNHCR budget.  In 2005, OCHA’s budget 
was just over $110 million.  See OCHA, A Brief History of OCHA (avail. at 
http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?Nav=_about_en&Site=_about, last accessed October 31, 2005).
357 See, e.g., John C. Yoo and Will Trachtman, Less Than Bargained For: The Use of Force and the 
Declining Relevance of the United Nations, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 379, 383 (2005)(“ Like all international 
organizations, the United Nations seeks to facilitate the bargains made between states.”).
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be a zealous and forceful advocate for the well-being of refugees.358  Of course, the 
agency’s strategic choice to focus on material assistance might seem less troubling if it 
simply served as a temporary response to ephemeral political constraints, thereby 
allowing future agency leaders the chance to forcefully advocate for refugee security 
while continuing to provide material assistance through increasingly large contributions 
from (for example) domestic publics rather than governments.  As the discussion below 
suggests, reality is more complicated.
iii. Locked-In Organizational Goals
Between the mid-1950s and the late 1960s, UNHCR’s leaders put the agency on a 
path that would transform it into a major conduit for the delivery of material assistance, 
and would downplay protection and security concerns.  It was a mix of priorities that 
became exceedingly difficult to change. Organizations are molded by “the inefficiencies 
of history, [and] the ways in which the match between and environment and the rules 
followed by organizations may be slow to evolve or indeterminate.”359  Goals associated 
with the leadership’s strategic choices can easily become entrenched and hard to change.  
This implies that “path-dependence” has some impact; but that impact is best understood 
in the context of specific factors (discussed below) that explain more precisely the extent 
of “dependence” and the theoretical mechanisms that bring it about.360
While ambiguous legal provisions about refugee protection may engender an 
illusion of limitless flexibility, locked-in goals reify agency mandates through dynamics 
that strengthen each other like economic complements.  At the most basic level, 
protection officers, relief operations workers, and supervisors may all come to experience 
the sort of cognitive dissonance that goads people to reconcile their attitudes with their 
behavior.  This may help explain the frequency with which officials interviewed gingerly 
denied the severity of security problems, either downplaying them or arguing that 
UNHCR could do little or nothing about them.361  Even if individuals themselves could 
insulate themselves from this dynamic, the organization itself is likely to encourage 
resistance to evidence disconfirming its goals and strategies, given that such evidence 
might require it to endure subsequent pressures for change or a loss of autonomy.362
358
 It would, however, be misleading to conclude that UNHCR loses autonomy when it expands the scope of 
its mandate.  For such a view, see Loescher, supra note__, at __.  Instead, UNHCR’s transformed mandate 
appears to have brought with it space for the agency to exert control over some activities (such as the 
technical process through which humanitarian aid is distributed) while eventually restricting some of its 
independence to serve as a forceful advocate.  The contention that UNHCR lost autonomy overall therefore 
implies a judgment about the relative merits of its competing mandates that should be made explicit and, as 
the section that follows indicates, is far from universally accepted within the organization.  
359
 Cyert and March, supra note__, at 215.
360 See generally S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J. 
LAW ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995). Note that, by itself, invoking path-dependence does little to explain the 
status or evolution of an organization.  The key is to discuss what path the organization and its legal 
interpretations followed, and precisely why they did so.
361 See supra notes__ (where interviewees indicate UNHCR downplays its security responsibilities).  The 
structure of cognitive dissonance theory is cogently explained in R.H. Fazio, M.P. Zanna, and J. Cooper, 
Dissonance and Self-Perception: An Integrative View of Each Theory’s Proper Domain and Application, 
13 J. EXPER. SOC. PSYCH. 464 (1977).
362
 This may help explain the lack of research, development, and evaluation activity focused on security 
issues.
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Instead its performance measures increasingly exalted the distribution of assistance to as 
wide a group as possible, making it silly for the organization to restrict the number of 
beneficiaries.363  The pre-eminence of the Operations division, and the paucity of people 
with deep knowledge of security also make more sense when we consider the path-
dependent nature hiring and promotion paths.  People tend to hire those that share their 
priorities.364  To the extent that the organization and its leaders have priorities when it 
comes to the agency’s internal organization, moreover, it should be noted that the 
distribution of internal political power is also likely to be path-dependent.365  Even if these 
dynamics were not impediments to reconciling assistance with a focus on physical 
security, some functions are like oil and water.  When goals are “dis-complementary,”
distinctive characteristics of the initial goal make it especially difficult to harmonize with 
some goals, such as security determinations that undermine the refugee’s blameless
image, and easier to harmonize with others, such as providing development assistance.  
This is how an organization that helps create refugee camps can end up with new camp 
indicators measuring everything except security.366
The micro-politics evident in rivalries between the operations staff and other 
organizational units are only part of the story.  Internal routines may lead individuals and 
work groups within the agency to gradually, and perhaps unconsciously, downplay 
certain kinds of risks – such as those potentially marring the safety of refugees where 
UNHCR insists on repatriation.367  The reduced perception of risk almost certainly helps 
the organization cope with complexity and uncertainty that would otherwise threaten to 
overwhelm the organization’s tenuous grasp on the intricate environment where its work 
is performed.368 Scholars observing the work of other organizations with complex 
mandates have described this sort of lock-in before, sometimes under the rubric of 
363
 Even recent performance measures continue to focus on the importance of delivering aid, though High 
Commissioner Lubbers did manage to re-focus the organization on trying to reduce the total number of 
refugees.  Interview with High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers (Geneva, July 2004).  See also UNHCR, 
ANNUAL PROGRAMME BUDGET 2004 43 (2003)(listing among its performance measures the “number of 
IDPs in situations similar to that of refugees protected and assisted by UNHCR…”); id. at 46 (“Number of 
training and awareness raising activities held, and persons trained.”); id. at 47 (“Increase in number of 
enrolments, especially of girls…”).
364 See, e.g., James N. Baron, Alison Davis-Blake, and William T. Bielby, The Structure of Opportunity: 
How Promotion Ladders Vary Within and Among Organizations, 31 ADMIN. SCI. QUART. 248 
(1986)(discussing how promotion paths reflect and reinforce particular internal firm goals).
365
 The success of the Department of Operations in weathering its longstanding rivalry with the Department 
of Protection is an example of the former department’s pre-existing centrality to UNHCR’s core assistance 
delivery mission.
366 UNHCR’s new camp indicator reporting system is an attempt to gather data on 52 quantitative indicators 
of conditions in refugee camps.  See UNHCR, Camp Indicator Report (avai. http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/statistics, last accessed Nov. 3, 2005).  The 52 indicators cover matters such as the number of 
micro-nutrient deficiency outbreaks or the average number of kilocalories consumed daily by camp 
residents.  Aside from several questions about the number of survivors of sexual and gender based 
violence, the indicators do not cover any aspect of crime, security, or violence in the camps.
367 Cf. Barnett and Finnemore, supra note__, at 722 (explaining a perceived “lowering of barriers to 
repatriation and an increase in involuntary repatriation” as a result of a dynamic wherein UNHCR officials 
engaged in a normalization of risk and deviance).
368 Cf. C.R. Snyder, Social Motivation: The Search for Belonging and Order, 7 PSYCH. INQUIRY 247 
(1996)(discussing the need for “order” and “belonging” to social groups as a means of managing 
cognitively undesirable unpredictability).
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“organizational culture.”369  Criminal investigation agencies in the Treasury Department 
simultaneously resisted focusing their energies on investigating financial activities related 
to terrorism and using more sophisticated analytical techniques in favor of focusing on 
methods that piggybacked off existing undercover drug investigations or involved 
looking for bulk aggregations of currency.370   The FBI appears to have repeatedly failed 
to adapt its priorities, sources, and methods to investigate the threats of asymmetrical 
terrorist attacks despite what appear to have been strong political demands and policy 
arguments favoring such adaptation.371  In short, observers of public organizations report 
something akin to locked-in organizational goals frequently enough that it would seem 
important to investigate its potential role here, particularly given the exacerbating factors 
discussed below. 
Together these factors almost certainly help explain why some High 
Commissioners have sought to rein in the organization’s focus on providing material 
assistance, and to enhance its focus on protection (and even, occasionally, on physical 
security) without much success.372  In effect, the fundamental goals of the organization (or 
ideal point in the parlance of game theory) appear to have shifted over time to reflect
greater interest in emergency relief and less in filling gaps in protection, security, and 
advocacy.  Even individual staff members who otherwise show considerable regard for 
the welfare of refugees and are sometimes willing to make sacrifices for them 
nonetheless express relatively little concern about the security issue, and sometimes even 
insist that the organization itself can do virtually nothing on the issue.  For instance, one 
protection officer interviewed who decried the security problems at several campsites in 
Africa where UNHCR provided relief.  On the one hand, the official noted that to address 
security, “you [presumably meaning UNHCR] have to think of relocating the camp 
further inside the country of asylum.  In the case where the camp is militarized, you have 
to identify who the militarized elements are, separate them, and encamp them.”373 It did 
not, however, follow for this official that UNHCR had a security responsibility:
It’s not really in our mandate to deal with security matters.  It’s in the first place 
the responsibility of the host state, to maintain the ‘civilian character of asylum.’  
369
 The problem with this particular term, in my view, is that it does not lend itself to asking explicit 
questions about how the culture in question develops and why it is maintained.  Though the difference may 
seem subtle, framing the issue as one involving “locked-in” organizational goals seems naturally to 
provoke the question not only of what those goals are, but precisely how and why they remain locked-in.  
For two analytically-rigorous and insightful efforts to disentangle the “organizational culture” concept, see
David Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in RATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL 
SCIENCE, (James A. Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, eds. 1986); GARY MILLER, MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HIERARCHY (1992).
370 See Cuéllar, Tenuous Relationship, supra note__, at __.
371 See Commission Report, supra note__, at __.  Even critics of the report recognize the extent to which the 
FBI failed to adapt.  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The 9/11 Report: A Dissent, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, 
August 29, 2004.
372 Compare Interview with High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers, supra note __ and accompanying text 
(emphasizing the importance of long-range planning to focus on refugee protection and physical security) 
with Barb Wigley, The State of UNHCR’s Organizational Culture, Report: UNHCR Eval. & Pol. Analysis 
Unit, Doc. No. EPAU/2005/08 22 (May 2005)(quoting a senior official as emphasizing that “I like the way 
the organization operates in emergencies.  It’s incredible, does its work incredibly well.  At times we joke 
that it doesn’t work properly when not in an emergency”).
373
 Interview with UNHCR Protection Official # 3 (New York, 2004).
85
And then you have in the UN this sort of military branch which is DPKO, which 
normally deals with anything that is a threat to international peace.  And normally 
they would have some room for maneuvering.  So we really say it point blank –
it’s not in our mandate, but we really have a vested interest in securing the civilian 
and humanitarian character of asylum, and to reduce the threats caused by 
problems… that’s why we consider the issue and try to advocate.374
Even such advocacy often appears circumscribed.  Assuming the organization has 
continuing political incentives to avoid responsibility for security because it’s costly and 
likely to make it look bad, that does not fully explain its unwillingness to more fully 
incorporate security into its procedures for planning refugee camps (by promulgating 
formal procedures, hiring more experts, or creating a dedicated bureaucratic unit) or in its 
priorities for research and development – even when its major donor (the United States) 
would occasionally want it to do so.375  Indeed, such neglect even runs the risk of making 
the organization appear ineffective.  Yet, as we have seen, public pronouncements about 
security – even when they focused on the security responsibilities of others – have been 
remarkably slow in coming from UNHCR, despite the extent to which it’s been facing 
the problem since its inception.376
374 Id. The difference in perception between this official’s view and that of an advocacy NGO official 
decrying UNHCR’s lack of focus on security does not seem to originate exclusively in a semantic 
distinction about whether focusing on security necessarily implies fielding employees who can use force.  
The difference in perception seems instead rooted in a deeper question about whether concern about 
security is almost implicit in the material assistance role of the organization.  See supra Part III.
375 See UNHCR, HANDBOOK FOR EMERGENCIES (2002).  UNHCR’s Handbook for Emergencies includes 24 
pages on “community services and education,” 26 pages on “food and nutrition,” 20 pages on 
“environmental sanitation,” and less than two pages to the “physical safety of refugees.”  The information 
contained in that section almost uniformly implores staff to turn over responsibility over all aspects of 
physical security to the host country.  For example, it states: 
The authorities of the country of asylum must be made aware of the fact that they retain primary 
responsibility for security and must ensure the safety and well-being of refugees.  63.  Corrective 
action is in the hands of the authorities and must be taken resolutely… Criminal attacks and 
banditry against refugees should be addressed by civil authorities and security forces of the host 
country in close cooperation with UNHCR and the refugee community.
Id. at 19.  To be sure, the Handbook’s exhortation for staff to focus on the host countries is understandable 
given that states do have a measure of responsibility for security under a fair reading of the law.  See supra 
Part II.  Moreover, in an ideal situation, host states would indeed be far better equipped than UNHCR or 
international peacekeepers to providing security.  The problem is that UNHCR routinely works in situations 
so far from the ideal that any prospects for the provision of effective law enforcement services in the camps 
depends on some corrective UNHCR action, involving (for example) measures to fund police provided by 
the host government or rebel forces, dispute resolution advice technical assistance to law enforcement 
personnel at the camps, monitoring of the security situation to advise headquarters on the necessity of 
additional funds or international measures, and recruitment of refugee volunteers or paid workers to assist 
with security.  Virtually none of this is discussed in the Handbook, which advises that “[i]n cases of 
internal conflicts among the refugee population  UNHCR should initially encourage a mediation by the 
refugee community.  If this fails, UNHCR should request the authorities of the host country to resolve the 
conflict.”  Id.  While agency staff clearly try to fashion case-by-case responses to specific security 
problems, the Handbook says little about refugee security in comparison to every other topic even arguably 
relevant to emergencies.
376
 This is something that even UNHCR officials have generally found difficult to explain.  For example, 
one official, in response to a question about why UNHCR had taken so long even to start making regular 
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In short, the facts in this case match the implications of an existing body of 
research about path dependence in organizational practices such as interpreting a legal 
mandate.  Had locked-in organizational goals not influenced the organization’s 
performance, its staff and sub-units might have responded far more rapidly and forcefully 
in cases where the High Commissioner and donors decided to prioritize protection and 
security over generalized assistance.  The organization’s mid-level staff might have spent 
more time trying to implement the lawyers’ occasional recognition that security was an 
integral aspect of the organization’s mandate and less time insisting on alternative 
interpretations downplaying such responsibilities.  Instead, as one UNHCR staff member 
put it, “we’ve always been doing it like that” is ironically a refrain that permeates the 
organization’s interpretation of its legal mandate and conception of its present mission.377
iv. The Structure of Refugee Law
Treaties and legal interpretations gave birth to the modern refugee protection 
system.  It should thus be no surprise that a final factor appearing to exert some impact 
over the evolution of refugee protection seems to be the structure of the doctrines 
underlying refugee law.  UNHCR officials incessantly discuss and repeatedly cite this as 
a justification for their actions.378  True, some of the employees’ focus on the doctrine 
may serve to assuage dissonance borne from the inevitable separation between what the 
organization did and what many of its staff would have wanted it to do.  But in other 
respects, staff members plausibly claim that the legal architecture of refugee protection 
has impacted their work.  The interaction of non-expulsion norms and the power states 
retain to make discretionary grants of long-term asylum create conditions encouraging 
(though by no means compelling) the creation of refugee camps.  The legal structure of 
the existing system limits resettlement possibilities.  Together with the material assistance 
that the system makes possible and the difficulties in successfully repatriating refugees to 
their home countries, these arrangements tend to make camps into long-term human 
agglomerations.  Maintaining and supplying them absorbs much of UNHCR’s energies, 
and those of its partners.  The law also makes it relatively easier than it might otherwise 
be for staff to continue voicing the mantra that security is the host state’s responsibility, 
given the UNHCR Statute’s level of generality and traditional international law’s focus 
on states rather than transnational organizations.379
public statements from top officials about security (i.e., well in to the 1980s, with more earnest efforts 
waiting until after the Great Lakes debacle), said the following: 
Why has it taken so long to focus on the key issue of refugee physical protection?  I’m not sure… 
Maybe because UNHCR was not mandated, and certainly not competent to deal with it.  I’m not 
sure… that’s a tough one.
Interview with UNHCR Operations Official # 2 (Geneva, 2004).  As I note in Part II, the argument 
that UNHCR’s legal mandate excludes security concerns is unpersuasive.  Competence, meanwhile, is 
mostly a function of what the organization’s leaders choose to do.
377
 Wigley, supra note__ at 82.
378 See Interview with UNHCR Protection Official # 1 (Geneva, 2004), Interview with UNHCR Operations 
Official # 3 (New  York, 2004)
379 See UNHCR Statute, supra note__, and William D. Coplin, International Law and Assumptions About 
the State System, 17 WORLD POL. 615, 620-21 (1965)(describing the traditional focus of international law 
on countries rather than individuals or organizations).
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These legal realities almost certainly contribute to the staff’s legalistic discussions 
of host states’ responsibilities and of UNHCR’s own mandate.  As one staff member 
noted:
The responsibility for security is vested in the sovereign state.  The presumption is 
that refugee protection in terms of physical security must be the responsibility of 
the host state.  Also – money for education and other services is also important to 
security.  The survival of the family depends on women, so providing for their 
needs, including “sanitary materials” is security.  Education has an impact on 
security.  So providing adequate assistance is security.380
Whether or not one agrees with the substance of this observation, its structure of refugee 
law made it both possible and desirable for UNHCR to fill a relief-focused niche while 
continuing to pay at least some symbolic heed to the rest of its legal mandate for 
“protection.”  Had existing law not blatantly encouraged the creation of refugee camps, 
or leave UNHCR’s early goals so vaguely defined, or created a separate disaster relief 
organization from the very beginning, then UNHCR might have approached its job 
differently.  
Refugee law, in short, seems to have played two related roles in shaping 
UNHCR’s evolution.  Throughout the tense history of UNHCR, it provided authoritative 
texts setting up the features of refugee protection that were a backdrop to UNHCR’s 
evolution, and by providing a set of legal norms to justify particular actions.  If the law’s 
structure made little or no difference, early High Commissioners such as Lindt and 
Schnyder would not have so eagerly sought formal legal authorization through United 
Nations General Assembly resolutions before extending protection and providing 
assistance to non-mandate refugees.  The organization’s constant focus on doctrine would 
make little sense.  Neither would national governments’ strained but still occasionally 
meaningful efforts to weave asylum law into their domestic law.  High Commissioners 
like Lindt and Aga Khan constantly put their occasional objections to new UNHCR 
responsibilities in legal terms and insisted on elaborate legal opinions to overcome them.  
At the very least, the impact of legal doctrine on UNHCR’s evolution cannot be ruled 
out.
* * *
A host of other initially plausible explanations for the evolution of UNHCR and 
the refugee protection system prove to fit more poorly with the historical record.  For 
instance, one cannot explain UNHCR’s evolution purely on the basis of pressure from the 
United States or Western donor governments.  Although such pressure shaped UNHCR’s 
priorities in crucial ways, the evidence does not support the view that their concerns were 
entirely (or even primarily) responsible for UNHCR’s choices.  Time and again, 
UNHCR’s leadership endured occasional conflicts with donor governments, particularly 
during the lengthy term of Aga Khan, but also with respect to decolonization issues 
before then, and with matters involving Indochina and Central America after Aga Khan’s 
tenure.381  Indeed, in some cases it was the U.S. government itself that registered concern 
380
 Interview with UNHCR Operations Official # 4 (New York, 2004).
381 See supra notes__ (discussing UNHCR’s conflict with the United States and other donor countries).
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about UNHCR’s apparent lack of concern with refugees’ physical security.  The 
following desclassified intelligence cable to the State Department from the U.S. 
Ambassador to Honduras shows just one example, involving UNHCR’s location of 
camps for Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras:
GOH [Govt. of Honduras] could have moved refugees to Mesa Grande more than 
two years ago if UNHCR… had not developed fancy notions which gave refugee
self-sufficiency priority over refugee safety.382
The Americans’ perceptions must be placed in the context of the larger drama 
playing out in Central America.  The cable nonetheless emphasizes the complex and 
sometimes bellicose relationship between the agency and its chief donor.  Explaining 
UNHCR’s behavior on security and other matters therefore takes more than simply 
ascertaining the position of the U.S. government or other donors (though these 
undoubtedly have an effect).  Nor can UNHCR’s performance be blamed on the related 
notion that all organzations reflexively seek resources as jurisdiction.  
It also takes more than an ascription of causal importance to the Cold War.  Many 
of UNHCR’s activities and priorities continued unabated after the Soviet Union’s 
eventual whimpering collapse.383  Key facts about international politics – like the apathy 
of some powerful nations to the security-related problems of refugees in Africa –
continued unchanged after the Cold War.384  The accumulation of financial resources, 
moreover, is not a reflexive characteristic of every public organization, or even of 
transnational organizations with complex legal mandates.385 Nor does it appear that 
UNHCR’s focus on material assistance reflects a principled effort to press (or perhaps 
shame) powerful governments such as the permanent members of the United Nations 
Security Council and host states into assuming greater responsibility for security-related 
functions that governments can handle better than UNHCR.  After all, the agency’s 
provision of material assistance to actual or potential refugees can also discourage states 
from acting, as UNHCR’s role in the Balkans amply demonstrated.386  Moreover, if the 
agency genuinely sought to galvanize global attention to security issues, it would have 
sought to gather more data about security problems as it has about, for example, the 
nutrition of refugees.387
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 John Negroponte, Colomoncagua Refugee Camp, U.S. Embassy, Honduras, Cable/Confidential (April 
19, 1984)(Digital National Security Archive, El Salvador, 1977-1984 Collection)(copy on file with author). 
383 See supra Part IV.a.
384 See Thomas Weiss, Researching Humanitarian Intervention: Some Lessons, 38 J. PEACE RES. 419 
(discussing the continuity in the scope of many peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention before and 
since the Cold War).
385 See infra notes __ (describing how organizations don’t constantly or obviously seek to self-aggrandize).
386 See supra notes __ and accompanying text (describing UNHCR’s role in the Balkans during the 1990s).
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 In fact, it is quite difficult to accept the argument – sometimes voiced by UNHCR staff interviewed and 
by former High Commissioner Ogata – that the assumption of security-related responsibilities by the 
agency would make it easier for other actors to avoid their responsibilities.  Such an argument rests on a 
number of questionable suppositions, including (for example) that host country governments will do less as 
UNHCR assumes greater responsibilities, and that the permanent members of the Security Council will 
move closer to assuming greater responsibilities for refugee security if UNHCR continues to copiously 
insist on a narrow reading of its mandate with respect to security.  If anything, UNHCR’s own historical 
trajectory demonstrates the agency’s capacity to galvanize global attention on issues that it does consider 
central to its mandate (such as the provision of material assistance) rather than those it does not.  Even if 
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Finally, it’s hard to explain the agency’s evolution or its impact on refugee 
protection simply on the basis of pervasive apathy or inefficiency.388  Though the agency 
certainly has its share of deadwood,389 the reality of the agency’s historical performance 
juxtaposes a certain feverish intensity about some aspects of its mission against the more 
conventional perceptions of lethargy in United Nations organizations.  The organization’s 
collective skill and efficiency is starkly evident as it endeavors to set up camps and 
deliver material assistance.  And many of its employees show considerable signs of being 
quite personally dedicated to the welfare of refugees, as evidenced by their willingness to 
expose themselves to some combination of demanding jobs at salaries that are not 
competitive with the private sector, challenging working conditions, and in some cases 
considerable exposure to health and security threats.390
D.  UNHCR’s Impact on the Grand Compromise
As the agency evolved, UNHCR undeniably molded larger features of the grand 
compromise, such as the content of treaty and customary law governing refugees, the 
priorities of some nation states, and the performance of NGOs.  This occurred even as 
UNHCR was itself reciprocally shaped by some of the constraints embodied in that 
compromise.  Though it’s hard to disentangle the direction of causation in explaining the 
overall architecture of the refugee protection system, two things should be noted here to 
justify the focus on UNHCR as a vehicle for understanding the larger refugee protection 
system.  
First, the organization’s agenda has undeniably shaped the legal structure of 
refugee protection, most notably through the aforementioned expansions in the scope of 
the refugee concept (as discussed in Part I), and through constantly articulating a version 
of the refugee protection mandate with material assistance at its core.  A recent High 
Commissioner put it thus:
On refugee protection you are the one.  It is a strange role.  You are the agency, if 
you understand what I mean.  More modestly you might say the High 
Commissioner is like a Minister of the Interior – with responsibility for the 
protection and governance of the people under my mandate.  They need access to 
shelter.  They need protection.  We provide it.391
This is not mere bluster.  UNHCR has been instrumental in the drafting and 
promulgation of the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention, the OAU Convention, 
legal interpretation, and priority-setting for innovation in the refugee protection system at 
the domestic and international level.392  It shapes how the public understands refugee 
the suppositions above were true, they must be weighed against the benefits that could be achieved for 
refugees and the people living near camps if UNHCR undertook greater measures to fund and evaluate 
policing, conflict-prevention, separation of armed elements from refugees, and demobilization.
388 See John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 205 (2000)(
developing an inefficiency critique of the United Nations).
389 See Interview with High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers (Geneva, July 2004)(describing staff lethargy as 
his single biggest problem at UNHCR).
390 See Wigley, supra note __.
391 Id.
392 See, e.g., Goodwin-Gill, supra note__, at (describing UNHCR’s centrality in developing the refugee 
protection system as it exists today).
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problems through funding priorities that, in turn, provide the basis for fundraising appeals 
focused on providing shelter, medical care, nutrition programs, and education for millions 
of refugees and displaced persons.393
Second, UNHCR has had an important effect on the priorities of its partners, a 
point which needs some elaboration.  Different kinds of NGOs work on refugee and 
humanitarian issues.  Some, like the International Rescue Committee, focus on providing 
relief services.394 Others, like Human Rights Watch, eschew operational involvement and 
focus on advocacy.395  Because UNHCR helps fund relief NGOs, it is likely to exert an 
impact on what they prioritize, and how they carry out their work.  Because of its 
strategic position as the official agenda-setter of refugee protection problems, it’s even 
likely to have some effect on advocacy NGOs.  The agency itself is certainly not immune 
from the impact of NGOs themselves.  Staff often move back and forth between UNHCR 
and NGOs, and the NGOs have had a particular effect on UNHCR’s approach to sexual 
and gender-based violence.396  But historical developments (and my interviews) suggest 
the influence is somewhat lopsided in UNHCR’s favor. From Lischer’s perspective, 
UNHCR’s influence lies in part in its ability to help NGOs overcome coordination 
problems:  
In the refugee relief regime, UNHCR is the dominant actor.  Despite the 
constraints described above, UNHCR could coordinate humanitarian action in 
situations where most organizations agree that their efforts are worsening 
conflict… Because of the coordination problems afflicting NGOs, they will not be 
able to encourage change among donor governments or refugee eceiving states 
without UNHCR leadership.  It is probable that agencies that feel to helpless to 
seek change might follow the UNHCR lead, were it to do so.397
Advocacy NGOs reach a similar conclusion, attributing NGOs’ lack of 
responsiveness to manipulation problems in Guinea and the Great Lakes in large measure 
to UNHCR’s decisions398
In short, UNHCR deservers particularly close scrutiny in understanding the fate of 
refugee security problems and the evolution of the refugee protection system.  First, it has 
garnered sufficient autonomy to have an important hand in building the overall refugee 
 
393 See supra Part II.a.
394 See, e.g., Interview with NGO Official # 2 (New York, 2005)
395 See, e.g., Interview with NGO Official # 3 (Stanford, 2004)
396 See Interview with NGO Official # 1 (Geneva, 2004).
397 See Lischer, supra note __, at 164.
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Human Rights Watch, Liberian Refugees in Guinea: Refoulement, Militarization of Camps, and Other 
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protection system.399 Understanding the organization’s priorities therefore helps explain 
how the grand compromise that has contributed to refugee insecurity came about.  
Second, despite its many shortcomings and political, the organization represents one of 
the few viable avenues through which refugee security problems may be at least partially 
mitigated and receive greater global attention.  Put differently, although the argument 
below explains how UNHCR’s priorities are largely locked in by past political 
circumstances, its priorities may ultimately prove easier to change than those of host and 
advanced industrialized nations with even fewer reasons to be concerned about refugee 
protection.  Third, as the following section explains in detail, UNHCR and its partner 
organizations could undertake work that would at least mitigate certain security 
problems.  Efforts in this area would depend, among other things, on creating 
bureaucratic sub-units to gather expertise in various types of security problems and 
integrate such concerns into overall planning for refugee assistance and legal protection.  
They would also depend on raising dedicated funds to assist and reward willing host 
states in the provision of security services and building coalitions of NGOs and donor 
nations to place pressure on host states that deliberately undermine the refugees’ security.  
Finally, what limited prospects exist for gradual changes in host and donor nations’ 
interest in resolving various kinds of refugee security problems depend on UNHCR’s 
ability to articulate connections between those players’ interests and improved security.  
Such evolution in national governments’ perceptions of their interests may seem unlikely 
to some observers.  An analysis of UNHCR’s evolution thus helps underscore how 
organizations with ambiguous legal mandates make appeals to national governments, 
their elites, and (in some cases) their larger publics in order to shape perceptions about 
the underlying nature of the problem entrusted to their care. 
V.  THE FUTURE OF REFUGEE SECURITY UNDER THE GRAND COMPROMISE 
The preceding analysis illuminates theoretical questions about how organizations 
restructure their legal mandates to navigate their political circumstances.  But the analysis 
also sheds light on practical problems that UNHCR inherits because of the very essence 
of its legal mandate.400  Contrary to accepted wisdom, not all of the problems identified 
depend on Security Council action, peacekeepers, exorbitant sums of money, or radical 
restructuring of international politics to be resolved.401  There have always been things 
399
 By “autonomy,” I mean an agency’s ability to influence its political environment and engage in 
significant legal and policy innovation despite the existence of political constraints.  Cf. DANIEL 
CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY (2002).
400 Compare Terry, supra note__, at __ (contending that humanitarian actors such as UNHCR do not 
“inherit” the security problems that other international actors fail to solve) with UNHCR, Personal Security 
of Refugees, supra note__, at __.
401
 For a particularly severe polemic emphasizing the perceived futility (or, indeed, perversity) of expecting 
humanitarian actors to navigate security-related problems, see generally Rieff, supra note__.  Although 
Rieff’s trenchant insights reveal some of the potential paradoxes associated with the assumption that 
humanitarian action is intrinsically pure or inherently defensible, his project largely sidesteps practical 
questions about how humanitarian actors like UNHCR can respond to security problems.  Moreover, in an 
effort to develop his argument that humanitarian actors should not assume responsibilities for promoting 
international law or human rights, he fails to grapple with the reality that transnational organizations like 
UNHCR already have legal responsibilities that entail a concern with human rights and security.  If Rieff’s 
critique is to apply to transnational organizations like UNHCR, then it must devote some attention to 
explaining why pre-existing legal mandates should be changed or ignored.   
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UNHCR and its partners could have done to mitigate security problems, even though 
some of these would have required the agency to make very different strategic choices.  
Those choices cannot guarantee success.  They can advance the prospects for more 
reasonable trade-offs involving refugee security.  Accordingly, this Part outlines 
promising, analytically-grounded changes to refugee law and policy that could contribute 
materially to striking the aforementioned balance.  Its aim is to undermine the predictable 
but deceptive embrace of arguments maintaining the futility of reforms meant to enhance 
refugee security in a complicated and uncertain world.  It then considers how the 
dynamics and challenges associated with implementing such changes have implications 
beyond refugee security, in other realms where organizations with complex legal 
mandates navigate an imperfect world.
A.  Rethinking Refugee Security in a Second- (or Third-) Best World
It is difficult to think rigorously about how to mitigate the various physical 
security threats without first setting aside implausible solutions, such as assuaging the 
“root causes” of refugee problems, or simply exhorting developed countries to absorb 
more refugees.  Root causes are simply much harder to uproot than the people who flee 
across borders.  
The fate of the infamous Great Lakes region, for instance, shows just how hard it 
is to address some of the structural dynamics making it exceedingly difficult to simply
turn off the refugee spigot.  For over four decades the Great Lakes region of Africa has 
been both a fertile source of, and a fragile home for, refugees.  Even as Rwandan 
government officials were signing the Genocide Convention, the central African nation 
was already subject to growing resource constraints that would almost inexorably 
exacerbate the ethnic tensions and political opportunism commonly associated with mass 
atrocities.  With its population growing rapidly, Rwanda nonetheless lacked mechanized 
agriculture or any other means for obtaining the resources to keep up with its growing 
internal resource demands.402  In some regions, its farms were shrinking to an average of 
less than two acres each by the 1990s.403 Whatever forces were driving Rwanda towards 
mass slaughter, their impact was almost certainly exacerbated by the country’s 
agricultural mismanagement, leading to erosion and dwindling food stocks.404 It’s no 
wonder that in some regions, killings proceeded with the same brutal efficiency even in 
regions with virtually no Tutsis for the Hutus to kill, and why well- to-do Rwandans 
(including Hutus) were disproportionately subject to murders.405  As André and Platteau 
put it:
The 1995 events provided a unique opportunity to settle scores, or to reshuffle 
land properties, even among Hutu villagers… It is not rare, even today, to hear 
402 See Diamond, supra note__, at __. 
403 See Catherine André and Jean-Philippe Platteau, Land Relations Under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda 
Caught in the Malthusian Trap, 34 J. ECON BEHAVIOR & ORG. 1 (1998).
404 See Diamond, supra note__, at 324-25 (“When one compares crime rates for people of age 21-25 among 
different parts of Rwanda, most of the regional differences prove to be correlated statistically with 
population density and per-capita availability of calories: high population densities and worse starvation 
were associated with more crime”).
405 Id. at __.
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Rwandans argue that a war is necessary to wipe out an excess of population and 
to bring numbers into line with available land resources.406
Rwandans faced added risks from the existence of people who, like many African 
warlords, were ready to invest heavily in fomenting conflict to pursue private gain 
(whose influence is often enough, even without the problems plaguing Rwanda, to spark 
conflict).  Together these factors make it clear how well-meaning refugee assistance itself 
can be overwhelmed by forces dissipating its effectiveness and perverting the legal norms 
associated with that assistance.  All of this suggests that actual refugee flows are unlikely 
to fall dramatically.  And getting first-world nations to accept sharply greater numbers of 
refugees is almost as unlikely as witnessing the complete short-term success of efforts to 
turn off the refugee spigot altogether.407
A number of other initially attractive solutions prove similarly unavailingg.  In the 
Balkans during the mid-1990s, UNHCR made efforts to preclude refugee flows 
altogether by emphasizing the besieged Bosnians’ “right to remain.” As Hathaway has 
cogently explained, these efforts have proven unavailing or downright 
counterproductive.408  Both Hartling and Lubbers sought to coax from the agency greater 
sustained attention to repatriation.409  Despite occasional past successes by UNHCR and 
its partners in facilitating repatriation of refugees from a host country to their country of 
origin, there is no good reason to believe that its ability to achieve large-scale 
repatriations in a short amount of time will dramatically improve in the coming years.  
Instead the agency is likely to continue confronting structural problems making 
repatriation an unreliable strategy.  Host countries might compel refugees to repatriate 
against their will, as were some Cambodians in Thailand and Burmese in Bangladesh in 
the 1980s, or East Pakistanis in India in 1971. Countries of origin routinely resist 
repatriation as did Sudan during the 1960s, fearing a destabilizing influx of political 
opponents or populations likely to deplete scarce resources.  Problems also arise for those 
trying to solve the security by simply insisting that UNHCR behave in ways that are 
strictly “neutral,” thereby avoiding situations where its aid supports the continuation of 
conflict.410 There is no easy way to make sense of neutrality in the recurring situations 
where assistance flows through a war zone.  Indeed, it may not be possible have a policy 
be politically “neutral” when the very fact of humanitarian assistance can prolong 
conflict.  
406 See André, and Platteau, supra note__, at __.
407 See Peter Schuck, A Response to the Critics, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 385 (1999); David A. Martin, 
Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247 (1990).
408 See Hathaway, Palliative Role, supra note__, at __.
409 See Interview with High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers (Geneva, July, 2004)
410 The difficulty in defining neutrality is rooted in the fact that assistance is valuable, and regardless of how 
neutrally it is delivered, it can affect the evolution of political struggles.  For example: Vietnam imposed a 
Cambodian government that it controlled during the 1980s, formed in exile at Vietnamese camps supplied 
with international assistance.  Even leaving this aside, sometimes it’s hard to argue that neutrality is as 
normatively compelling as it might appear on the surface.  The Khmer Rouge’s brutality was not obviously 
owed neutrality, and as Reiff has pointed out, the ICRC’s commitment to neutrality was at the core of its 
justification for keeping secret the genocide playing out in German camps during World War II while it 
was going on.  See Rieff, supra note__, at __.
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Once it becomes clear that security problems realistically cannot be solved by 
simply eliminating refugee flows altogether or expecting humanitarian actors to follow a 
simplistic version of neutrality, it is easier to grasp how the fate of refugee protection 
depends on achieving two interrelated tasks: radically enhancing the global capacity to 
deploy military or civilian police assets to promote security, and gradual reform of the 
grand compromise.  For instance, reform of the much-maligned UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is among the most potentially useful policy changes 
for enhancing refugee security but also fraught with complications.411  At present DPKO 
endeavors to limit its responsibility for refugee-related matters as much as possible.  The 
peacekeeping department obviously cannot control the Security Council’s willingness to 
shoulder the burdens of securing refugee camps.  Nonetheless, DPKO’s role as the 
technical architect of peacekeeping missions gives it some sway over the Council’s 
deliberations.412  A reformed peacekeeping organization can forcefully articulate the value 
of enhanced security in refugee camps and expand the number of circumstances where 
the provision of such services – particularly in the context of separation and disarmament 
of asylum seekers – is identified by the Council as being both practically feasible and 
sufficiently within the scope of DPKO’s existing mandate.  Although the prospect for 
such reform is dim, unexpected political developments can change these possibilities, or 
allow regional agreements to deploy civilian police forces or even military contingents in 
refugee camp settings.  Moreover, even in the absence of further changes in DPKO, 
below I discuss a number of practical measures UNHCR can still take to enhance the 
willingness and capacity of host countries to provide effective policing and security 
services.
The payoff from these actions would be enhanced if they were accompanied by 
changes in other features of the grand compromise, such as expanding UNHCR’s 
capacity to entice host states to modify existing laws and policies governing refugee 
management.  Since proximity to water sources is such an important criterion in deciding 
on the cite for refugee camps,413 obtaining locations that are more favorable in preventing 
violence may depend on securing funding for refugees to obtain water and other 
resources from further away.  Although UNHCR’s influence on camp locations is far 
from absolute, its negotiations with host states may be enhanced through the creation of 
financing mechanisms to compensate such states for making available more favorable 
camp locations.414
Loosening the constraints of the grand compromise also depends on the continued 
engagement of advanced industrialized countries.  While national governments from such 
countries currently shoulder the bulk of the financial burden for refugee protection, in 
recent years they have stepped up efforts to limit refugee flows to their territory.  Policies 
coupling refugee status and long-term immigration benefits tend to discourage wealthier 
411
 For a cogent and thoughtful approach to doing precisely this, see Report of the Panel on United Nations 
Peace Operations, P 19, U.N. Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (2000)(“Brahimi Report”).
412 See id.
413 See UNHCR Emergencies Manual, supra note__, at __.
414 Cf. Karen Jacobsen, Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee 
Influxes, 30 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 655 (1996)(availability of financial support influences host country 
flexibility to different policy arrangements for responding to mass refugee influxes).
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countries from admitting refugees.415 Under the existing system, thousands have access to 
a new life while millions more are stuck in refugee camps that so often face poor security 
conditions.  Hathaway and his collaborators have suggested changes to create temporary 
protection regimes that decouple refugee protection from permanent immigration 
status.416  Burden-sharing agreements, similar in spirit to the framework for the 
resettlement of the Indochinese boat-people during the 1980s, might also engender more 
opportunities for people to gain temporary resettlement protection away from conflict 
zones.
417
  There is no guarantee that such a system would allow a greater number of 
people to be protected.  But simply insisting on some of the implausible solutions 
described above effectively ratifies an arrangement that constantly places refugee safety 
at risk and can exacerbate conflicts that threaten millions more.418
Principled refugee advocates should also reassign priority to funding for, and 
evaluation of, dispute resolution, camp policing, and demobilization strategies.419
UNHCR should provide funds to assist host countries or international contingents in 
delivering security services, along with a strategy for minimizing the moral hazard 
impact of funding activities that the host states are already supposed to provide.  In 
extreme situations, UNHCR and the United Nations could make available special funding 
mechanisms to finance the relocation of refugees altogether, or to defray the costs of 
deploying host country or other security forces to manage an emergency.  They could 
consider suspending funding for camps where refugees are subject to brutal coercion.  
Even this limited agenda may prove too ambitious.  The intractability of 
peacekeeping reform, the constraints imposed by donor countries, and UNHCR’s own 
locked-in organizational goals may therefore militate in favor of an even more 
incremental agenda, fitting for a “third-best” world of locked-in organizational goals and 
intricate political complexities.420  Accordingly, the final list of strategies for refugee 
415 See supra note __ (discussing how immigration status and refugee status are interconnected in advanced 
industrialized countries.
416 See Hathaway and Neve, supra note__, at __.
417 See Peter H. Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 243 (1997).
418 Schuck’s proposal has (perhaps not surprisingly) been subjected to vigorous criticism from refugee 
advocates in advanced industrialized countries who understandably want to protect at least the limited 
humanitarian impulse underlying the current system.  See, e.g., Deborah Anker, Joan Fitzpatrick, and 
Andrew Shacknove, Crisis and Cure: A Reply to Hathaway/Neve and Schuck, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 295 
(1998).  Part of the disagreement over these reform proposals is undoubtedly over whether, at core, the 
current system is viewed primarily as a means of promoting the protection of refugees while they face the 
most acute threat of persecution and violence, or whether it’s viewed as the best possible means to help at 
least a few people gain access to better lives.  
419
 One of the challenges UNHCR faced when it briefly considered deploying private security forces to 
camps in Eastern Congo involved the extraordinarily steep financial cost of commencing such deployment 
on short notice.  The legal and prudential concerns governing a decision to proceed in these circumstances 
are undoubtedly complicated, but they are moot if resource constraints (or, conversely, a failure to 
anticipate the problem) are pronounced enough to preclude the option entirely.  Surprisingly, it was not 
until 1998 that UNHCR officials articulated in earnest that “host States might require extra resources to 
establish and maintain the rule of law in refugee populated areas.”  See UNHCR, Operationalizing the 
Ladder of Options, supra note__, at ¶ 6.
420
 Although this article has documented how such constraints are difficult to overcome at the level of the 
organization, it would be wrong to treat those constraints as impossible to overcome.  For one, UNHCR, its 
partners, and NGOs boast sufficient autonomy to continue shaping the evolution of the refugee protection 
system, even at the margins.  For another, refugee advocates’ humanitarian efforts over the past half-
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might therefore reflect what a High Commissioner essentially could undertake tomorrow, 
though admittedly not without encountering some resistance.  In recognition of the fact 
that past agency leaders had proven far more successful than they might have guessed in 
transforming UNHCR into an operational agency, the High Commissioner could make an 
enlightened and counter-intuitive move to separate UNHCR assistance from its role as 
overseer of the entire refugee protection system.  Such separation could enhance the 
prospects for making latter oversight function more meaningful – perhaps in the hands of 
a separate organization able to analyze and forcefully report on the quality of refugee 
determinations and the extent of threats to refugees’ physical integrity.421 The agency’s 
leadership could create a dedicated security unit to ensure a focus on mitigating violence 
in routine agency decisions, hire substantial numbers of people who know about security, 
collect data and evaluate everything that touches security. Changes in bureaucratic 
structure can affect what organizations do, not only by creating the possibility of 
gradually recasting an agency’s entire culture and priorities, but more immediately by 
creating an organizational advocate for a particular set of concerns.422  Finally, it could 
create a fund to promote security and fundraise aggressively for it in order to create a 
more limited version of the financing mechanism described above. 
As with all defensible judgments on questions of legal policy, these prescriptions 
here offered reflect a normative presumption regarding the value of refugee security, as 
well as a set of plausible empirical premises that are worth making explicit. First, other 
things being equal, exhaustive research and evaluation efforts help an organization 
develop strategies to solve problems like those involving refugee security.423  Second,
UNHCR shares with its actual and potential partners the scarcity of financial resources to 
devote to security, or to anything.  Potential reforms accordingly must be evaluated at 
least in part on the basis of their financial cost.  Third, changes in hiring and promotion 
century have repeatedly displayed determination and ingenuity in the face of adverse conditions and limited 
resources, sometimes at great personal risk.  Such reservoirs of organizational autonomy from the most 
direct constraints of the international system and determination on the part of refugee advocates make it 
particularly worthwhile to consider steps that may be gradually implemented to promote the physical 
integrity and security of refugees.  
421
 The spirit of this idea is not unlike that suggested in the work of Arthur Helton, who called for the 
creation of a transnational research and oversight agency to monitor humanitarian developments.  See
ARTHUR C. HELTON, THE PRICE OF INDIFFERENCE: REFUGEES AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN THE NEW 
CENTURY (2002). See also Ralph Wilde, Note, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Why and How UNHCR 
Governance of “Development” Refugee Camps Should Be Subject to International Human Rights Law, 1 
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 107 (1998).
422
 Such organizational changes have the potential to reallocate resources, to reshape formal lines of 
authority at the margin by creating a persistent organizational advocate for particular concerns, and to alter 
the expressive impact of the organization’s work and policies by providing a signal of organizational 
priorities to external constituencies.  Regarding the impact of formal organizational structure on 
performance, see generally HERBERT SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR XVI (3RD ed. 1976)(“If 
organization is inessential, why do we insist on creating a position for the man [sic]?”).
423
 Research efforts may even yield strategies with the potential to improve security without a material 
increase in the financial or political costs faced by the organization.  This premise reflects a plausible 
assumption that, at least to some extent, crucial aspects of security are technical problems and addressing 
those problems depends on expertise.  UNHCR’s experience with sexual and gender-based violence, and its 
belated efforts on projects such as the creation of guidelines to separate combatants from refugees suggests 
that security problems encompass that sort of technical dimension to it.
97
patterns are likely to affect how organizations implement their mandate.424  Fourth, other 
things being equal, creating dedicated bureaucratic units to focus attention on a particular 
issue materially increases the probability that an organization will devote attention to that 
issue.425  Fifth, refugee advocates can enhance security through interventions addressing 
different facets of refugee protection. These include: (a) managing the influx of arriving 
asylum seekers; (b) emphasizing prevention by incorporating security into camp planning 
and design; (c) providing security and dispute resolution services; and (d) responding to 
special problems that arise when a situation has already deteriorated, such as when 
combatants pervasively control the camps.  Finally, while the three actors most 
immediately able to shape refugee security are UNHCR, the host state, and the refugees 
themselves, improvements in security depend on enhancing the capacity of UNHCR and 
refugees themselves to assume a greater share of the security responsibility that is 
unlikely to be effectively discharged by anyone else.  Yet discussions of refugee security 
over the last few decades have overwhelmingly focused on host states.
These changes are unlikely to resolve a situation definitively where the host state 
actively encourages militarization or the bulk of assisted refugees vigorously embrace the 
prospect of ongoing conflict.  Unfortunately, the perceptions of futility often associated 
with security concerns among refugee advocates have made it harder for the organization 
to do some things that are not impossible.426  In 2000, fully a half-decade after the Great 
Lakes crisis and a half-century after its creation, UNHCR finally decided to seek a 
“limited number” of the Humanitarian Security Officers to “liaise” with local police and 
the military, “assess the capability” for providing security services, and “provide 
expertise on criminal investigations and procedures.”427  UNHCR’s leadership could have 
proposed such a tentative step two decades before, as criminal bands routinely attacked 
Congolese refugees in Angola.428  Incremental changes in UNHCR’s legal interpretations 
and organizational structure along the lines described above are meant to nudge the 
organization to act where it can without waiting decades to do so.
B.  Implications Beyond Refugee Security
Though my primary concern in this article has been with the fate of refugees, at 
the outset I asked the reader to consider the present subject as an example of a more 
general dynamic.  Refugee security problems open a window for envisioning how 
organizations with ambitious legal mandates recast their missions in response to 
complicated political circumstances, and to the risk of failure.  From Geneva to Ghana, 
humanitarian workers, lawyers, and organizational staff would have been hard pressed to 
424 Cf. STEPHEN PETER ROSEN: INNOVATION AND THE MODERN MILITARY (1991).
425 Cf. Wilson, supra note__, at __.  See also Interview with Senior UNHCR Official # 3 (emphasizing how 
creation of units to focus on environmental issues and sexual and gender-based violence issues have forced 
the organization to increase attention to those issues).
426
 Matching an organization’s interpretation of its mandate to a normatively desirable standard of what that 
mandate should be is, as with statutory interpretation, a dynamic process.  Cf. WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, 
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).  Thus, the mere designation of security as an 
organizational priority does not guarantee success in enhancing refugee security.  But the absence of such a 
priority almost certainly works against efforts to galvanize attention both within and beyond the 
organization) that is critical to mitigating the problem over time.  See supra Part IV.
427 See UNHCR, Operationalizing the Ladder of Options, supra note__, at ¶ 15.
428 See Elly-Elikunda, supra note__, at 96.
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avoid a disquieting reality: under almost any defensible understanding of the term, 
refugee “protection” was difficult to deliver, sometimes too opaque to measure, and 
impossible to guarantee.  Refugee security, though clearly encompassed by “protection,” 
repeatedly posed thorny political problems for the organization – regardless of whether 
the problems in question were of the more tractable law enforcement variety or the more 
intractable state-in-exile form.  In contrast, refugee assistance filled a crucial niche, 
delivered opportunities for organizational relevance, was visually compelling, and its 
delivery could be readily measured.  
UNHCR’s sleight-of-hand in redefining its legal mandate is not unique.429  The 
Customs Service, for example, turned a broad charge to investigate money laundering 
into a more specific mandate to sniff out bulk aggregations of currency at airports, and to 
heighten punishments faced by mid-level drug activity in American cities like Miami, 
Houston, and Los Angeles serving as nodes in a global network of international trade.430
The FBI avoided involvement in organized crime and narcotics, preferring to focus on 
communist subversives and bank robbers.  Loath to change its internal routines, 
procedures, personnel and policies, the agency deliberately interpreted its mandate to 
avoid the turf battles and corruption risks enmeshed with drug enforcement.431  It also 
avoided involvement in potentially risky areas that could damage its reputation and 
thereby its autonomy.  But budgets and jurisdiction were given up in the process.  The 
State Department long rejected opportunities to absorb USIA and USAID.432  Local fish 
and game departments routinely avoid responsibility for controlling predators, a task that 
tends to be controversial among their primary public constituencies.  Indeed, in a study of 
25 domestic U.S. agencies threatened with the loss of a program or sub-unit, ten of 25 
either supported or did not oppose the change.433 A compelling question for further 
research is when organizations choose to stick loyally to a mission faithful to their 
original mandate despite the constraints they may face, or to challenge those constraints 
by pursuing different kinds of autonomy, or to sound the alarm and, exercising a 
429 Cf. W. Keith Warner and A. Eugene Havens, Goal Displacement and the Intangibility of Organizational 
Goals, 12 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 539 (1968)(hypothesizing that “goal attainment” in organizations is maximized 
when goal displacement is minimal, which occurs when goals are “tangible”). Warner’s and Havens’ 
synthesis of the small literature on “goal displacement” provides a reasonable point of departure for 
thinking about the implications of organizations’ interpretation of their legal mandate.  It does not, 
however, capture the subtleties arising beyond the context of the “tangibility” dimension on which they 
focus.  The precise degree of “tangibility” in UNHCR’s organic statute is a question that invites 
considerable hermeneutic dissection.  Regardless of the outcome of that discussion, both theoretical and 
empirical work could richly inform critical questions about how transnational organizations such as 
UNHCR (and their domestic regulatory counterparts) enshrine commitments to particular kinds of goals.   
The proposed framework suggests that such choices may be understood in part through attention to 
organizational leaders’ perceived risk associated with different interpretations of their legal mandate.
430 See Cuéllar, Tenuous Relationship, supra note__, at __.
431
 Wilson, supra note__, at 189 (“The FBI’s opposition to any involvement in narcotics investigation was 
based not only on a fear of corruption but also on a desire to avoid taking on a task already performed by 
other organizations that would then become its rivals.”).
432 MORTON HALPERIN, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY 37 (1974).
433 See Marc Tipermas, Jurisdictionalism: The Politicso f Executive Reorganization, Ph.D. Dissertation, 
Dep’t of Govt., Harvard Univ., 159 (1976)(on file with author).
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prerogative akin to the “voice” from Hirschmann’s work,434 implore others to mitigate an 
insoluble problem.435
The potential role of organizational autonomy suggests a second implication of 
the refugee security story, regarding the role of law in a context lacking traditional 
features of judicial review. Far from being some esoteric feature of international 
organizations, a number of crucial bureaucratic decisions in domestic settings also
involve legal determinations subject little or no judicial review.436  In UNHCR’s case, the 
time, energy, and resources consumed by UNHCR in articulating legal interpretations 
suggests that the law here plays distinct but interrelated functions.  It has an intimate 
connection to institutional redefinition.  Not only does it provide the organization with a 
reason to act, but it furnishes a means to justify inaction.  Legal interpretations defined 
core tasks of organizations to the world and internal work groups, making it possible for 
people to see the organization’s choices less as a discretionary act and more as a laudable 
attempt to comply with a higher mandate. The content of legal rules even served as a 
convenient scapegoat when the institutional redefinition process is no longer able to
suppress the recognition that a serious problem exists.  The debate about legal reform 
provides a convenient conduit for achieving key goals that organizational leaders and 
mid-level managers might find appealing, including the channeling of frustrations into a 
less threatening activity and signaling to key external constituencies that a problem is 
being addressed.437   Law, too, may serve as the basis for persuasive appeals to individuals 
who value compliance even in the absence of an obvious coercive mechanism.  In the 
enduring drama of refugee protection, cross a range of countries, those persuasive appeals 
were repeatedly believed by refugee advocates to have some kind of payoff in advancing 
434 See ALBERT HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970)
435
 A plausible theoretical model of this dynamic would need to encompass the following factors: (a) 
perceptions of risk of different courses of action for leaders, (b) extent to which external constituencies can 
discern the long-term implications of different conceptions of the institutional mandate, (c) professional 
and institutional constraints forcing organizations to stick to particular interpretations of law, and (d) the 
organizational lock-in phenomenon described in Part IV, supra.  Given the interplay  between strategic 
action and organizational routines in this context, an analysis of institutional redefinition would almost 
certainly benefit from drawing on two distinct strands of scholarship that are often (prematurely) treated as 
being incompatible, one rooted in political economy, the other in sociology and social cognition.   For a 
particularly cogent example of a political economy account of organizational politics, see, e.g., LAWRENCE 
S. ROTHENBERG, REGULATION, ORGANIZATIONS, AND POLITICS: MOTOR FREIGHT POLICY AT THE ICC
(1994)(persuasively demonstrating that the “capture” metaphor ill-fits the development of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission).  In contrast, Diane Vaughan draws instead from sociology and social psychology 
to provide a rich portrait of organizational decisionmaking leading to the Space Shuttle Challenger, 
showing how organizational routines and bureaucratic procedures led actors to normalize the risk of an 
inherently risky technology, thereby blinding them to the accumulating dangers of a launch like the one that 
produced the Challenger disaster.  See Vaughan. supra note__, at __.  For another cogent application of 
institutional sociology and social cognition, see Ian F. Haney López, Institutional Racism: Judicial 
Conduct and a new Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000).
436 See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion, Stanford Public Law & Legal 
Theory Working Paper (December 2005)(on file with author).
437 See Jacquemet, supra note__, at __.  The danger with all these dynamics is the same one encountered 
with the larger process of institutional redefinition they support – that the cold, hard, practical complexities 
of a problem are downplayed, that certain narrow ways of thinking about the problem are locked in, and 
that potential solutions and opportunities are not pursued.  
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their organization’s agenda.  Precisely how much respect that agenda should command 
awaits the judgment of history. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has explored the implications of two crucial characteristics of the 
modern refugee protection system.  First, in a world where asylum in industrialized 
countries is tightly rationed and a major touchstone of refugee protection is a network of 
sprawling camps in the developing world, refugee law is in large measure defined by how 
organizations and humanitarian workers use their discretion.  Second, whatever the 
merits of the normative case for refugee protection, the reality is that vulnerable 
populations fleeing persecution and violence in their home countries are routinely 
afflicted by violence and physical insecurity in the refugee camps where most of them are 
housed.  By considering both of these features together it becomes clear that security 
problems are, to some extent, inherent in the structure of the protection system itself, 
generally ignored by the core organizational actor implementing international legal 
mandates for refugee protection, and occasionally exacerbated by that actor’s role and 
that of its relief organization partners.  
There is no denying that refugee security has suffered greatly from neglect, and 
even manipulation, by powerful actors controlling the brunt of the globe’s military, 
economic, and political power.  While this reality must be acknowledged, the full story is 
more complicated.  Indeed, the very legal and institutional structure of refugee protection 
– what has given with one hand asylum and assistance to millions – has with another 
hand neglected the physical security of massive numbers of people.  Refugee advocates 
have at times ignored the chronic failure of host states to solve refugee security problems, 
and the multiple forms that those security problems take: spurred by a major power as in 
Southeast Asia, complicated by genocide and staggering human stampedes as in Rwanda, 
abetted by a host country as in Pakistan, and afflicted by rampant disorder as in Northern 
Kenya.  And the institutions that most readily “own” refugee protection have little 
incentive to set their entrepreneurial vigor towards securing ownership of the security 
problem.  Far from encouraging powerful nation states to step in, the relative neglect of 
security by refugee advocates contributes to episodes of refugee assistance plainly at odds 
with the law, as with the continued flows of resources reaching tightly militarized camps 
in the Goma region of Eastern Congo in the mid 1990s and in southern Africa in the early 
1980s.438
The people and institutions that must cope most directly with such chaos can be 
forgiven for suppressing the latent conflict between law and lending a hand.  But that
suppression comes at a cost.  In the organizational rush to disown security problems, 
potential solutions (though surely only partial ones) almost certainly go underdeveloped, 
and deep-seated problems in the current system are not fully appreciated.  Changing that 
would require refugee protection organizations to recognize what they should have
438 This observation does not imply that UNHCR or its partners are capable of assuming complete 
operational control over a spate of near-insoluble refugee security problems.  Nonetheless, if the agency’s 
identity as an operational player is to be maintained, then its mandate should either plainly expand to 
encompass critical aspects of the security problem (as it once expanded to encompass the delivery of 
material assistance), or it should be recognized as incompatible with the agency’s core legal mandate.
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grasped at the dawn of the modern era of instant cities for displaced people: sound policy 
and fidelity to the principles underlying their legal mandates requires them to become 
experts in the management of conflict within and around the camps.  This is not what 
UNHCR and its relief partners have become.  Organizations with complex legal 
mandates can, at their best, serve as a voice of conscience, even problems cannot readily 
be solved, as with the question of what to do when the states-in-exile harden their grip on 
the camps and are sustained in this by material chunks of the refugee population itself.  
Any chance of addressing that reality depends on organizational leaders taking a measure 
of risk, borne from asserting ownership over problems they cannot readily solve.  When 
organizations with difficult legal mandates assume such risk, at a minimum they help 
assure that the problems are not far from the minds of those who study, administer, fund, 
support, or judge the legal machinery purporting to perform tasks like refugee protection.
Ironically, the only thing more remarkable than the perils of continuing to ignore 
those problems is how much of the refugee protection system has managed to do 
precisely that.  The civilian and humanitarian character of asylum is no mere technicality.  
In a world where peacekeepers and responsible police are hard to come by, no one can 
expect UNHCR or its partners to conjure up security for the camps out of thin air.  
Nonetheless, sustained analysis reveals many aspects of those problems to be neither 
intractable nor impossible to solve.  Law enforcement services in the instant cities that 
refugee camps have become, for example, almost certainly depend on more than host 
country resources and desires.  The management of camp conflict is also likely to benefit 
from the existence of specialized bureaucratic units, fundraising appeals, research and 
development efforts, evaluations of security incidents across camps, and the hiring of 
expert personnel.  One payoff of this analysis is therefore to highlight the strategies 
UNHCR and its partners can pursue over time to close the gap between the High 
Commissioner’s compelling picture of the world and the more disturbing reality afflicting 
millions of refugees in Asia and Africa.  
Another payoff is decidedly bleaker.  It involves discerning what problems are not
suitable for simple fixes.  Dealing with state-in-exile situations commanding substantial
refugee support is such a problem.  No amount of wishful thinking, legal clarification, or 
technical precision will resolve this problem.  The current architecture of refugee law and 
politics ensures that, absent a miracle or a stark transformation in powerful nations’ 
conception of their own interests, a solution to this last problem will continue eluding 
refugee advocates, some of whom paradoxically insist on the contradictory goals of 
refugee self-determination and preservation of asylum’s vaunted civilian and 
humanitarian character. 
At the core of the elaborate legal machinery those advocates till is a still larger 
paradox rooted in the fact that legal mandates have an organizational logic.  Little can be 
accomplished without excluding some parts of the problem from immediate 
consideration.  But that very act of exclusion blinds organizations to the full range of 
possible solutions to legal problems.  A version of this paradox touches nearly every 
organization with an ambitious legal mandate facing complicated political environments, 
whether they are protecting a fragile ecosystem or an elaborate cyber-system. Legal 
mandates almost never get carried out perfectly by the organizations to which they are 
imparted.  Police don’t investigate crimes perfectly.  Tax collectors engage in patterns of 
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enforcement that leave certain nodes of the economy effectively untaxed.  Occupational 
safety or environmental inspectors (if they exist at all) provoke derision among some 
segments of society – and so it goes.  Part of the problem is how notoriously difficult it is 
for vital constituents to agree on what “perfectly” means.439 But another complication is 
how the organizations themselves shape their responsibilities and the world’s thinking 
about that mandate as they navigate their environment.  UNHCR’s contribution to the 
refugee protection system is an example of how that navigation plays out.  When 
organizations are given near-impossible responsibilities and resources that fall far short 
of what they need to live up to those mandates, they often redefine their task.  This 
provides more of what's easy for them to provide, less of what's not, and a distorted 
image of the underlying problem to the constituencies who may on occasion wield the 
power to nudge circumstances in a different direction.   And nothing about this is likely 
to change.   
Or is it?  Tempting as it is to end on a pessimistic note, a more nuanced 
conclusion is in order.  Somewhere in the tortured process that turns the UNHCR Statute, 
the Refugee Convention, the United Nations Charter and humanitarian law into refugee 
camps and paper guarantees, small windows of opportunity sporadically emerge for 
incremental reforms.  So it was when sexual and gender based violence became a concern 
in the mid-1980s, and when the Ladder of Options was in its heyday after the desultory 
chaos of the Great Lakes Crisis.  But those windows tend to close in the absence of the 
kind of goading by refugee advocates, or the rich troves of evaluative information, that 
can make key actors in the system rethink their interests.  What hampers these 
developments in the refugee protection world is how the present system has managed to 
assume much of the security problem away – by either pretending it’s not there, that it’s 
someone else’s problem, or that it cannot be solved.  Ultimately, whether something will 
change depends in underappreciated ways on the prospects for building organizations that 
– despite the enormity of the legal responsibility entrusted to them – learn to do 
something other than ignore their thorniest predicaments. 
 
439 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995).
